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3Abstract
In this thesis multiple approaches are presented which demonstrate the effectiveness
of mathematical modelling to the study of terrorism and counter-terrorism strategies.
In particular, theories of crime science are quantified to obtain objective outcomes.
The layout of the research findings is in four parts.
The first model studied is a Hawkes point process. This model describes events
where past occurrence can lead to an increase in future events. In the context of this
thesis a point process is used to capture dependence among terrorist attacks com-
mitted by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) during “The Troubles” in
Northern Ireland. The Hawkes process is adapted to produce a method capable of
determining quantitatively temporally distinct phases within the PIRA movement.
Expanding on the Hawkes model the next area of research introduces a time-varying
background rate. In particular, using the Fast Fourier Transform a sinusoidal back-
ground rate is derived. This model then enables a study of seasonal trends in the
attack profile of the Al Shabaab (AS) group. To study the spatial dynamics of ter-
rorist activity a Dirichlet Process Mixture (DPM) model is examined. The DPM is
used in a novel setting by considering the influence of improvised explosive device
(IED) factory closures on PIRA attacks. The final research area studied in this thesis
is data collection methods. An information retrieval (IR) tool is designed which can
automatically obtain terrorist event details. Machine learning techniques are used
to compare this IR data to a manually collected dataset. Future research ideas are
introduced for each of the topics covered in this dissertation.
4Impact Statement
The aim of the research conducted in this dissertation is to develop methods which
can quantitatively describe phenomena observed in terrorist activity. To achieve this
aim the fields of mathematical modelling and crime science have been utilised to
generate numerical insights into a range of terrorism and counter-terrorism datasets.
In particular, spatial and temporal patterns in these databases have been derived
with real-world interpretations which can be of benefit to both academics and prac-
titioners.
From an academic perspective all the research conducted in this thesis acts as
a good foundation for future studies. For example, researchers studying terrorist
groups will likely find the mathematical models which have been developed here use-
ful in a wide variety of contexts. All of the modelling techniques developed through-
out this dissertation are likely adaptable to other terrorist groups and settings. In
addition, the insights found by utilising the frameworks derived in this thesis could
prove highly beneficial to complementing qualitative and quantitative studies. An
example of complementing qualitative research in this dissertation is the use of a
Hawkes process model to quantify temporal shifts in terrorist group organisations.
These shifts were found to demonstrate gaps in current social science findings. By
forming a bridge between qualitative and quantitative research this thesis proves
useful in a wide variety of disciplines.
The research in this dissertation has also proven its academic impact via journal
publication. In 2016 research from this thesis was published in the European Journal
5of Applied Mathematics with the title “Spatio-temporal patterns of IED usage by the
Provisional Irish Republican Army”. Moreover, this research has been distributed
to a wider audience through other media. In particular, The Washington Post and
the Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics have featured articles covering
some of the research findings in this thesis. Further papers are also currently under
preparation for future publication.
As well as having a wider academic impact there is potential for the models
studied in this thesis to be used in a variety of ways by practitioners. Tackling
terrorism and constructing counter-terrorism strategies are highly important secu-
rity issues facing societies across the globe. Therefore, methods which can assist
in understanding the dynamics underpinning terrorist activity are essential. Mathe-
matical modelling can also provide an objective framework to analyse terrorist activ-
ities leading to more precise counter-terrorism measures. The research conducted as
part of this thesis provides practitioners many different ways to collect and analyse
terrorism data. Moreover, it has been shown in this dissertation that the models
presented have real-world interpretations. This linking between numerical findings
and real-world phenomena would likely prove useful to practitioners unfamiliar with
the mathematical concepts being presented.
Overall, the research covered in this thesis will likely prove useful in many different
ways. Within academia the research covered in this dissertation can provide useful
techniques to assist in future terrorism studies. On the other hand, the models, and
their practical interpretations, will likely be of benefit to practitioners aiding both
their decision making and design of counter-terrorism approaches.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
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23
1.1 Introduction
No one solution exists to tackle the problem of terrorism. However, many approaches
have been found, and are being developed, which can help build a clearer picture of
the many facets of terrorism and so yield valuable insights into how it can be reduced.
Amidst the plethora of sociological approaches a new tool is being harnessed for the
depth of understanding it can provide, namely, mathematical modelling. Applied
successfully in many other real world problems, from understanding the nature of
earthquake occurrence (Hawkes, 1971) to uncovering the spatio-temporal pathways
by which contagious diseases spread (Verity et al., 2014), mathematical modelling
offers a way to condense hugely complicated phenomena into numerical quantities
with real-world interpretations. In this dissertation it is shown that through the use
of carefully considered and context relevant mathematical models a powerful tool
can be created with the ability to numerically quantify the structural and tactical
approaches of terrorist organisations in near real time.
1.2 Motivation
As discussed by Matusitz (2013) finding a universally accepted definition of terrorism
is difficult. One definition that Matusitz states as being the most widely accepted
is that “terrorism is the use of violence to create fear for political, religious, or
ideological reasons.”
Terrorism has been a major security concern for governments around the world
24
for decades (Hanhima¨ki and Blumenau, 2013). A critical turning point in global
attitudes that brought terrorism to the forefront of modern security challenges was
the attacks of September 11, 2001 commonly referred to as 9/11. After this event
research into the many facets of terrorism garnered much more attention as govern-
ments around the world sought ways to stop terrorist attacks occurring and ensure
public safety (Chen et al., 2008). Despite this increase in research Horgan and Brad-
dock (2012) finds that whereas 80% of studies in forensic psychology and 50% of
studies in criminology use some type of statistical analysis only 25% of terrorism
studies following 9/11 utilise some kind of statistical argument. The situation ap-
pears even more strikingly in research looking at ways to tackle terrorism where Lum,
Kennedy and Sherley (2006) found that only 7 out of 20,000 terrorism studies had a
sufficient evaluation of counter-terrorism approaches. This lack of research however
seems odd particularly at a time when the digital era has produced huge quantities
of data that mathematics is best placed to analyse.
One way in which the deficit of statistics in the terrorism literature is being ad-
dressed is via the use of mathematical modelling. This field of applied mathematics
aims to create a bridge between the well developed tools and techniques that have
been developed over many years in pure mathematics and real world problems. The
use of mathematical tools to model real-world phenomena is prevalent in multiple
fields of academic research. One area in particular where modelling has been found
to yield important insights is in the study of social sciences where research in eco-
nomics (Kendall, 1968; Ostaszewski, 1993; Shubik, 1967), psychology (Bush, 1956;
Kempf and Repp, 1977; Restle, 1971) and sociology (Abell, 1971; Lenhard, Ku¨ppers
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and Shinn, 2006; Sorensen, 1978) has gained much from interpreting problems in
mathematical terms. In these fields the main outcome of studying mathematical
models is that they provide a platform where policies regarding a range of issues
from financial crisis to war and terrorism can be tested (Ball, 2012).
An emerging area where modelling has been particularly successful is the fields
of crime and security studies. As discussed by Memon et al. (2009) applied maths
proved invaluable during the Second World War from cryptography to crack and
secure communications to game theory to pre-empt opponents moves. Despite this
Memon et al. (2009) point out that government uptake of mathematical modelling for
decision making has been slow in recent times. But as data collection and availabil-
ity garners more attention by law enforcement agencies and governments the world
over new opportunities are arising to apply well developed mathematical techniques
to explore data in ways not possible previously (Johnson, Restrepo and Johnson,
2015). This approach has been successful in revealing new information about sev-
eral different event types including burglary (Bernasco, Johnson and Ruiter, 2015;
Davies and Bishop, 2013; Short et al., 2009), gang related violence (Egesdal et al.,
2010; Hegemann, Lewis and Bertozzi, 2013; Stomakhin, Short and Bertozzi, 2011),
insurgency (Arney and Arney, 2012; Braithwaite and Johnson, 2012; Farley, 2007)
and civilian deaths in conflicts (Lewis et al., 2012). The aim of these sort of studies is
to use available data, such as, times of a gang or terrorist attack, and build a math-
ematical representation which reveals the underlying forces leading to the events. It
is this ability of mathematical models to provide deep insights with relative ease that
provides the strongest case for their use. In particular, studying terrorism from the
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perspective of any academic field is difficult due to the clandestine nature of terrorist
groups who rely on secrecy in order to operate (Silke, 2001). But mathematical mod-
elling can overcome some of these barriers by making full use of open source data,
such as, times of an attack reported in a news article, to shed light on the different
components of how groups are operating.
Where mathematical modelling differs from other forms of investigation is in its
flexibility. When modelling a specific topic it is possible to incorporate the ideas of
many different theories explaining various components of the topic. Moreover, math-
ematical modelling offers an iterative method of research whereby as models reveal
new insights about existing notions these can be fed back into the model to improve
its ability to capture true underlying dynamics. In other words modelling provides
a way to both explore existing ideas and generate new ones (Epstein, 2008). This
concept is especially widespread in the use of simulation studies. Here mathematical
interpretations of the theoretical ideas surrounding terrorism can be studied using
computer programs which simulate the results of different theories. An example of
this type of approach is agent based modelling of terrorist attacks. Research con-
ducted by Park et al. (2012) examines the use of agent based modelling in the context
of simulating terrorist attacks at public venues to study how crowds might respond.
This type of model leads to the development of effective practises for emergency
response teams responding to terrorist incidents.
Another strength of using models is their predictive abilities. In particular, math-
ematical models can be used to capture the patterns of previous event data and try
to project these patterns to simulate possible future occurrences. This was the ap-
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proach taken by Clauset and Woodard (2013) when studying the probability of large
scale terrorist events. By analysing historical database of terrorist events Clauset
and Woodard were able to find a power-law distribution for the probability of a large
scale event. With this distribution it was discovered that the worldwide probability
of an attack on the scale of 9/11 since 1968 was 11-35%. Moreover, the power-law
model also indicates a 19-46% chance of a large scale attack in the next decade. From
this research Clauset and Woodard conclude that it is possible that global political
and social drivers can be used to study terrorism without the need to study localised
dynamics.
What this last example in particular shows is that there is a possibility to study
terrorism on a macro level by using mathematical models. In this thesis this idea
will be the foundation upon which all analysis is conducted. The necessary theory
behind this shift from a micro to macro level will now be explained.
1.3 Crime Science and Terrorism
Before attempting to use mathematical modelling in an applied setting it is first
necessary to understand the theoretical foundations of the problem to be studied.
In the field of crime and security studies the underlying principle which has made
modelling so successful is a shift from micro level analyses to ones on a macro level.
Attention is moved away from individual dispositions or social drivers towards an
exploration of environmental conditions which facilitate criminal or terrorist activity.
This departure from a more traditional criminological person-centred understanding
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is known as crime science. The theoretical foundations of this environmental ap-
proach are rooted in the rational choice perspective and the routine activity theory
of crime.
1.3.1 Rational Choice Perspective
This approach advocates the idea that great potential in the field of crime reduction
exists through a better understanding of the cost-benefit analysis undertaken by
offenders (Clarke and Cornish, 1985). In particular, it is argued that those who
commit crimes process information in a rational way in order to make decisions
about a particular offence, such as, what target is appropriate and at what time.
This perspective looks in detail at specific crimes and the decisions surrounding the
involvement and commission of that crime. The driving force behind each stage of
crime commission is therefore a cost-benefit analysis where maximum rewards are
aimed for at minimum cost. However, as noted by Simon (1990) human rationality
is bounded so that decision making is not assumed to be perfect. A similar theory is
also found to hold in the case of terrorism with Caplan (2006) finding that a rational
choice approach can be used to model terrorist acts.
1.3.2 Routine Activities Theory
Routine activity theory places a rationally motivated offender within an environ-
mental context and explains how these two link up and lead to crime occurrence
(Cohen and Felson, 1979). This approach to understanding crime was the result of
an observation by Cohen and Felson that a crime rise following World War II may in
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fact have been resulting from a societal transformation whereby the patterns of daily
life were being fundamentally altered triggering new opportunities for crimes to be
committed. Cohen and Felson hypothesised that crime was in fact the result of con-
vergence in space-time of offenders and targets in the absence of a capable guardian
(Brantingham and Brantingham, 1981; Cohen and Felson, 1979; Eck, 2010). As a
result of this way of thinking about how crimes are committed two key ideas emerge.
One conclusion that is obtained is that for an offence to take place an offender,
target/victim and lack of guardian must occur simultaneously in time and space.
As such several authors (Bowers and Guerette, 2014; Clarke and Eck, 2003; Cohen
and Felson, 1979; Eck, 1994; Tilley, 2012) postulate that crime prevention requires
one of three components: a handler for the offender, a manager for the place or a
guardian for the target/victim. Identifying which combination of these preventative
measures will be successful and what approaches to take is context dependent and
what works in a particular setting may not be directly applicable elsewhere (Bow-
ers and Guerette, 2014). In the work of Clarke and Newman (2006) ideas relating
to the applicability of the routine activities theory to terrorism can be found, such
as, terrorists using local knowledge to determine the best targets and locations for
attacks.
1.3.3 Crime Pattern Theory
Combining the fundamental ideas of the rational choice perspective and routine
activities theory leads to a macro level analysis of crime known as crime pattern
theory. The main hypothesis of this theory is that crimes do not occur randomly or
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uniformly but are actually the result of the combination of environmental and social
factors (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1993a). In particular, crime forms patterns
in space and/or time as a result of offenders aiming to maximise their cost-benefit
analysis within their environment of operation built from their routine activities.
Pattern theory can also be extended to the problem of terrorism. Using the same
logic that combines the rational choice perspective and routine activity theory of
crime Lafree, Morris and Dugan (2010) finds strong evidence for a patterned nature
of terrorism. Some examples of the terrorism patterns found include that 10 countries
in the study accounted for 38% of all terrorist attacks and that 32 countries were
found to have more than 75% of all attacks.
1.3.4 Crime Reduction
The motivation to formulate and apply the principles of crime science is that by
uncovering the macro level behaviour of criminals there exists great potential for
crime reduction with minimal resources. Specifically the rational choice perspective,
routine activities theory and crime pattern analysis of crime identify proximal cir-
cumstances, crime opportunities and situational factors as causes of crime (Smith
and Tilley, 2005). Therefore, by targeting these common areas which lead to crime
it is theoretically possible to make large reductions in the levels of criminal activity.
This has been shown to hold true in a number of examples including crime preven-
tion through environmental design (Atlas, 2008; Crowe, 2000; Draper and Cadzow,
2004), situational crime prevention (Clarke, 1997; Heal, Laycock and Great Britain.
Home Office. Research and Planning Unit, 1986; Smith and Cornish, 2003) and
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problem-oriented policing (Goldstein, 1990; Problem-oriented policing 2003; Scott,
2000). Application of these sort of approaches is also beginning to occur in the field
of terrorism studies (Atlas, 2003; Clarke and Newman, 2006; McGarrell, Freilich and
Chermak, 2007).
1.3.5 Patterns in Terrorism
Crime science provides the fundamental theories which motivate the study of spatial
and temporal patterns in terrorist activity. Some studies already exist looking for
these patterns and in order to provide context for this thesis background to research
in this area is now provided.
A widely studied area where temporal clustering is of interest is in the area of
human behaviour. One simple model that can be used for human activities is a
Poisson model assuming random distribution of events in time. However, in research
conducted by Baraba´si (2005) a discussion is presented highlighting that in fact
a non-Poisson model is more relevant for human behaviour modelling. Moreover,
Baraba´si argues for a more clustered nature of human events with a more accurate
model being heavy tailed with most events occurring closer together in time. This
type of idea has begun to find traction in the field of terrorism where temporal
patterns have been explored. In multiple studies (Bohorquez et al., 2009; Clauset and
Gleditsch, 2012; Clauset and Woodard, 2013; Clauset, Young and Gleditsch, 2007;
Johnson et al., 2013; Johnson et al., 2011; Picoli et al., 2014) temporal clustering has
been found with inter-event times being shown to have a heavy tailed distribution
as predicted by Baraba´si (2005).
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In addition to studies considering the temporal patterns of terrorism there has
also been advances in investigating spatial and spatio-temporal patterns. These types
of studies stem from similar ideas in crime science concerning the observation of a
contagion effect. For example, for residential burglaries Johnson and Bowers (2004)
find that following a residential burglary there is an increased risk for homes with
300-400 metres of the initial event for 1-2 months. In the context of terrorist activity
these sorts of patterns have been researched in numerous settings. In Iraq Towns-
ley, Johnson and Ratcliffe (2008) and Braithwaite and Johnson (2012) have shown
that the spatial and temporal components of insurgent activity are more clustered
than a hypothesis assuming event independence. Similarly results are reported in
the research of Lafree et al. (2012) studying the ETA (Euskadi ta Askatasuna) ter-
rorist group in Spain. It was found that the ETA group operated during two distinct
phases. During the first phase attacks were concentrated in the Basque region of
Spain. However, after the organisation shifted its focus to a war of attrition the
spatial clustering shifted outside of this region. It was also found that due to further
distances when attacking outside the Basque region the temporal length between
terrorist events increased. Spatial and spatio-temporal results suggesting a clus-
tered nature of terrorism have been observed in numerous other countries including
Afghanistan and Pakistan (O’Loughlin, Witmer and Linke, 2010; Zammit-Mangion
et al., 2012), Israel (Berrebi and Lakdawalla, 2007; Kliot and Charney, 2006), the
Northern Caucasus in Russia (O’Loughlin, Holland and Witmer, 2011; O’Loughlin
and Witmer, 2012) and the US (Cothren et al., 2008; Smith, 2008).
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1.4 Research Questions
Despite the existence of some research into patterns of terrorism there still remains
a gap in the literature for developing mathematical models of terrorist events. More
specifically, there is an opportunity for more research to be conducted into the spatial,
temporal and spatio-temporal patterns behind terrorist attacks. In this thesis these
opportunities will be seized upon by considering a range of mathematical models
which can capture clustering in terrorism data. Therefore, the first research question
that will hopefully be addressed is as follows
1. What does mathematical modelling reveal about the spatial, temporal and
spatio-temporal characteristics of terrorist attacks?
An essential component of mathematical modelling is data. In particular, if the
underlying data used in a study is inaccurate in some sense then the conclusions
drawn from models may be misleading. Hence, alongside model selection it is also
necessary to justify the data source employed in a study. In this thesis this issue
is addressed by considering the difference in outcomes using human and computer
created databases. This leads to the following research question
2. How does the method of data collection impact the mathematical models used
to study terrorism and the what implications does this have on the validity of
conclusions drawn from such models?
A principle objective in terrorism research is to derive outcomes with policy rele-
vance in the field of counter-terrorism. As such creating tools which can be used by
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academics and practitioners to gain insight about terrorist groups is important and
incredibly useful. However, there is a lack of such tools in the literature so in this
thesis a final question that will researched is
3. Is it possible to detect in real-time the behaviour of terrorist groups by using
open source data and mathematical models?
1.5 Case Studies
As with any mathematical modelling it is necessary to have a clear understanding of
the focus of the problem. In this thesis the central case studies that will be exam-
ined revolve around two terrorist groups known as the Provisional Irish Republican
Army (PIRA) and Al Shabaab (AS). For context a brief history of each of these
organisations will now be presented.
1.5.1 Provisional Irish Republican Army
There is a plethora of historical accounts concerning the origin and evolution of the
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA or Provisional IRA) (Bell, 2000; Coogan,
2002; English, 2004; Moloney, 2003; Patterson, 1997; Taylor, 1998). A summary of
these texts is provided here.
The IRA is an organisation born of the violent Easter Risings in 1916. Although
reincarnated over many years with different names arguably its most prominent
period was during “The Troubles” in Northern Ireland between 1969 until 1998.
During this period many different groups existed including the Official IRA, the Irish
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National Liberation Army, the Continuity IRA, the Real IRA and the Irish People’s
Liberation Organisation. However, it was the group known as the Provisional IRA
which was the most prolific organisation.
The main objective of PIRA was to have Northern Ireland removed from the
United Kingdom and instead have a 32 county Republic of Ireland. Initially PIRA
aimed for a quick offensive against British Forces. However, in 1977 the group realised
that a change of approach was necessary and instead PIRA began preparing for a war
of attrition. This is new objective was reflected in a publication of PIRA known as
the “Green Book” (O’Brien, 1999) which called for a “war of attrition against enemy
personnel which is aimed at causing as many casualties and deaths as possible so
as to create a demand from their people at home for their withdrawal”. According
to the sociological theory PIRA went through five distinct phases during its armed
struggle (Asal et al., 2013):
 1969-1976 - Phase 1: During this phase the organisation was arranged in
a military style consisting of brigades, battalions and companies. Within this
army structure each unit of the organisation was given responsibility for a
specific geographical area of combat.
 1977-1980 - Phase 2: A cell-based structure was adopted. This approach
was characterised by PIRA fracturing into small groups of members known
as Active Service Units (ASUs) (Horgan and Taylor, 1997). The aim of this
re-structuring was to improve the organisation’s secrecy by making it harder
to infiltrate. This change in structure was successful with 465 fewer charges
for paramilitary activity within a year (Smith, 1997). During this phase new
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leaders were also appointed for the organisation including Gerry Adams and
Martin McGuinness (Moloney, 2003).
 1981-1989 - Phase 3: This period began with the Hunger Strikes by Provi-
sional IRA members protesting against the conditions of their incarceration. A
catalyst moment during this period was the death of a PIRA member known
as Bobby Sands who had been elected to Westminster whilst in prison and died
on hunger strike (English, 2004). This incident resulted in a rise of sympathy
for PIRA and its political wing Sinn Fe´in. As a result the Republican cam-
paign moved into the political arena through the Sinn Fe´in party who now had
similar levels of prestige as their militant wing, PIRA.
 1990-1994 - Phase 4: Secret meetings occurred involving top ranking PIRA
leaders who were negotiating a ceasefire with the British Government.
 1995-1998 - Phase 5: Finally the peace talks were announced and a ceasefire
ratified in the Good Friday Agreement. For many this signalled the end of “The
Troubles”.
One of the main strengths of PIRA was its ability to develop and deploy impro-
vised explosive device (IED) attacks. In the “Green Book” it states that the group
aimed to have a “bombing campaign aimed at making the enemy’s financial inter-
ests in our country unprofitable”. In an extensive account of the evolution of IED
usage by the PIRA Oppenheimer (2009) illustrates that both the physical make-up
of the IEDs and the tactics used to employ them evolved greatly within the organ-
isation. For example, PIRA developed 15 different versions of mortar bombs with
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Oppenheimer, who is a weapons specialist, concluding about the Mark 6 mortar
that “in just over a year, the IRA mortar had developed from something relatively
primitive to an advanced weapons series”. This sentiment was further echoed by
Ryder (2005) who described the Mark 15 mortar bomb as “perhaps the ultimate im-
provised weapon.” Alongside this extensive development PIRA also improved their
tactics (Sutton, 1994) such as using secondary IED devices following initial attacks
to catch the British Forces off guard (Oppenheimer, 2009).
1.5.2 Al Shabaab
As with the PIRA the organisation in Somalia known as Al Shabaab (AS) was formed
from a complex history of events. Here a brief overview is provided giving a summary
of the accounts of Anderson and McKnight (2015a), Hansen (2013), Marchal (2009)
and Wise (2011).
The group known as Al Shabaab was initially part of a collective called the Islamic
Courts Union (ICU). After many years of fighting between warring clans in Somalia
the ICU helped by AS became a dominant force taking control of the countries
capital, Mogadishu, in 2006. Fearing a “jihad” the Ethiopian government sent troops
into Somalia in order to contain the expansion of the ICU. The Ethiopian forces had
some success in reversing the gains made by the ICU. With these gains the ICU
leaders began to retreat whilst members of Al Shabaab began launching a guerrilla
warfare campaign against the Ethiopian forces. Al Shabaab managed to frustrate the
Ethiopian efforts and this success lead to AS becoming an independent group using
IED attacks to counter the Ethiopian army. Al Shabaab’s abilities to launch attacks
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contributed to a withdrawal of Ethiopian troops in 2009. A replacement force to
counter AS was made up of Ugandan and Burundian peacekeeping forces as part of
the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). Despite a new force Al Shabaab
remained, and still remains, undefeated. Moreover, since 2010 the AS group has
become more internationally focused launching its first attack outside of Somalia in
Kampala, Uganda. Al Shabaab have also launched high profile international attacks
against Kenya following an invasion of Kenyan armed forces into Southern Somalia
in 2011 to counter AS gains (Anderson and McKnight, 2015b). High profile incidents
in Kenya include the Westgate Mall in Nairobi in 2013 in which 67 people were killed
(Williams, 2014) and an attack on the Garissa University in 2015 which resulted in
148 deaths (Lyons et al., 2015). The international dimension is further enhanced
by links between the group and al Qaeda since 2008. Furthermore, this link with
al Qaeda has led to advances in the tactics used by Al Shabaab in areas such as
assassinations, suicide bombings and IEDs (Shinn, 2011). Over the course of AS
history to date there have been three main leaders
 2006-2008: Aden Hashi Ayro (killed by a US airstrike).
 2008-2014: Ahmed Abdi Godane (killed by a US drone strike).
 2014-Present: Abu Ubeyda.
1.6 Research Methodology
Having discussed the theoretical foundations for this thesis and presented the research
questions to be studied it is now necessary to discuss the methods to be used. The
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two types of models which have been studied are the Hawkes point process and
geographic profiling. The theoretical backgrounds for each of these models is now
provided.
1.6.1 Hawkes Process
One type of mathematical model which has recently shown great potential for study-
ing security problems is known as a Hawkes self-exciting point process model. This
type of model was first discussed by Hawkes (1971) in the context of mathemat-
ical modelling of earthquake occurrences. The essential idea behind such models
is to capture the influence of past events on future occurrences. In the context of
earthquakes Ogata (1988) demonstrated that self-exciting models could be used to
understand historical ties between earthquake magnitudes thus opening up the pos-
sibility for predicting major future events. Mathematically such models are said to
capture the clustering of events in time and space where the occurrence rate of future
events depends on the occurrence of historical events (Daley and Vere-Jones, 2003).
Despite being a very useful model one of the drawbacks of the Hawkes process
was its inability to capture other influencing events. For example, in the study of
earthquakes it may be useful to consider the individual contributions of main and
aftershock earthquakes to the rate of future earthquake occurrence. An attempt at
solving this problem was touched upon in the initial exposition of Hawkes (1971)
with some work done to develop a multivariate model. Further developments to the
work of Hawkes were undertaken by Adamopoulos (1975) who expanded the analyt-
ical foundations of the multivariate model. With a multivariate Hawkes process, in
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addition to events being self-exciting, other external factors may also stimulate future
events through a method of mutual excitation. As was the case for the univariate
Hawkes process the multivariate model has also been demonstrated successfully in
the context of earthquake occurrences by Ogata, Akaike and Katsura (1982).
It is by analogy of past events stimulating future ones that has led to the ap-
plication of the Hawkes process to crime and security problems. This idea stems
from observations similar to the burglary example of Johnson and Bowers (2004)
where following a residential burglary homes within 300-400 metres were at an in-
creased risk of burglary for 1-2 months. This shows that burglary risk decays in
space and time a result found in numerous studies (Bernasco, Johnson and Ruiter,
2015; Sagovsky and Johnson, 2007; Townsley, Homel and Chaseling, 2000).
A batch of point process research which has proven particularly successful is
related to gang violence. In a student research paper by Egesdal et al. (2010) the
Hawkes process model is used to examine the retaliatory nature of gang violence
in Los Angeles. The authors discovered from this investigation that the historical
dependence of the Hawkes process outperformed a simple Poisson process. A Hawkes
process was found to capture the real world patterns of violence between pairs of
gangs. Moreover, this type of model, similar to findings in earthquake research, was
used as a predictive tool to study future violence. One of the limitations in the work
of Egesdal et al. (2010) was that only a univariate Hawkes process was employed. In
this case univariate means that only violence of one gang directed towards another
was studied neglecting the influence that fighting between multiple gangs had on
any one groups attacks. Later this research was developed using a multivariate
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Hawkes process. By a similar analogy of multiple earthquake interactions Short et
al. (2014) considered the use of the multivariate Hawkes process in the context of
multi gang violence. The additional complexity of a multidimensional model was
rewarded with further insights into the nature of gang violence in LA leading to
better policy recommendations for tackling this crime problem.
Despite these initial successes of the Hawkes self-exciting models gaps remain
in their application to security and crime science problems. One field in particular
which may have much to benefit from point process models is terrorism. By analogy
to the attacks and counter-attacks between gangs and those between security forces
and terrorist groups intuition suggests that there may be some new information to
be gained about terrorism by applying similar methods to those just discussed. Some
recent attempts in this direction have been made. In research conducted by Lewis
et al. (2012) violent civilian deaths in Iraq between 2003 and 2007 were found to
be well modelled by a Hawkes process. In particular, Lewis et al. found that as
much as 37-50% of all violent events were the result of self-excitation. Moreover,
the self-excitations that were observed were found to extend between two to six
months. From this approach precise policy relevant suggestions were obtainable
indicating ways in which a serious security problem like violence against civilians
could be negated. Another example looking at terrorist event data between 1970-
1993 in Northern Ireland by Mohler (2013) showed that the data did indeed exhibit
the property of historical dependence. Again these sort of findings can be used to
stimulate new ideas to approach the problem of tackling terrorism. Many other
studies with these and similar types of observations have been conducted including
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cases in Afghanistan (Zammit-Mangion et al., 2012), Indonesia (Porter and White,
2012), Israel and Northern Ireland (Mohler, 2013) and the Philippines and Thailand
(White, Porter and Mazerolle, 2012). The result of these studies is that point process
models which capture temporal patterns provide a better fit to terrorism data than
simple Poisson process models. This indicates that there is much to be gained from
using point process models to study temporal patterns in terrorist activity. Moreover,
another outcome of these types of studies is that even in the very difficult security
environments such as conflicts or illegal terrorist organisations it is possible to use
event data to understand underlying dynamics causing events to evolve in time and
space.
Hawkes point process models will be used in this thesis to contribute to the
research questions via the two case studies of the Provisional IRA and Al Shabaab.
In particular, the following hypotheses will be tested
Hypothesis 1 Timings of attacks by both the Provisional IRA and Al Shabaab are
past dependent, whereby, previous attacks can trigger future attacks similar to earth-
quakes and aftershocks.
Hypothesis 2 The temporal patterns of attacks by the Provisional IRA differ in
each of the organisation’s phases corresponding to structural and tactical shifts iden-
tified by social scientists.
In addition to modelling historical dependence in timeseries there can also be a
need to capture other dynamics. One particular example is the relationship between
crime occurrence and weather patterns.
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As described by Cohen and Felson (1979) crime occurs as a result of opportuni-
ties governed by environmental conditions. For example, an offender may be more
likely to commit a crime when temperatures are warmer compared to times when
there is rain. This understanding of crime through routine activities leads to the
idea that there is a great potential for reduction in criminal events by focusing on
environmental factors. For example, Cohn (1990) finds assaults, burglary, collec-
tive violence, domestic violence and rape are positively correlated with temperature.
Similarly, Pakiam and Lim (1984) reports that in Singapore crime against the per-
son increases with increasing temperature and climate comfort measures. Moreover,
Ranson (2014) elucidates a casual link between rises in multiple crime categories and
climate changes.
Extending Cohen and Felson’s routine activity approach to studying crime com-
parable results have been observed in terrorist attacks (Clauset and Woodard, 2013;
Townsley, Johnson and Ratcliffe, 2008; Zammit-Mangion et al., 2012). Also by
similarity to studies of criminal events terrorism has been shown to have cyclical dy-
namics. Enders, Parise and Sandler (1992) demonstrate that terrorist events, such
as, bombings, hostage events and assassinations have cycles ranging between 21 to
54 months. Furthermore, threat of attacks were found to have a seasonal trend of
11 months, which, the authors attribute to onset of tourism periods. More evidence
of terrorism cycles was observed by Weimann and Brosius (1988) where contagion
dynamics as well as a constant 1 month periodicity were modelled with a first-order
moving average.
To extend the literature on cyclical dynamics in terrorist attacks, and their links
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to weather patterns, in this thesis rainfall patterns will be incorporated into the
Hawkes process via a seasonal background rate. An application of this extended
Hawkes model will be to study the relationship between AS attacks and rainfall in
Somalia. In particular, Muchiri (2007) describes rainfall as the “defining character-
istic of the climate” in Somalia with two main rainfall seasons. The first season is
known as Gu and occurs between April and June. A second rainy seasons is named
Deyr and commonly appears between October and December.
As with the routine activities description of crime it may occur that AS attacks
are influenced by the onset of rainy seasons. For example, rain may make mobilising
attacks more difficult if flooding occurs. On the other hand, the availability of water
sources may provide AS with the ability to sustain attacks due to easy access to
resources. The hypothesis that will be tested to determine if rainfall influences AS
attacks is
Hypothesis 3 The temporal patterns of attacks by Al Shabaab have a 3 month cycle
corresponding to wet and dry seasons in Somalia.
The previously stated Hypotheses 1-3 concern the ability to model various ter-
rorist dynamics using the Hawkes process model. In real world situations where
counter-terrorism practitioners are attempting to disrupt and prevent terrorist at-
tacks a real-time analysis is essential. Therefore, combining the research outcomes
of using the Hawkes process model the following hypothesis will be addressed
Hypothesis 4 A Hawkes process model can be used to produce a real-time analysis
tool to study terrorist groups.
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1.6.2 Geographic Profiling
Another area of mathematical modelling which has shown potential in the field of
crime and security studies is geographical profiling (GP). As has already been dis-
cussed illegal criminal activities result from legal activities of everyday life (Branting-
ham and Brantingham, 1993a; Cohen and Felson, 1979) and that crimes occur when
three environmental aspects, offender, target and place converge (Brantingham and
Brantingham, 1981; Cohen and Felson, 1979; Eck, 2010). This motivates the idea
that by studying where in space a series of crimes are committed there is potential
to hone in on an area where the offender lives. The mathematical formulation of
this concept is GP. The idea of GP is to incorporate sociological and criminological
theory surrounding offender distance to crime into a mathematical model that allows
predictions of most likely offender locations (Rossmo, 2000). In particular, by study-
ing the spatial distribution of a series of crimes GP can be used to generate a risk
surface which when overlaid onto the map of a geographical area can indicate which
specific locations have the highest probability of being linked to a suspect. Such an
idea has important implications for law enforcement as it allows limited resources
to be targeted in the most beneficial manner. As discussed in the research of Verity
et al. (2014) GP has been adopted by a variety of law enforcement agencies as a tool
for determining the geographic location of criminals, such as, the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police, the Los Angeles Police Department and the National Crime Agency.
Moreover, GP techniques have been incorporated into several software packages for
use in criminal investigations (Canter et al., 2000; Levine, 2006; Miller, 2003).
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One of the main drawbacks of the GP model was that it only dealt with the
case of searching for a single source (O’Leary, 2009; O’Leary, 2010; O’Leary, 2012)
- the offender’s home. But in the work of Verity et al. (2014) the authors develop
the GP approach by incorporating a Dirichlet Process Mixture Model (DPMM). The
DPMM makes the extension of allowing multiple, and potentially unknown number,
of sources to be found. Moreover, Verity et al. (2014) also provide a Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) method for applying the DPMM in situations with large
datasets when the problem is otherwise numerically difficult. The mathematical
foundations of the DPMM already exist (Green and Richardson, 2001) with the
essential idea being that the model clusters data points without requiring knowledge
of how many clusters exist a priori. This type of model has been highly effective in
the field of biology where it has been used to discover multiple sources of malaria
outbreaks (Verity et al., 2014) however it has yet to be used in a major study in
crime science. Moreover, the current DPMM approach does not include a temporal
component. Therefore, there is no way at present to use the DPMM to consider how
the spatial patterns found by GP vary in time.
In this thesis the version of GP developed by Verity et al. (2014) will be used
to study spatial and spatio-temporal patterns of improvised explosive device (IED)
usage by the Provisional IRA. Specifically, the following hypotheses will be tested
Hypothesis 5 The DPMM of GP can be used to determine the locations of IED
making factories from the location of IED attacks.
Hypothesis 6 The DPMM can be used to assess the effectiveness of counter-terrorism
strategies which aim to shut down IED factories.
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Hypothesis 7 Incorporating a temporal component in the DPMM will produce new
insights into the spatio-temporal patterns of IED attacks by the Provisional IRA.
1.7 Data Issues
A major issue that has implications for the types mathematical models just discussed,
and other modelling both within the confines of academic research and beyond, is ob-
taining useful and reliable data. This issue is becoming more significant as a plethora
of digital data becomes available in an era of “big data”. A universally accepted def-
inition of big data is difficult to find (Ward and Barker, 2013) but four principle
components, known as the “four v’s” can be used as a useful way to characterise
a big data problem - volume, variety, velocity and veracity (IBM, 2015). The first
three of these v’s deal with magnitude covering the required memory for the data,
multiple data sources and rate of data production. For research purposes the final v
is of particular importance covering the need for data validity to be confirmed. In
data analysis false conclusions drawn from inaccurate data has serious implications
and thus there is a need to cross-reference data sources and collection methods in
order to have confidence in research deductions.
A method which has great potential to deal with the problems of big data is
found in a field of research known as data mining (Han, Kamber and Pei, 2012;
Larose and Larose, 2014; Wu et al., 2014). Data mining can be defined as “a set of
mechanisms and techniques, realized in software, to extract hidden information from
data” (Coenen, 2011). Since human capacity is limited the aim of data mining is to
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use computers in order to analyse large datasets. Furthermore, data mining tech-
niques are often combined with information retrieval (IR) tools. IR covers methods
of obtaining datasets. Finding ways to automate the IR process enables efficient data
analysis frameworks to be constructed. This can be incredibly useful to researchers
in a time when digital records of events are beginning to flourish.
Another area of research which can assist in the management of big data is known
as machine learning (ML). ML is an umbrella term which covers tools and techniques
developed to enable computers to derive value from data via learned structures and
patterns (Alpaydin, 2014). The two main branches of ML techniques are supervised
and unsupervised learning (Alpaydin, 2014; Masashi, 2016; Mu¨ller and Guido, 2017).
Supervised ML provides inputs and outputs for an algorithm to learn. On the other
hand, unsupervised ML provides only inputs to the algorithm. Using ML automatic
tools can be constructed to conduct data analysis. Therefore, ML can complement
and enhance data mining and IR techniques and vice versa.
One academic area in particular that can gain from all the above methods is
terrorism studies. As briefly mentioned earlier terrorist groups rely heavily on secrecy
in order to operate undetected thus making mathematical modelling of terrorist
groups inherently difficult (Silke, 2001). However, by applying data mining, IR and
ML tools to the big data available from of open sources that can be found relating to
terrorism, such as, news articles covering terrorism events, it is possible to generate
interesting research datasets and discover new insights into terrorism dynamics.
Utilising the tools and techniques of big data, data mining, IR and ML to obtain
and analyse data allows researchers to compare analytical results arising from a
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variety of data sources. In particular, comparisons can be made between computer
generated datasets and those of more traditional human built databases such as
the Global Terrorism Database (Lafree and Dugan, 2007) and the Armed Conflict
Location and Even Data (ACLED) Project (Raleigh et al., 2010). In this thesis
this idea will be taken forward by comparing the terrorism events obtained through
the different data collection methods of an online automated information retrieval
tool and the ACLED database. In particular, attacks conducted by the Al Shabaab
group will be considered. As well as contributing to the second of the research
questions discussed earlier studying the impact of different data sources will also
provide insight into the best approach for creating a real time terrorism analysis
tool. In particular, through comparison of an IR and human collated dataset the
strengths and weaknesses of each should be revealed.
In this thesis the issue of examining data collection methods will be covered in
the final research chapter. This is in opposition to the more natural approach of
discussing data retrieval prior to any modelling or analysis. The motivating reason
for this presentation stems from the exploratory nature of data collection techniques
developed in this thesis. In particular, the aim will be to demonstrate new approaches
that can be devised based on modern technological capabilities to obtain datasets.
However, since these approaches are still in early development it would be considered
unwise to rely on their usage throughout the entirety of the research in this thesis
without more in-depth studies.
The central hypothesis for the collection methods comparison is
Hypothesis 8 An automated information retrieval tool can be constructed to yield
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terrorism data comparable to a manually collated database across temporal, spatial
and event description categories.
1.8 Dissertation Structure
With the models and case study groups defined the ultimate aim of this dissertation is
to contribute to the available tools and techniques for academics and practitioners to
use to study terrorism and terrorist groups. In particular, ranging from older terrorist
groups such as the PIRA in Northern Ireland to more modern day examples such as
the AS movement in Somalia one of the primary issues faced by law enforcement and
intelligence agencies is how to understand and predict a group’s actions. It’s clear
that there are many interactive methods by which terrorist groups can be monitored
such as a variety of surveillance techniques and these are irreplaceable sources of
information. However, it would be unwise to ignore the fact that open source data
concerning the actions of terrorist groups can easily be used to shed a lot of light
on what an organisation is doing. Such a field of study is beginning to bloom but a
systematic way of looking at what such open source data actually shows is desired.
The layout of this dissertation will be in five chapters. Chapter 1 is the present
chapter which is the literature review for this thesis. In Chapter 2 a case study of the
PIRA is made. In this chapter the Hawkes process model and relevant computational
details will be provided. Moreover, two techniques will be discussed which illustrate
how the Hawkes process model parameters can be used to determine major changes
in a terrorist group’s structure based on a change point analysis of event times.
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Having analysed a Hawkes process with just a constant background rate in Chapter
2 in Chapter 3 attention will be shifted to a more responsive underlying rate of
events via the introduction of a seasonally varying Hawkes process. In addition, in
Chapter 3 a modern and ongoing terrorist group in the form of Al Shabaab will
be used as a new case study to test the wider applicability of the Hawkes process
model. Next in Chapter 4 the method of geographic profiling will be introduced in
more detail as will the computational tools necessary to use this type of model, such
as, the Dirichlet Process Mixture Model and Markov Chain Monte Carlo method.
This chapter will then move on to examine a use of GP in the context of studying
counter-terrorism strategies by looking at the consequences of bomb factory closure
on a terrorist group’s attack profile. Next in Chapter 5 an automated data sourcing
technique will be constructed which provides a real time data gathering tool. With
data derived from using this tool it will be possible to explore issues surrounding
the research impact of automated versus manual data collection methods. Finally,
in Chapter 6 all of the research findings from this thesis will be summarised and
possible areas of future research will be presented.
CHAPTER 2
HAWKES PROCESS MODELLING OF THE PIRA
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2.1 Introduction
The Hawkes self-exciting point process model is used to model events where past oc-
currences can increase the rate of future occurrences (Hawkes, 1971). This structure
of the Hawkes process made it useful in the study of earthquake modelling whereby
the relationship between main shocks and aftershocks could be captured mathemat-
ically (Ogata, 1988). Picking up on an analogy between this type of behaviour and
the retaliatory nature of gang violence the Hawkes process was then used to model
gang attacks in Los Angeles (Egesdal et al., 2010; Short et al., 2014). In this chapter
a similar theme will be continued by considering the self-exciting nature of terrorist
attacks. The mathematical details of the Hawkes process and parameter estimation
methods will be provided as well as details of how the model can be applied to
terrorist attacks. With the mathematical formulations established a case study is
then given considering improvised explosive device (IED) attacks by the Provisional
Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland. For this case study new methods will
be introduced showing how the Hawkes process can be used to determine temporal
evolutions of the PIRA over the time of its existence.
2.2 Mathematical Formulation of Point Process
Models
In general terms a temporal point process is mathematical construct which is used
to capture the properties of points in time. A common method to move from this
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abstract idea to an applied setting is to study point processes via their conditional
intensity function. In the work of Daley and Vere-Jones (2003) all the necessary
definitions and details to construct the intensity function of a point process are
provided and also summarised here.
The formulation begins by defining the counting process at time t denoted N(t)
as
N(t) =
∑
ti<t
1ti([0, t)), (2.1)
where {ti} are event times of the phenomenon being studied and 1ti([0, t)) is the
indicator function which is equal to 1 if ti ∈ [0, t) and 0 otherwise. It is also necessary
to define the history of events up to time t as
H(t) = {ti|ti < t}. (2.2)
The conditional intensity function λ(t) associated to the counting process N and
dependent on the history H can now be described as
λ(t|H(t)) = lim
δt→0
E(N(t+ δt)−N(t)|H(t))
δt
. (2.3)
Qualitatively, λ is the expected number of events that occur at each time t. Ana-
lytically this model is unique if N(t) is simple and finite. In this case simple means
that all times ti in N(t) are unique meaning ti 6= tj for i 6= j.
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2.2.1 Poisson Process Model
Before introducing the Hawkes process it is initially beneficial to consider a simpler
model known as a Poisson process (Ross, 2010). The Poisson process works by
assuming time intervals of a fixed length have a constant probability of an event.
Moreover, events described by a Poisson process are independent of the history of
past events. For the case of a Poisson process the conditional intensity is given by a
constant function
λ(t) = µ (2.4)
where µ is a positive constant.
2.2.2 Hawkes Process Model
The simplicity of the Poisson process does not allow for more complex dynamics to be
captured. This last point is particularly prominent when the data being considered
may have a past dependent nature. One possible solution to overcome this problem
is to use a Hawkes self-exciting point process model. For a dataset satisfying such a
model this means that a given event raises the chances of another event in the future.
For a given set of unique event times {ti} the conditional intensity function of
the Hawkes self-exciting process is defined as (Hawkes, 1971)
λ(t) = µ+ k0
∑
t>ti
g(t− ti), (2.5)
where the response function g is defined as g(t) = ωe−ωt in this thesis. Other forms
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for g are also possible (Hardiman, Bercot and Bouchaud, 2013; Mitchell and Cates,
2009; Ogata, 1999; Rambaldi, Pennesi and Lillo, 2015; Wang, Bebbington and Harte,
2010). Here the form of g employed by Egesdal et al. (2010) and Lewis et al. (2012) is
used based on the success of (2.5) to model violent conflicts. The right hand side of
this model can be understood in terms of the three parameters (µ, k0, ω). The first is
the background rate µ which simply describes the average rate of event occurrence.
Next is the jump factor k0. This component indicates the rate increase of events
following a past event with large values implying the underlying process is highly
reactive to new event occurrences. Finally the value of ω controls the decay rate
after a rise in the event rate. As this value occurs in the exponent the higher its
value the shorter the timespan of influence an event has on future events. Moreover,
as Lewis et al. (2012) explain the inverse parameter ω−1 describes the average time
period over which an increased rate of events occurs.
Some assumptions need to be made for the model and its parameters to be correct
mathematically and make sense in a real-world setting. Since the Hawkes process is
dependent on the infinite past, events outside of the observation period could lead
to incorrect results. Therefore, Rasmussen (2013) explains that the event times {ti}
should be measured from time zero. Practically determining the start of events can
be difficult and this issue will be addressed in more detail in Section 2.5.
For the conditional intensity function to be unique the event times must also be
unique with ti 6= tj for i 6= j (Daley and Vere-Jones, 2003). How this assumption can
best be met is context dependent and for each dataset introduced in this dissertation,
and studied using the Hawkes process, a description of the data cleaning performed
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will be provided. Essentially all methods of handling this assumption rely on some
sort of timestamp randomisation as in Bowsher (2007). For event times which are
measured as positive integers the simplest form of randomisation is to differentiate
between two identical timestamps by adding a random number taken from a uniform
distribution over the interval (0, 1) as applied in this thesis.
In the work of Lewis et al. (2012) an assumption is made that the parameter
values should all be positive. This assumption ensures that the interpretations of
the model parameters provided earlier make sense in a real-world application. It is
immediate that the background rate µ should satisfy this criteria since the lowest
number of events is zero. It is possible that the jump factor k0 can be negative
producing a self-inhibiting effect as discussed in the work of Reynaud-Bouret and
Schbath (2010), however, this case will not be considered in this thesis. The Hawkes
process is such that following an event occurrence there is an increase in the rate of
new events. Since it is unreasonable to expect such an increase to persist over an
indefinite period of time the condition that ω ≥ 0 also makes sense.
According to the work of Hawkes and Oakes (1974) if µ > 0 and
0 <
∫ ∞
0
g(t)dt < 1 (2.6)
there exists a unique Hawkes process for the event times {ti}. For the case of the
self-exciting response function this condition becomes
∫ ∞
0
ωe−ωtdt = 1. (2.7)
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Therefore, the Hawkes process is well-defined if, and only if, 0 < k0 < 1.
Another interesting result in the work of Hawkes and Oakes is to express the
Hawkes process as a branching ratio. If the above conditions on the response function
hold then the process is stationary. This means that given a long history the process
is time invariant. Mathematically this is expressed as
E(λ) =
µ
1− ∫∞
0
g(t)dt
. (2.8)
With this branching ratio interpretation the Hawkes process can be described as
having parent events occurring at rate µ each with a probability of having offspring
determined by the response function g (Rasmussen, 2013). Each offspring also has a
chance of further offspring. However, the assumption (2.6) ensures that the process
is non-explosive.
2.3 Parameter Estimation
To find the parameters of the intensity function for the Hawkes process a technique
known as maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) can be employed (Ozaki, 1979).
The aim of this method is to find parameters which maximise the loglikelihood
function. For a set of event times {ti}Ni=1 the loglikelihood is given by (Rubin, 1972)
log L({ti};µ, k0, ω) =
N∑
i=1
log(λ(ti))−
∫ T
0
λ(t) dt, (2.9)
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where T is the end time of the observation period commonly taken to be the last
event time T = tN (Ozaki, 1979).
In the work of Ozaki (1979) and Ogata (1981) it has been shown that the pa-
rameter set {µ, k0, ω} which maximises (2.9) is a good approximation to the true
parameters of the underlying Hawkes process. Heuristically, the loglikelihood func-
tion can be considered as a comparison method. In this case the comparison is
between the value of the intensity function at event times, the first term, and the
value of the function at all times in the time interval considered, the second term.
Therefore, when maximising the loglikelihood the parameters which give the best
representation of the actual event data are found.
The first term on the right hand side of this equation can be substituted directly
from (2.5). For the second term the integral can be simplified as follows
∫ T
0
λ(t)dt =
∫ T
0
µ+ k0
∑
ti<t
ωe−ω(t−ti)dt (2.10)
= µT + k0
∑
i
∫ T
0
ωe−ω(t−ti)1{t>ti}dt (2.11)
= µT + k0
∑
i
∫ T
ti
ωe−ω(t−ti)dt (2.12)
= µT + k0
∑
i
[−e−ω(t−ti)]T
ti
(2.13)
= µT + k0
∑
i
[
1− e−ω(T−ti)] . (2.14)
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Substituting this result in (2.9) yields the full form for the loglikelihood as
log L =
N∑
i=1
log
µ+ k0 ∑
ti>tj
ωe−ω(ti−tj)
+ k0 (e−ω(T−ti) − 1)
− µT. (2.15)
As was noted by Liniger (2009) this form of the loglikelihood can be improved to get
a faster computational time by observing that
λ(ti) = µ+ k0
∑
ti>tj
ωe−ω(ti−tj) (2.16)
= µ+ k0
 ∑
ti−1≤tj<ti
ωe−ω(ti−tj) +
∑
tj<ti−1
ωe−ω(ti−tj)
 (2.17)
= µ+ k0
ωe−ω(ti−ti−1) + e−ω(ti−ti−1) ∑
tj<ti−1
ωe−ω(ti−1−tj)
 (2.18)
= µ+ k0ωe
−ω(ti−ti−1) + (λ(ti−1)− µ) e−ω(ti−ti−1). (2.19)
With this recursive method the first term on the right hand side of (2.15) can be
calculated more efficiently thus improving computational speed.
There are a variety of methods by which the maximisation of this function can
be achieved. For this dissertation the Python programming language has been used
with the Scipy Optimize (SciPy Optimize 2015) routines being employed to find the
optimal parameter set. It should be mentioned at this point that the routines pro-
vided in Scipy Optimize search for the minimum of a function and so the equivalent
mathematical problem of finding the parameters which minimise − log L was under-
taken. Both the “Nelder-Mead” and “differential evolution” methods were found to
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work well for finding the Hawkes process parameters.
The Nelder-Mead method of optimisation relies on a downhill simplex approach
(Nelder and Mead, 1965). For this method a moving polytope is considered. At
each stage of the minimisation the function is evaluated on the polytope with the
shape shifting according to where the lowest function value is obtained. This pro-
cess continues until the polytope contracts sufficiently to declare convergence of the
algorithm. An advantage of the Nelder-Mead algorithm is that it relies only on func-
tion calculations and not derivatives which can be complicated or even impossible
to compute. However, a drawback of the Nelder-Mead method is that it is a local
minimisation technique. Therefore the algorithm must be run multiple times starting
at different points to find the optimal solution.
Published by Storn and Price (1997) the differential evolution method of opti-
misation uses a set condition to compare possible minimising values and find the
optimum solution. In particular, a set of possible solutions is created and the algo-
rithm moves around the function domain by combining these possible solutions. If
one of these combinations is found to provide a lower function value then it is included
in the set of possible solutions. This process continues until convergence is reached.
Similar to the Nelder-Mead method the differential evolution approach relies only on
function evaluations and hence there is no need to try and compute derivatives. The
differential evolution approach can search a large space of possible solutions with the
hope of finding a global minimum although this is not guaranteed. The differential
evolution method in Python also requires user specified bounds on each parameter.
In this thesis the bounds that were set were µ ∈ [0, 1], k0 ∈ [0, 1], ω ∈ [0, 10]. The
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bound on µ follows from the fact that the event data used was measured according to
the day of event so the background rate should not be more that 1 per day. As dis-
cussed earlier a mathematical condition exists on k0 limiting it to the range [0, 1) to
ensure the model is well-defined. Since ω−1 is the average length of time over which
a series of attacks decays for data on the scale of day of event, as in this thesis (see
Section 2.5.1), we require ω ≤ 1. However, to ensure that the decay in the Hawkes
process is exponential a cut-off of 10 was decided in the search space of the parameter
ω since higher values would imply the response function is sufficiently small to be
deemed 0. In cases were the response function is deemed to be 0 the conditional
intensity function becomes a Poisson process with a constant background rate. The
observation was also made that for datasets with more than 500 points the differen-
tial evolution algorithm found the minimising parameters of the loglikelihood in one
run. With datasets less than 500 entries multiple algorithm runs were undertaken.
This final point was especially relevant when studying change points (explained in
Sections 2.5.2 - 4) where there was a need to greatly reduce code runtime.
2.4 Model Goodness of Fit
To test whether the Hawkes process with parameters obtained via the MLE is a good
fit to the original data a method known as residual analysis can be employed (Brown
et al., 2002). The aim of this test is to look for differences between the fitted model
and underlying data dynamics. The test relies on the following logic. Assume that a
set of event times {ti} are from a Hawkes process with rate function λ and compute
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the residuals using the formula
τi =
∫ ti
0
λ(t) dt (2.20)
for each i. The {τi} form the residual process. These residuals should be distributed
as a stationary Poisson process with unit rate (Papangelou, 1972). From this it can
be deduced that
Yi = τi − τi−1 (2.21)
=
∫ ti
0
λ(t)dt−
∫ ti−1
0
λ(t)dt (2.22)
=
∫ ti
ti−1
λ(t)dt (2.23)
=
∫ ti
ti−1
µ+ k0
∑
tj<t
ωe−ω(t−tj)dt (2.24)
= µ(ti − ti−1) + k0
∫ ti
ti−1
∑
tj<t
ωe−ω(t−tj)dt (2.25)
= µ(ti − ti−1) + k0
i−1∑
j=1
∫ ti
ti−1
ωe−ω(t−tj)dt (2.26)
= µ(ti − ti−1) + k0
i−1∑
j=1
[−e−ω(t−tj)]ti
ti−1
(2.27)
= µ(ti − ti−1) + k0
i−1∑
j=1
[
e−ω(ti−1−tj) − e−ω(ti−tj)] (2.28)
are exponentially distributed. This implies that
Ui = 1− exp−Yi (2.29)
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= 1− exp
(
−
(
µ(ti − ti−1) + k0
i−1∑
j=1
[
e−ω(ti−1−tj) − e−ω(ti−tj)])) (2.30)
are uniform random variables.
Hence evidence for the fit of the Hawkes process can be gained by checking
whether the Ui come from a uniform distribution. One such test is the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (KS) test (Massey, 1951). This test works by comparing the value of a test
statistic calculated via the formula (Zar, 2014)
Dn = max
k
(∣∣∣∣Uk − k − 1N
∣∣∣∣ , ∣∣∣∣ kN − Uk
∣∣∣∣) (2.31)
to a critical value Dα. Critical values can be found in many different sources of
statistical tables e.g. O’Connor and Kleyner (2012). Evidence suggesting that the
Hawkes process does fit the data is found if Dn < Dα.
Another technique which is also relevant to judging the fit of a Hawkes process
is the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) (Akaike, 1974). The AIC is a method of
comparing models applied to the same dataset. A better fitting model will have a
lower value for the AIC given by
AIC = 2k − 2 log L, (2.32)
where k is the number of model parameters and log L is the MLE. At this point it
should be mentioned that the AIC is simply a comparative tool and not a significance
test. Therefore, some simple rules of thumb are (Burnham and Anderson, 2002)
that difference of AIC value of 0− 2 suggests little difference between models, 4− 7
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moderate evidence for difference, > 10 strong evidence for model difference.
2.5 Applying the Hawkes Process
In this section the techniques that have been outlined at the start of this chapter
will be applied to study IED attacks by the Provisional IRA.
2.5.1 IED Data
Before applying the Hawkes process model it is first necessary to have an overview
of the data being used. For this thesis the data studied was collected as part of a
research project by Asal et al. (2013). The database used consists of information
about IED attacks committed by the PIRA between 1969-1998. Details of the event
fields in this database that are relevant to this thesis are provided in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: PIRA IED Dataset Event Fields
Field Values
Date Year (1970-1998)/Month (1-12)/Day (1-31)
Location {Antrim, Armagh, Belfast, Derry, Down, Fermanagh, Tyrone}
Target {Political, Military, Police, Paramilitary,
Government, Transport, Civilian, Foreign}
Since the temporal scale of the data is day of event an important processing step
that was undertaken with this data was to ensure that the event times were unique
as discussed in Section 2.2.2. One way this could have been achieved would be to
simply take the first occurrence of each timestamp and discard duplicates. However,
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this approach risks removing a large amount of data. A better option that was
employed for this thesis was to take account of the additional spatial information
in the database. In particular, each IED event time also had details of the county
where the event took place. Therefore, when two timestamps were equal and in
the same county the event was recorded only once. On the other hand, if two
timestamps were equal but the counties where the event occurred were different
then the timestamps were distinguished via the addition of a random number from
a uniform (0, 1) distribution as in Bowsher (2007). For this purpose Belfast was
considered as a separate county. This is justified by looking at the command and
functional structure of the PIRA which reveals that at the county and Belfast levels
IED attacks were fairly autonomous (Horgan and Taylor, 1997).
2.5.2 Change Point Detection
The foundation for the research conducted in this thesis is a masters degree submit-
ted by Tench (2014). In this masters degree the IED event database was studied via
the Hawkes process. The method used was to separate the database according to
the five phases of PIRA activity outlined in Section 1.5.1. The Hawkes process was
then applied directly to the data corresponding to each phase. One of the problems
with this approach however was that no investigation was made concerning how to
manage the past dependence of the Hawkes process. In particular, as pointed out by
Rasmussen (2013) if events occur outside the dataset being studied the parameters of
the Hawkes process may not truly reflect the underlying dynamics. Therefore, when
dividing the dataset into the five phases it is necessary to study the influence of the
67
events in past phases on future ones. This is especially relevant because the sociolog-
ical timings marking the start of each phase may not be the same as mathematically
determined boundaries. This leads to the idea of change point detection studied in
the remainder of this chapter where properties of the Hawkes process will be used to
study mathematically when the changes in the phases of the PIRA occurred. Two
novel approaches have been designed in this thesis to study these change points.
2.5.3 Change Point Analysis Based on Sociological Bound-
aries
The first approach that will be used to study change points in the IED data is one
developed and published by the author of this thesis (Tench, Fry and Gill, 2016) (see
Appendix A). The method used is to consider the sociological boundaries in pairs
and observe how far the influence of one phase extends into the next. Specifically
for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} consider phases i and i + 1. Then step one is to compute
the MLE parameters of phase i + 1. Next the final point of phase i is added to
i+ 1 and the MLE parameters of this new dataset is calculated. This previous step
is then repeated with the last two points in phase i added to phase i + 1 and so
on until the MLE parameters for the combined dataset of phases i and i + 1 are
computed. To determine where a phase change has occurred the residual analysis
test as described earlier is used. For each of the parameter sets obtained the KS
test statistic Dn is calculated and compared to the KS critical value Dα for that
particular dataset. For significance it is necessary that Dn < Dα. Hence a greater
positive difference ∆ = Dα − Dn provides more evidence that the model is a good
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fit for the data. Therefore, the dataset yielding this greatest difference is viewed as
the most accurate representation of the past dependence of phase i+ 1 into phase i.
Using this KS test method the mathematical boundaries between the phases
are found to be as in Table 2.2. Corresponding to the new boundaries are model
parameters in each phase and details of their goodness of fit as provided in Table
2.3. From Table 2.3 it can be seen that the models found all have significant fits
under the KS test at the 95% level except the model in phase 1. Also in Table
2.3 are the results of applying a simple Poisson process as a comparison to the more
complex Hawkes process model. The AIC comparisons show that the Hawkes process
outperforms the Poisson process in all five phases.
Further to the quantitative results in Figures 2.1-2.4 are graphs illustrating how
the parameters {µ, k0, ω} and ∆ = Dα −Dn values change for each consecutive pair
of phases. It is also interesting to note some of the trends which appear in these
figures. The graphs in Figure 2.1 are relatively flat indicating that the dynamics
present in phase 2 extend quite far into phase 1. However, in Figure 2.2 there is a
less distinct pattern suggesting much greater variability in the dynamics in phases
2 and 3. In contrast in Figure 2.3 there is a trend appearing after the identified
change point. This implies that a Hawkes process corresponding to a dataset using
the mathematical boundary has similar characteristics to a Hawkes process found
from the dataset of phases 3 and 4 combined. In particular, this would suggest that
mathematically these phases are very similar and potentially could exist as a single
phase. In Figure 2.4 there is again a less distinctive pattern suggesting quite different
dynamics between phases 4 and 5.
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Figure 2.1: Figure (a) shows the values of ∆ = Dα−Dn for each point added from phase 1 to phase
2. Figures (b)-(d) show the corresponding changes in the MLE parameter values. The vertical line
indicates the change point between the phases as determined by maximising ∆ = Dα − Dn. The
x-axis runs backwards in time representing each new pointed added from phase 1 to phase 2.
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Figure 2.2: Figure (a) shows the values of ∆ = Dα−Dn for each point added from phase 2 to phase
3. Figures (b)-(d) show the corresponding changes in the MLE parameter values. The vertical line
indicates the change point between the phases as determined by maximising ∆ = Dα − Dn. The
x-axis runs backwards in time representing each new pointed added from phase 2 to phase 3.
71
(a)
−0.015
−0.010
−0.005
0.000
0.005
0.010
∆
(b)
0.04
0.08
0.12
0.16
µ
(c)
0.55
0.65
0.75
0.85
k0
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
(d)
Number of Data Points
0.025
0.035
0.045
0.055
0.065
ω
Figure 2.3: Figure (a) shows the values of ∆ = Dα−Dn for each point added from phase 3 to phase
4. Figures (b)-(d) show the corresponding changes in the MLE parameter values. The vertical line
indicates the change point between the phases as determined by maximising ∆ = Dα − Dn. The
x-axis runs backwards in time representing each new pointed added from phase 3 to phase 4.
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Figure 2.4: Figure (a) shows the values of ∆ = Dα−Dn for each point added from phase 4 to phase
5. Figures (b)-(d) show the corresponding changes in the MLE parameter values. The vertical line
indicates the change point between the phases as determined by maximising ∆ = Dα − Dn. The
x-axis runs backwards in time representing each new pointed added from phase 4 to phase 5.
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Table 2.2: Change Point Analysis Results with KS Test Method Boundaries
Phase Number of Data Points Added New Boundary Original Boundary
1 - 27/01/1970 27/01/1970
2 11 24/10/1976 01/01/1977
3 11 22/08/1980 16/01/1981
4 494 11/04/1984 02/01/1990
5 41 22/05/1994 07/01/1995
Table 2.3: Parameters with KS Test Method Boundaries
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5
Model 0 µ 0.3020 0.2541 0.2250 0.3028 0.0957
AIC 3359.6 1784.4 3834.3 5190.5 1079.7
Model 1 µ 0.0543 0.1721 0.0800 0.0597 0.0270
k0 0.8241 0.3233 0.6529 0.8040 0.7231
ω 0.0542 0.7685 0.0426 0.0316 0.0901
KS Test 0.0686 0.0528* 0.0465* 0.0343* 0.0455*
KS Critical 95% 0.0492 0.0701 0.0490 0.0396 0.1072
KS Critical 99% 0.0590 - - - -
AIC 3083.7 1717.6 3750.5 5004 987
* Significant at 95% level.
2.5.4 Change Point Analysis Independent of Sociological Bound-
aries
The previous section described a method which uses sociologically defined boundaries
as a starting point to find mathematical boundaries working backwards between pairs
of phases. A different approach to finding the mathematical change points for the IED
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database is to consider the problem without using prior knowledge of the sociological
bounds. Previously the change between phases 1 and 2 was found starting at the
sociologically defined boundary for phase 2 and working backwards through phase 1.
However, this condition may conceal the fact that the best boundary mathematically
between the two phases occurs after the sociologically determined start of phase 2.
In this case an algorithm is required which looks at all possible positions for the
change point and returns the optimal value.
One possible method is to use a brute force approach whereby a test statistic is
employed to examine the set of all possible change point combinations and determine
which set is optimal (Ross, 2015). This approach can be undertaken using the AIC.
After a specific change point is identified two datasets are created corresponding the
data either side of the point. The Hawkes process model is then fitted to each of
these datasets and the AIC for each model is computed leading to two values AIC1
and AIC2. The total AIC can then be defined as the sum AIC1+AIC2. The total
AIC is then the test statistic through which different change points are compared.
Since lower values of the AIC imply a better model fit, after checking each change
point in this way the result yielding the lowest total AIC is declared as the best
change point. Although this is an effective method for small datasets, with larger
datasets it is likely that many possible combinations exist making the brute force
method computationally impossible to use.
To overcome lengthy computation times in this thesis an optimisation algorithm
was written in Python which searches the space of possible change points more
effectively. This approach can be understood as having two iteration loops. Firstly
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the routine runs an outer loop. In this case the “differential evolution” minimisation
routine of the Python package Scipy looks to minimise the total AIC. Since the total
AIC is the sum AIC1+AIC2 it is also necessary to compute the values of each of
AIC1 and AIC2. Therefore, the current change point being tested by the outer loop
is passed to the inner loop. In the inner loop the dataset is first divided into two
separate sets corresponding to the data on either side of the change point. Again
using the “differential evolution” package the Hawkes process model is fitted to each
dataset. The inner loop then ends by calculating AIC1 and AIC2 for each of the
Hawkes process models and returning the value of AIC1+AIC2 to the outer loop.
Finding the lowest total AIC then occurs by repeating this process with the algorithm
then returning the change point yielding the lowest value of AIC1+AIC2.
The method of optimising the total AIC was applied to the dataset consisting
of all data from phases 1 and 2 combined. Applying the AIC method only to two
phases was to allow for an analysis of the consistency of the results of the algorithm by
running it 50 times. No other pair of phases could be considered since the total AIC
would also depend on any previous phases due to the past dependence of the Hawkes
process. The results of these code executions are displayed graphically in Figure 2.5.
Graphs in Figure 2.5 are Gaussian kernel density estimates (KDE) of the distributions
of the parameter and AIC values for the two Hawkes process models obtained after
each code run. The Gaussian KDE is implemented in Python’s Scipy.Stats package
(Scipy.Stats 2016) and essentially fits one or more Gaussian bell shaped curves to
the data.
In general the graphs in Figure 2.5 suggest that the parameter values occur in
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two sets. Specifically, considering Figure 2.5(d) each of the AIC distributions have
two distinct peaks. However, it should also be observed that in Figure 2.5(c) some of
the ω values for the model in phase 2 are greater than one. However, since ω−1 is the
average time window over which a series of attacks occurs and the data is recorded
on a daily temporal scale we require ω ≤ 1. Removing the cases where ω > 1 and
plotting the distributions again leads to the graphs in Figure 2.6.
The graphs in Figure 2.6 reveal a much narrower distribution for the parameter
values and only one main peak for the AIC values. The action of restricting the
results to the case where ω ≤ 1 is further justified by the fact that from all the code
runs the model with the lowest total AIC satisfied this condition. The change point
corresponding to the models with the lowest total AIC is given in Table 2.4 and the
corresponding model parameters in Table 2.5. From Table 2.5 it can be seen that the
models found also have significant fits under the KS test at the 99% level. Moreover,
the Hawkes process models in both phases significantly outperform a simple Poisson
process model under the AIC comparison test. Also, in this case the model in phase
1 has a significant fit whereas the phase 1 model under the KS test method of Section
2.5.3 did not. This provides further evidence for why it is advantageous to consider
the change point problem from a different perspective.
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Figure 2.5: Graphs (a)-(c) show the distribution of the parameter values for the Hawkes process in
phase 1 (blue) and phase 2 (red) after each attempt at minimising the total AIC. Graph (d) is the
corresponding distribution of the AIC values for each of these Hawkes process models.
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Figure 2.6: Graphs (a)-(c) show the distribution of the parameter values for the Hawkes process
in phase 1 (blue) and phase 2 (red) after each attempt at minimising the total AIC and restricting
the results to the case ω ≤ 1. Graph (d) is the corresponding distribution of the AIC values for
each of these Hawkes process models.
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Table 2.4: Change Point Analysis Results with AIC Test Method Boundaries
Phase Number of Data Points Added New Boundary Original Boundary
1 -287 27/01/1970 27/01/1970
2 287 23/06/1973 01/01/1977
Table 2.5: Parameters with AIC Test Method Boundaries
Phase 1 Phase 2
Model 0 µ 0.3837 0.2426
AIC 1869.7 3153.1
Model 1 µ 0.0439 0.1717
k0 0.9074 0.2924
ω 0.0497 0.8069
KS Test 0.0724** 0.0551**
KS Critical 95% 0.0623 0.0533
KS Critical 99% 0.0746 0.0638
AIC 1657.9 1717.6
** Significant at 99% level.
For the AIC method the validity of the minimisation routine needs to be checked.
One of the ways that the models obtained can be checked is to use bootstrap sim-
ulations. The aim of this technique is to study the uncertainty associated with the
model parameter values. To achieve this the parameter values are used to simulate
event times from a Hawkes process. MLE is then applied to the simulated times to
obtain their corresponding Hawkes process parameter values. Finally the distribu-
tion of the simulated parameter values are analysed. The bootstrap methodology
can be summarised as follows (Embrechts, Liniger and Lin, 2011)
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1. Simulate the Hawkes process 1000 times over the interval [0, T ] where T is the
time of the original final observation. Each run of the simulation is required
to produce a set of event times {t1, ...tN} where N is the length of the original
dataset.
2. Compute the MLE parameters for each simulated dataset.
3. Analyse the statistical properties of the resulting parameters.
A common simulation technique used for Hawkes process models is Ogata’s Thin-
ning Algorithm (Lewis and Shedler, 1979; Ogata, 1981). The basic idea behind this
algorithm is to simulate a homogeneous Poisson process and decide whether or not
to keep a point based on the Hawkes process intensity function λ. The algorithm
below is based off of the work presented in Ogata (1981). To make the algorithm
realistic the same number of points as in the original dataset are generated.
The final result of this algorithm is a set of simulated event times {t1, ..., tN} with
N being the length of the original dataset.
Statistical analyses of the results of applying the bootstrap method to the models
in phases 1 and 2 are provided in Tables 2.6 and 2.7. In Figure 2.7 the distributions
of the bootstrap parameters are provided.
These observations provide strong evidence that the Hawkes processes found for
each phase are well-defined. From the descriptive statistics we see that the means of
the simulated parameter values are close to the actual parameters and the associated
standard deviations are relatively small. The ranges of the simulated parameters
suggest some extreme values were found but, as can be seen from Figure 2.7, these
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Set λ∗ = µ and s = 0.
Generate a random number U from a uniform([0, 1]) distribution and set u =
− log ( 1
λ∗
)
U .
if u <= T then
Set t1 = u.
else
Stop.
Set n = 1 and λ∗ = λ(tn|t1, ..., tn−1).
while n < N − 1 do
Generate a random number U from a uniform[([0, 1]) distribution and set u =
− log ( 1
λ∗
)
U .
Set s = s+ u.
if s > T then
Stop.
else
Generate a random number U from a uniform([0, 1]) distribution.
if U ≤ λ(s|t1,...,tn−1)
λ∗ then
Set n = n+ 1, tn = s and λ
∗ = λ(tn|t1, ..., tn−1) + k0
else
Set λ∗ = λ(s|t1, ..., tn−1).
extrema are rare. The graphs in Figure 2.7 also demonstrate graphically that the
simulation results are densely clustered around the original MLE parameters. This
suggests a low level of uncertainty regarding the parameter values of the original
Hawkes process models.
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Figure 2.7: Graphs (a)-(c) show the distribution of the simulated parameter values for the Hawkes
process in phase 1 (blue) and phase 2 (red). The parameters have been simulated from the Hawkes
process models in phases 1 and 2 as defined by the AIC method for determining boundaries. The
vertical lines represent the original model parameters.
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Table 2.6: Phase 1 Bootstrap Statistics
Parameter Mean Standard Deviation Range
µ 0.0757 0.0013 0.3558
k0 0.8272 0.0035 0.6493
ω 0.0531 0.0167 0.1511
Table 2.7: Phase 2 Bootstrap Statistics
Parameter Mean Standard Deviation Range
µ 0.1734 0.0116 0.0756
k0 0.2882 0.0391 0.2353
ω 0.8393 0.1862 1.5967
2.6 Interpreting Phase Boundaries
In Sections 2.5.3 and 2.5.4 two methods to determine change points in temporal se-
ries of terrorist attacks have been constructed and applied to PIRA IED data. The
results of these analyses have indicated that there exists a difference between the
phase changes of PIRA found qualitatively in social science research and the bound-
aries found using quantitative methods. In particular, Figure 2.8 demonstrates the
change in the distribution of events between the phases for the original, KS and AIC
boundaries. The discrepancies between the qualitative and quantitative boundaries
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Figure 2.8: Distribution of IED events between phases under the original phase boundaries (blue),
KS method boundaries (orange) and AIC boundary (red).
warrants further consideration to understand the origins of these differences.
For the KS method of determining phase boundaries in Section 2.5.3 all of the
phases of PIRA were analysed. It was discovered that phases 2 and 3 only required
11 points from their prior phases to yield the best model fits. In addition, these extra
points only moved the temporal boundaries by 2 months for phase 2 and 4 months for
phase 3. From these observations we can conclude that the social science boundaries
observed for these two phases are approximately consistent with the quantitative
findings. Furthermore, since it is unreasonable to expect that an organisation like
PIRA can shift its entire operations and organisational structure instantly the delays
found in Section 2.5.3 seem reasonable.
The main differences between the research findings of Section 2.5.3 and the social
science phase boundaries occur in phases 4 and 5. In phase 4 an additional 494 points
were required to find the best fitting model. These extra points were equivalent to
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shifting the start of phase 4 backwards by almost 6 years. During the literature
review at the beginning of this thesis an overview of the evolution of PIRA was
provided in Section 1.5.1. Here it was described that phase 4 marked a shift in
PIRA towards political engagement with the British Government via secret channels
of communication. Phase 4 was also preceded by phase 3 which Moloney (2003)
describes as one of escalating violence similar to the “Tet Offensive” launched by the
People’s Army of Vietnam in 1968. As stated in the observations about the change
in phase boundaries for phases 2 and 3 organisational changes are unlikely to occur
instantly. Moreover, since the negotiations in phase 4 were secret the wider PIRA
cadre would likely not have known of their existence. Therefore, the large changes
observed in the phase 4 boundaries indicate that we should consider phase changes
as fluid. In particular, phases 3 and 4 could have been occurring in parallel and
delineating them via a sequential boundary is inaccurate.
A similar observation for the phase boundary in phase 4 explains the result found
for the boundary between phases 4 and 5. Specifically, phase 5 required 41 data
entries from phase 4 corresponding to a shift in temporal boundary of close to 1
year. In Section 1.5.1 it was stated that the secret peace talks between PIRA and
the British Government were announced and ratified in the Good Friday Agreement
in phase 5. As before here we observe the fluid nature of temporal boundaries
and their ability to occur in parallel. As noted by Coogan (2002) PIRA had the
ability to “turn ... bombing[s] on and off like a tap”. Therefore, as ceasefire terms
came to conclusion PIRA may have selectively used IED attacks to negotiate better
terms. In addition, some PIRA members may have been reluctant to accept an end
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to violence given that recruits were instructed to wage a “war of attrition against
enemy personnel which is aimed at causing as many casualties and deaths as possible
so as to create a demand from their people at home for their withdrawal” (O’Brien,
1999).
For the second approach to finding phase changes in Section 2.5.4 an AIC method
was introduced. For this method only the phase boundary between phases 1 and 2
was considered due to computational restraints. From the AIC method it was found
that 287 points needed to be added from phase 1 to phase 2. This result corresponded
to a shift backwards in the temporal boundary, from the social science boundary, by
3.5 years. In contrast to the KS method, when using the AIC method a tradeoff
is made to decide the best boundary for both phases simultaneously. As stated
in the overview of PIRA in Section 1.5.1 phase 1 was characterised by a military
structure. However, this organisational approach was susceptible to infiltration by
British security forces. Therefore, in phase 2 PIRA split into a cell-based structure
consisting of small groups known as Active Service Units. This new structure aided
the PIRA in keeping its operations secret and protecting its member’s identities. The
results of the AIC phase change analysis suggest that PIRA members may have been
making a shift to increased secrecy at an earlier time. In particular, changing the
entire structure of an organisation like PIRA would not be instantaneous. Moreover,
PIRA may have wanted to move to a new structure slowly to avoid detection of
the shift by British security forces. Therefore, it can be observed that a similar
observation is made to the findings found for the KS test method. Specifically,
terrorist groups evolve over time in response to external stimuli. Hence, a shift in
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understanding phase changes is required to consider them as gradual processes which
can overlap and occur simultaneously.
2.7 Interpreting Model Parameters
Mathematical modelling in general is motivated by the opportunities it provides to
yield insights about real-world dynamics. One of the ways insight can be obtained
for the Hawkes process is through studying the MLE parameters of the model. In
particular, the intensity function of the Hawkes process is specified via three param-
eters {µ, k0, ω}. Each of the parameter values obtained via MLE can be interpreted
in terms of the events being modelled. In the context of this thesis it is of interest
to study what the parameters imply about the timings of IED attacks by PIRA and
how these timings relate to the tactical and structural evolution of the organisation.
First the parameters obtained using the KS method for boundary determination will
be discussed. These parameters will then be compared to the ones obtained via the
AIC method for boundary determination.
2.7.1 KS Method Parameters
To interpret the meaning of the value of ω it is first useful to recall that the inverse
ω−1 indicates the average length of time over which a series of attacks decays (Lewis
et al., 2012). In phase 1 the inverse of ω satisfies 1
0.0542
= 18.5 days. Following
this in phase 2 the value of ω increases producing a smaller average attack window
of 1.3 days. This change in the average attack window can be related back to the
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sociological and historical observations of the PIRA. In particular, it is discussed in
the work of Asal et al. (2013) that in phase 1 of the PIRA the organisation adopted
a militaristic structure. However, this particular organisational structure made the
PIRA susceptible to infiltration by British security forces. Therefore, in phase 2 the
PIRA re-organised their structure instead opting for a cellular strategy made up of
Active Service Units (ASU) (Horgan and Taylor, 1997). This cell based approach
saw the PIRA break into small groups meaning any potential informers could be
quickly identified. The shift in structure was successful at limiting the security forces
abilities to place informers within the PIRA with Smith (1997) reporting there were
465 fewer charges for paramilitary activity within a year. By comparing these two
different organisational structures the dynamics which led to the observed changes
in the value of ω can be explained. In particular, with a military hierarchy in phase
1 it may have been easier for the PIRA to carry out a sustained wave of attacks.
Whilst in phase 2 with a more fragmented organisation sustained attacks may have
been harder to achieve.
In phase 3 the average length of attacks becomes 23.5 days. This period is de-
scribed by Moloney (2003) as one of escalating violence similar to the “Tet Offensive”
launched by the People’s Army of Vietnam in 1968. This is reflected in the PIRA
issued Green Book discussing the organisations aims and objectives. PIRA wanted
a “bombing campaign aimed at making the enemy’s financial interests in our coun-
try unprofitable” and to wage a “war of attrition against enemy personnel which is
aimed at causing as many casualties and deaths as possible so as to create a demand
from their people at home for their withdrawal” (O’Brien, 1999). These objectives
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are being reflected in the longer length of an average attack window.
For the final two phases of the organisation the trend is for ω to increase resulting
in shorter lengths of time for waves of attacks. For phase 4 the average attack window
is 31.6 days and this falls in phase 5 to 11.1 days. During the final two phases the
leadership of PIRA was conducting secret negotiations with the British Government
to end hostilities (Coogan, 2002; English, 2004; Moloney, 2003). However, during this
time the PIRA wanted to demonstrate their attack capability in order to strengthen
their negotiating position. As noted by Coogan (2002) PIRA had the ability to
“turn ... bombing[s] on and off like a tap”. The PIRA’s flexibility in IED attacks is
represented in the shortening of the average time window as the focus of bombings
was as a bargaining tool rather than for a war of attrition.
Similar to the values of ω the parameter µ can also be related to actual observa-
tions about the PIRA. The parameter µ represents an underlying background rate
at which new events occur. Moving from phase 1 to phase 2 the value of µ increases.
Explained previously this change of phase saw the PIRA move from having a mili-
taristic structure to a cellular based structure consisting of ASUs. Therefore, with
less control within the fragmented organisation the ASUs may have been carrying
out attacks more randomly resulting in an increase in the value of µ.
The final three phases show a declining trend in the values of µ. In phase 3 it
has been discussed that at a strategic level PIRA moved towards a “Tet Offensive”
campaign characterised by a renewed emphasis on bombings. Therefore, it is possible
that to make this approach successful attacks were becoming more systematic as well
as occurring in succession. Thus there would have been less randomness in the IED
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attacks explaining the decline from phase 2 to phase 3 in the value of µ.
For phases 4 and 5 the leadership of the organisation was focused on negotiations
with the British Government to end the conflict in Northern Ireland. Hence these
two periods had an overall de-escalation of violence. This is precisely the trend found
in the values of the parameter µ where the background rate of events decreases.
The values of the final parameter k0 across the five phases of the PIRA also
demonstrates trends related to actual events. This parameter describes the magni-
tude of increase in the intensity of events following an initial incident. The highest
value of k0 is found in phase 1. Since this was the military phase of PIRA in phase
1 coordinating attacks would have been easier for the organisation. Therefore, gen-
erating a sequence of IED attacks would have been more likely in this phase. In
phase 2 however the cellular structure emerged. Hence coordinating multiple attacks
may have been hindered which is demonstrated by a decline in the value of k0. In
the next phase the “Tet Offensive” strategy was used and hence ASUs could have
been instructed to launch more IED attacks. Thus a rise in the value of k0 can be
observed in phase 3. Finally in phases 4 and 5 the main focus of events was negoti-
ations between PIRA and the British Government. During these phases the aim of
IED attacks was to strengthen the position of PIRA at the negotiating table. The
high values of k0 in phases 4 and 5 could be representing PIRA using IEDs as a
bargaining tool as described above.
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2.7.2 AIC Method Parameters
To reduce computational time it was only possible to consider the AIC method for
change point detection between phases 1 and 2. However, the resulting models, in
Table 2.5, can still be compared to those from the KS method, in Table 2.3. For
both phases 1 and 2 the magnitudes of the parameter values are the same for both
methods. In particular, each of the parameter values resulting from the AIC method
are close to those from the KS method. Moreover, the trends in the parameter
values are the same. A similar qualitative assessment as was conducted for the KS
method results holds for the AIC method results. This shows that the AIC method
for determining change points also produces real-world interpretable parameters.
Also of interest is a comparison between where the division between phases occurs
when trying to minimise the total AIC and that found earlier from the KS test
method. Initially it can be seen that many more points are added to phase 2 for the
AIC method than for the KS method. However, as just discussed, the parameters
for the models obtained under the two different approaches are very similar. This
observation suggests that the evolution of the PIRA was quite gradual since the
underlying dynamics appear to be stable over a long period of time.
It is also of interest to observe that for both the KS method and AIC method
the boundaries are different from those suggested by the sociological theory. This
raises interesting research questions which can be pursued considering the possibility
of some new sociological theory concerning the evolution of the PIRA.
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2.8 Discussion
The chapter opened by introducing the Hawkes self-exciting point process model.
To gain an initial understanding of how the model worked the mathematical back-
ground of the model was detailed. This background covered the basic components of
the Hawkes model including the intensity function, maximum likelihood parameter
estimation and a discussion of the computational nuances associated with the opti-
misation problem. The intensity function serves as the essential interface between
the mathematical theory behind the point process and the real-world applications
for which it can be used. In particular, as part of the mathematical foundation the
specific form of the intensity function was provided and shown to rely on three pa-
rameters. The first of these three parameters was a background rate µ describing
an average rate of event occurrence. Next a jump parameter, k0, is used to de-
scribe how following an incident there is a spike in the event rate occurrence due to
self-excitations. Finally, since it is unrealistic that self-excitations last indefinitely a
decaying kernel in the form of an exponential, with exponent ω, is used to dampen
the increased event rate.
With the physical interpretation of the parameters explained the next step in this
chapter was to introduce a case study in the form of the PIRA. As was already dis-
cussed earlier in the literature review taking a historical and sociological perspective
on the PIRA’s activities indicated five unique phases relating to shifts in the organi-
sations structural and tactical modus operandi. The task undertaken in this chapter
was to compare the mathematical boundaries for these phases to the five qualitative
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descriptions. The mathematical approach to boundary detection followed two routes
- a KS method and an AIC method.
The KS method designed used the idea of maximising the KS difference between
the KS test statistic and critical value between pairs of phases. Each adjacent phase
pair was scanned with a moving time window adding one data point from the previous
to the next phase at each shift. With each new dataset thus obtained a Hawkes
process was fitted to the time series and a corresponding KS test statistic and critical
value were calculated. Finally by graphing all these differences it was possible to
observe where the optimum change point should be placed. This method proved to
be quick and straightforward to implement so that insights could be readily obtained.
A different method that was developed to handle the change point analysis prob-
lem was to study the total AIC between two phases. The aim of this technique is
to find the break point which produces the lowest possible AIC for each phase com-
bined without relying on the sociologically defined boundary. A problem that was
discovered was the computational inefficiency of this approach. To overcome long
code runtimes a strategy was developed involving a two loop procedure. In the outer
loop a minimisation algorithm was being applied to the total AIC corresponding to
the break point inbetween the two phases. Since this total AIC was a function of the
sum of the two individual AIC values of the Hawkes process in each phase it was then
necessary to have a second minimising loop. In this inner loop the MLE values for
the Hawkes processes in each phase were computed in order to define the intensity
functions. With the intensity functions defined the AIC of the Hawkes processes in
each phase were found and the sum returned to the outer loop. This approach to
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the change point provided the advantage of not having to rely on the sociological
boundaries thus enabling the best change point among all possible change points to
be detected.
Tying this chapter together the final section aimed to interpret the different
mathematical findings from the KS and AIC approaches to change point detection
in the context of the PIRA and “The Troubles” in NI. It was found that the Hawkes
process MLE parameters from each technique were close in value with similar trends.
This observation provided confidence that both methods were providing valid results.
This confidence was further reinforced by converting the quantitative results into a
qualitative description of the PIRA. By comparing the real-world interpretations
of the MLE parameter estimates to historical accounts and sociological theory of
the PIRA it was found that the Hawkes process models were indeed picking out
important shifts within the organisation. Moreover, the differences between the
phase points obtained here and those previously used by social scientists indicate
that the Hawkes process is also offering new insights opening up opportunities for
further research into understanding the origin of these differences. Such additional
research may prove fruitful in uncovering as yet undetected subtleties concerning the
PIRA and the political climate in the time it operated.
The results of this chapter provide evidence for Hypotheses 1-2. In particular, de-
veloping unique change point detection methods using the Hawkes process model has
shown PIRA attacks are historically dependent. Moreover, via the interpretation of
the parameters of the Hawkes models it has been shown that the phases of the PIRA
were quantitatively distinct. Both of these outcomes illustrate that the research
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conducted in this chapter provides useful advancements to knowledge for studying
terrorism. Also, employing the change point detection frameworks that have been
described important insights into the evolution of terrorist groups can be identified.
Specifically, academic researchers in the field of social science can benefit from these
types of methods to obtain deeper understandings of when and how terrorist groups
change structurally and operationally. Furthermore, practitioners can use the mod-
els developed in this chapter to study terrorism in real time and quickly identify
important shifts. Therefore, the research in this chapter also provides evidence for
the validity of Hypothesis 4.
To extend the research presented in this chapter further use of spatial data could
be made inside of the Hawkes process. In particular, it may prove fruitful to study
change point detection dependent on both time and space. A possible method to
achieve this objective would be to include a spatio-temporal kernel inside the Hawkes
process model. This type of Hawkes model could then be used inside the change point
detection framework developed and analysed in this chapter. By explicitly study-
ing spatial components of PIRA attacks new insights may be revealed pertaining to
their use of geography during “The Troubles”. In addition to deeper academic under-
standings of PIRA having models including spatial patterns could assist in identifying
hotspots of terrorist activity. Moreover, improved understanding of spatial change
points would help guide practitioners in developing evidence based counter-terrorism
approaches.
CHAPTER 3
SEASONAL HAWKES PROCESS MODELLING OF AL SHABAAB
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In 1979 Cohen and Felson published their paper describing research formulating
the routine activities of crime (Cohen and Felson, 1979). According to their work
they claimed crime occurs as the result of opportunities governed by environmental
conditions. Through analysing the relationship between different environmental fac-
tors and criminal events it is possible that many new crime reduction techniques can
be discovered.
Research since has focused on the influence of environmental factors on crime,
particularly, the effect of weather. Multiple articles have been published exploring
this link. For example, the research of Cohn (1990) concludes that assaults, burglary,
collective violence, domestic violence and rape are positively correlated with temper-
ature with a breakdown in these relationships occurring around 29°C. Similar results
have been reported by Pakiam and Lim (1984) whose study of crime and weather
in Singapore found that crimes against the person increase with increasing temper-
ature and climate comfort measures. Extrapolating the effect of weather conditions
on crime Ranson (2014) estimates rises in multiple crime categories as a result of
climate changes.
It has already been shown in several studies that a theory akin to Cohen and Fel-
son’s routine activity approach holds true for terrorist attacks (Clauset and Woodard,
2013; Townsley, Johnson and Ratcliffe, 2008; Zammit-Mangion et al., 2012). Sim-
ilarly, some studies have emerged illustrating repeating trends in the frequency of
terrorist activity. In the research of Enders, Parise and Sandler (1992) it has been
shown that terrorist events, such as, bombings, hostage events and assassinations
have cyclical patterns ranging from 21 to 54 months. Moreover, threats of attacks
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were found to have a seasonal trend of 11 months which the authors associate to the
onset of tourism periods. Also finding cyclical trends in terrorist attacks Weimann
and Brosius (1988) finds a contagion dynamic as well as a constant one month peri-
odicity modelled with a first-order moving average.
However, a gap in terrorism literature remains to utilise advanced mathemati-
cal techniques to capture seasonal variations in terrorist attacks. In particular, it
has been discussed that terrorist events have both cyclical and contagion dynam-
ics. But there exists a disconnect between the models used to capture each of these
components. By developing a more encompassing modelling framework which can
simultaneously describe the different influences on terrorist activity it may be pos-
sible to discover more effective counter-terrorism policies. In this chapter a possible
solution to this problem will be presented in the form of a Hawkes point process
model with a seasonal background rate. To illustrate the usage of this type of model
a case study of Al Shabaab (AS) terrorist incidents in Somalia will be examined.
3.1 Datasets
3.1.1 Al Shabaab Event Data
The data used in this chapter is sourced from the Armed Conflict Location and
Event Database (ACLED 2016). ACLED is a project run from the University of
Sussex and the database aims to provide up-to-data disaggregated data for conflicts
in Africa as well as South and South-East Asia. The data is sorted according to date
(on a daily scale), location, type of event (battles, civilian killings, riots, protests
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and recruitment activity), event actors (rebels, governments, militias, armed groups,
protestors and civilians), information on changes in territory control and fatalities.
The database is formed using information from a variety of sources including local
and international news sources and humanitarian agency reports. An outline of the
two main fields used in this chapter is provided in Table 3.1
Table 3.1: ACLED Data Fields
Field Data
EVENT DATE Day of the recorded event
EVENT TYPE
Battle-{“Government regains territory”, “No change of territory”,
“Non-state actor overtakes territory”},
Headquarters or base established, Non-violent transfer of territory,
Remote violence, Riots/Protests, Strategic development,
Violence against civilians
In the research of Maszka (2017) the strategic developments of AS are examined.
Specifically four distinct phases of the group are identified. These phases are from
the group’s inception to December 2007, January 2008 to April 2008, May 2008 to
July 2011 and August 2011 to the present time. Within these transitions the group
also had three leadership changes according to the following timeline
 2006-2008: Aden Hashi Ayro (killed by a US airstrike).
 2008-2014: Ahmed Abdi Godane (killed by a US drone strike).
 2014 - Present: Abu Ubeyda.
Multiple historical and social science studies have been conducted into the evo-
lution of the AS group (Anderson and McKnight, 2015a; Hansen, 2013; Marchal,
100
2009; Maszka, 2017; Wise, 2011). During the early stages in the formation of AS the
group’s main objective was resisting a perceived occupation of Somalia by Ethiopian
troops. After the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces in 2009 AS struggled to retain local
support and began an international recruitment campaign. This shift from a local
struggle to a global movement was also accompanied by Godane’s desire to link AS
to the international terrorist group known as al Qaeda. In 2010 the African Union
Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) consisting of Ugandan and Burundian troops moved
to counter the growing threat presented by AS. However, AS persisted and in 2011
Kenyan troops crossed into South Somalia to provide a bulwark against the risks of
AS attacking inside the Kenyan border. Retribution for these moves to contain and
eliminate AS was seen in high profile attacks, such as, an attack on the Westgate
Mall in Nairobi in 2013 (Williams, 2014) and another on the Garissa University in
2015 (Lyons et al., 2015).
Examining the historical roots of AS indicate that the group was heavily focused
on fighting various governmental forces. However, as Maszka (2017) discusses under
the change of leadership to Godane the AS group underwent a tactical shift. In par-
ticular, the usage of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) became more widespread.
Alongside the use of IEDs Godane’s appeal for foreign fighters also lead to the em-
ployment of suicide attacks in Somalia. These developments significantly increased
events involving violence against civilians.
Since attacks against governmental forces and those against civilians were sep-
arate developments within the history of AS it was decided to model these two
categories of events separately. Thus the ACLED data was divided according to the
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following criteria
 Battle Territory (BT) - Covers pre-existing categories “Battle-Government re-
gains territory”, “Battle-No change of territory”, “Battle-Non-state actor over-
takes territory”.
 Violence Against Civilians (VAC) - Covers pre-existing category “Violence
against civilians”.
In total the ACLED database, at the time of production of this chapter in 2016,
contains a total of 5935 events involving the Al Shabaab militant group. The BT
category of events includes 4089 recorded incidents and the VAC database has 670
events. Therefore, these two databases combined cover 80% of all the available Al
Shabaab data and hence provide good coverage of the group’s activities for numerical
study.
It should also be noted from Chapter 2 that one of the assumptions that must be
met to use the Hawkes process model is that the timestamps of events must be unique
so that ti 6= tj for i 6= j (Daley and Vere-Jones, 2003). For the study of Al Shabaab
attacks in this chapter the events in the ACLED database are recorded according to
day of the event. Therefore, to ensure the uniqueness of event times multiple events
on a single day are counted as only one event. Justification for such an approach to
analysing the Al Shabaab data comes from studies of the groups command structure
which shows it operates in a top down fashion (Agbiboa, 2014; Marchal, 2009) im-
plying that multiple same day attacks can be considered as stemming from a single
decision.
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Due to the uniqueness assumption of the Hawkes model dividing the AS data
into BT and VAC categories also ensures more data is retained. In particular, if the
data was analysed in aggregate form then important information may have been lost
due to the removal of repeated timestamps. However, under the analysis framework
presented in this chapter this problem is avoided due to the data disaggregation used.
Before removing duplicate entries the BT category of events has 4089 records.
After ensuring unique timestamps the BT dataset has 1751 events. Performing the
same procedure for the VAC dataset leads to a reduction from 670 to 547 datapoints.
These reduced datasets are used in the remainder of this chapter.
Since the AS group’s tactics evolved in four phases a further disaggregation of
the data can also be undertaken into the four datasets as illustrated in Tables 3.2 -
3.3. Observe that the dates demarcating the phase boundaries are adjusted based on
the actual data. In particular, the first and last dates recorded in the BT and VAC
datasets that fall inside each of the phases found by Maszka (2017) are used to define
the phase edges. The motivation for this presentation of the phases is to ensure that
the analyses conducted in this chapter capture the actual data dynamics. It should
also be noted that phases 1 and 2 have very few datapoints. Therefore, the analyses
in this chapter will focus only on phases 3 and 4.
Table 3.2: Number of Entries in BT Datasets
Dataset Name Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4
(Aug 2006 - (Jan 2008 - (May 2008 - (Aug 2011 -
Nov 2007) Apr 2008) Jul 2011) Dec 2015)
Battle Territory 5 6 407 1333
Combining all of the previous disaggregations yields four datasets - BT (phases
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Table 3.3: Number of Entries in VAC Datasets
Dataset Name Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4
(Aug 2007) (Jan 2008 - (Jun 2008 - (Aug 2011 -
Apr 2008) Jul 2011) Dec 2015)
Violence Against Civilians 1 3 51 492
3 and 4) and VAC (phases 3 and 4). These datasets were used for the studies in the
remainder of this chapter.
3.1.2 Weather Data
As discussed in the introduction to this chapter research has shown that terrorist
attacks are often linked with seasonal trends. One of the main seasonal trends in
Somalia is the onset of wet seasons. In the report of (Muchiri, 2007) rainfall is
described as the “defining characteristic of the climate” in Somalia with two main
rainfall seasons. The first rainfall season in Somalia is known as the Gu (April-June)
resulting from the northward movement of weather fronts whilst the second is called
Deyr (October-December) resulting from a southerly shift. An established monitor-
ing body of weather patterns in Somalia is known as the Somalia Water and Land
Information Management (SWALIM) which is managed by the Food and Agricul-
tural Organisation (FAO) of the United Nations (FAO SWALIM 2016). All the data
collected as part of the SWALIM project is openly accessible via the organisation’s
website. Of particular interest in this thesis is rainfall data. The SWALIM database
offers rainfall data from a variety of collection stations across the country. Since most
of the Al Shabaab attack data in the ACLED database records events in the south of
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Somalia (89% of all data points) data for the central southern data collection point in
Diinsor in the Bay area was used in this thesis. This area is highlighted in Figure 3.1
(FAO SWALIM 2016). The rainfall data downloaded for use in this chapter consists
of monthly volume counts spanning the years 2008 to 2015 providing full coverage of
the period of AS attacks being studied. In Tables 3.4 - 3.5 an overview is provided
of the rainfall datasets used in this chapter. Note that these rainfall datasets have
start and end dates corresponding to those used for the BT and VAC datasets. This
ensures consistency in the analyses of dynamics in the rainfall and event data.
Table 3.4: Number of Entries in BT Weather Datasets
Dataset Name Phase 3 Phase 4
(May 2008 - (August 2011 -
July 2011) December 2015)
BT Weather 39 53
Table 3.5: Number of Entries in VAC Weather Datasets
Dataset Name Phase 3 Phase 4
(June 2008 - (August 2011 -
July 2011) December 2015)
VAC Weather 38 53
3.2 Modelling Framework
The main objective of this chapter is to develop a model that can capture both
seasonal trends and past dependent behaviour in terrorist activities. This task will
be divided into two steps.
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Figure 3.1: Map of Somalia. The area indicated in red indicates the location of the weather station
from which the rainfall data used in this chapter was obtained.
Initially, in Section 3.3 the periodicities present in the AS event dataset and
Somalia weather dataset will be obtained using Fourier analysis. By comparing
these periods it will then be possible to determine if there exists a weather-related
dynamic within AS attacks.
Having extracted the underlying periodicities the past dependent behaviour of
the AS attacks will be captured using a Hawkes point process model in Section 3.4.
Results will be presenting comparing the modelling of AS events using a Hawkes
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model with a constant background rate and a Hawkes model using a seasonally
varying background rate. The seasonally varying Hawkes process will utilise the
periodicities found from the Fourier analysis described previously.
3.3 Identifying Seasonality
To justify the usage of a seasonally varying Hawkes process model it is necessary
to demonstrate quantitatively that the AS attacks contain a seasonal dynamic. In
particular, the focus of this chapter will be to study the influence of rainfall levels
in Somalia on AS events. One method well suited to this task is the construction of
a Fourier series. As described by Stade (2005) the aim of this approach is to gener-
ate a model using a summation of sinusoidal terms where each term has a distinct
frequency. The inverse of these frequencies yields the periodicities of dynamics in
the data being modelled. By obtaining a Fourier series model of both the Somalia
rainfall datasets and AS event datasets it will be possible to discover their underlying
cyclical trends as measured via periodicity. Directly comparing these periodicities
then enables conclusions to be drawn concerning the link between weather trends
and AS attacks.
Prior to presenting the analysis comparing the rain and event datasets the math-
ematical formulation of Fourier series will presented in the following section. Since
the rainfall data used is measured according to a monthly scale a comparison will be
made to monthly AS data. The AS data is grouped into months via binning of the
data with bin widths equal to 30 days.
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3.3.1 Detrending Data
An important note concerning the use of Fourier analysis is that the dynamic of
interest is data periodicity. Therefore, prior to constructing a Fourier series the data
being studied should be detrended so that only cyclic repetition is present. Two
common approaches of detrending are
1. subtract the mean of the data from the dataset,
2. remove a linear trend in the data using a least squares regression.
The exact method chosen to detrend a dataset is context dependent. Also it is
important to remember that the detrended method has to be incorporated at the
end of fitting the Fourier series. This can be achieved either by adding the mean as
a constant or adding a linear function to correspond to the one found in the second
detrend method.
To illustrate the context of data requiring detrending observe the histogram in
Figure 3.2. This figure shows the monthly event counts corresponding to the “Battle
for Territory” category in phase 3 of the AS evolution. It is clear from viewing this
plot that there exists a linearly increasing trend across the dataset.
One method which can be used to detrend linearly increasing data is known as
linear least squares regression. Assume a given set of data points {(tn, fn)}Nn=1. To
these datapoints we aim to fit a linear function f(t) = αt + β with parameters
p = {α, β}. This aim can be achieved by minimising the sum of squared differences
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Figure 3.2: Battle territory phase 3 binned data histogram. Bin widths are set to 30 days to
correspond to approximately one month of data.
given by the loss function (Hansen, Pereyra and Scherer, 2012)
`(p) =
N∑
n=1
(fn − f(tn; p))2. (3.1)
Since the aim is to minimise (3.1) we need to find the partial derivatives with respect
to each of the two parameters and set the resulting equations equal to zero. Hence
we obtain the set of simultaneous equations
∂`
∂α
= −2
∑
n
tn(fn − αtn − β) = 0, (3.2)
∂`
∂β
= −2
∑
n
(fn − αtn − β) = 0. (3.3)
The equations in (3.2) and (3.3) can be simplified to
α
∑
n
t2n + β
∑
n
tn =
∑
n
tnfn, (3.4)
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α
∑
n
tn + βN =
∑
n
fn. (3.5)
Solving the linear equations in (3.4) and (3.5) yields the following formulae for the
parameter values
α =
N
∑
n tnfn −
∑
n fn
∑
n tn
N
∑
n t
2
n − (
∑
n tn)
2 , (3.6)
β =
1
N
∑
n
fn − α 1
N
∑
n
tn. (3.7)
Applying the detrending technique to the BT dataset in phase 3 gives the coeffi-
cients {α, β} in Table 3.6. Figure 3.3 illustrates how the histogram of event counts
changes after detrending the data.
Table 3.6: Battle Territory Phase 3 Linear Detrend Function Coefficients
Coefficient Value
α 0.0114
β 3.5329
3.3.2 Fourier Series
Literature describing the mathematical background and application details of Fourier
series is abundant (Davis, 1989; Dyke, 2014; Pinkus and Zafrany, 1997; Stein and
Shakarchi, 2003; Strang, 1986; Tolstov, 1977). Here a summary of this literature
relevant to determining seasonal trends will be presented.
The basic premise of a Fourier series is to express a periodic function in terms of
a summation of sines and cosines. For example, consider a function f with a period
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Figure 3.3: Battle territory phase 3 binned data histogram with a linear detrend. Bin widths are
set to 30 days to correspond to approximately one month of data.
of 2T i.e. assume f satisfies the periodic property that
f(t) = f(t+ 2T ). (3.8)
For the periodic function f the full Fourier series on the interval 0 < t < 2T is
defined as
f(t) =
a0
2
+
∞∑
n=1
(
an cos
(
2pint
T
)
+ bn sin
(
2pint
T
))
, (3.9)
where the set of coefficients {ai}∞i=0 and {bi}∞i=1 are constants to be determined.
Another equivalent formula for expressing the Fourier series in (3.9) is found by
mapping the problem into the complex domain. To achieve this mapping first recall
De Moivre’s formula (Abramowitz and Stegun, 1964)
eiα = cos(α) + i sin(α). (3.10)
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Now it can be observed that
cke
ikt + c−ke−ikt = ck(cos(kt) + i sin(kt)) + c−k(cos(kt)− i sin(kt)) (3.11)
= (ck + c−k) cos(kt) + i(ck − c−k) sin(kt) (3.12)
= ak cos(kt) + bk sin(kt), (3.13)
where
ak = ck + c−k (3.14)
and
bk = i(ck − c−k). (3.15)
Rearranging the equations in (3.14) and (3.15) it can be deduced that
ck =
ak − ibk
2
(3.16)
and
c−k =
ak + ibk
2
. (3.17)
Now if we apply a mapping from t 7→ 2pit
T
the formula for the Fourier series (3.9) can
be expressed as
f(t) =
∞∑
n=−∞
cne
int. (3.18)
Now observe that for integers n, k such that n 6= k
∫ 2pi
0
einte−iktdt =
∫ 2pi
0
ei(n−k)tdt =
1
i(n− k)e
i(n−k)t
∣∣∣2pi
0
= 0, (3.19)
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since ei(n−k)0 = ei(n−k)2pi = 1. In the case where n = k we have that
∫ 2pi
0
einte−iktdt =
∫ 2pi
0
e0dt = 2pi. (3.20)
Therefore, a formula for the coefficients ck can be written as
ck =
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
f(t)e−iktdt. (3.21)
3.3.3 Discrete Fourier Transform
The formula for the ck can be discretised using a numerical integration method known
as the trapezoidal rule (Davis and Rabinowitz, 2007). The aim of this numerical
approach is to divide the area of integration into rectangles, the area of each being
easily computed, and then sum these areas to get an approximation to the original
integral.
The interval [0, 2pi] can be subdivided into intervals of length
h =
2pi
N
(3.22)
with boundaries at points
tj = jh, j = 0, ..., N − 1. (3.23)
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On this subdivision the trapezoidal rule produces the formula
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
f(t)e−iktdt ≈ h
2pi
N−1∑
j=0
fje
−iktj := Fk (3.24)
where f(tj) = fj. The formula in (3.24) is known as the discrete Fourier transform
of the function f .
Some further simplification can be undertaken on the discrete Fourier transform
which will be particularly useful when describing the calculation method known as
the fast Fourier transform later on. Let
w = eih (3.25)
then using the notation of complex conjugation
w = e−ih. (3.26)
Now the discrete Fourier transform can be expressed as
Fk =
h
2pi
N−1∑
j=0
fje
−iktj =
1
N
N−1∑
j=0
fj(e
−ih)jk =
1
N
N−1∑
j=0
fjw
jk
. (3.27)
It is also helpful to have the inverse of the discrete Fourier transform. Define
fj =
N−1∑
k=0
Fke
iktj =
N−1∑
k=0
Fkw
jk, (3.28)
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Now it can be seen that
fj =
N−1∑
k=0
Fkw
kj =
N−1∑
k=0
1
N
N−1∑
m=0
fmw
mk
wkj =
1
N
N−1∑
m=0
fm
N−1∑
k=0
w(j−m)k, (3.29)
where,
w
mk
wkj = e−ihmkeihkj = eih(j−m)k = w(j−m)k. (3.30)
Since the sum
∑N−1
k=1 w
(j−m)k is a geometric series it holds that for j 6= m
N−1∑
k=0
w(j−m)k = 1 +
N−1∑
k=1
w(j−m)k (3.31)
= 1 + w(j−m)
(
1− w(j−m)(N−1)
1− w(j−m)
)
(3.32)
=
1− w(j−m)N
1− w(j−m) = 0 (3.33)
where the fact that
w(j−m)N = eih(j−m)N = ei2pi(j−m) = cos(2pi(j −m)) + i sin(2pi(j −m)) = 1 (3.34)
has been be used.
Notice that for the case where j = m the sum on the left hand side of (3.31) is
equal to N. This yields the result that the transformations defined above are indeed
the inverse of one another. Importantly, having established formulae for the DFT
and its inverse it is now possible to consider the problem of finding a Fourier series
in terms of finding the values Fk.
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3.3.4 Fast Fourier Transform
Although it is possible to compute the Fourier series coefficients from the discrete
Fourier transform a significant reduction is possible to the required number of cal-
culations. One approach which has been particularly successful at improving the
speed of computing Fourier series is known as the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT).
Algorithms to apply the FFT are numerous but the most commonly used approach is
the Cooley-Tukey FFT (Cooley and Tukey, 1965). The essential idea of the Cooley-
Tukey approach is to divide the discrete Fourier transform into two parts looking at
odd and even terms.
Since the discrete Fourier transform can be viewed as a matrix-vector multiplica-
tion the order of complexity is simply given by O(N2). However, if the total number
of data points N is a power of 2 we can express
Fj =
1
N
N−1∑
k=0
fkw
kj
=
1
N
∑
even k
fkw
kj
+
1
N
∑
odd k
fkw
kj
=
1
N
M−1∑
k′=0
f2k′(w
2
)k
′j +
1
N
M−1∑
k′′=0
f2k′′+1w
(2k′′+1)j
=
1
N
M−1∑
k′=0
f2k′(w
2
)k
′j
︸ ︷︷ ︸
:= F ′j
+w
j 1
N
M−1∑
k′′=0
f2k′′+1(w
2
)k
′′j
︸ ︷︷ ︸
:= F ′′j
. (3.35)
We now have two series F ′j and F
′′
j which are discrete Fourier transforms but of
length M which is half the initial length N. These smaller discrete Fourier transforms
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can again be simplified in order to obtain a fast recursive formula known as the Fast
Fourier Transform (FFT).
Recall that the index j represents the number of data points and that j =
0, 1, 2, ..., N − 1. For j = 0, ...,M − 1 we compute the discrete Fourier transform
using the formula in (3.35). Then for j = M, ..., N − 1 define
j′ = j −M. (3.36)
With this definition, and that h = 2pi
N
, the following formulae are readily obtained.
w
M
= e−ihM = e−ih
N
2 = e−ipi = −1 (3.37)
w
N
= w
2M
= 1 (3.38)
w
j
= w
j′+M
= w
j′
w
M
= −wj′ (3.39)
(w
2
)kj = (w
j
)2k = (−wj′)2k = (w2)kj′ . (3.40)
Therefore, the following recursive formula follows immediately for
j = 0, ..., M − 1
Fj = F
′
j + w
j
F
′′
j (3.41)
Fj+M = F
′
j − wjF
′′
j . (3.42)
Observe that with repeated use of this recursive relationship the F ′j and F
′′
j can be
computed with half the number of steps on each application. This is the essential
step which makes the fast Fourier transform so efficient.
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The improvement of the fast Fourier transform over the original brute force ap-
proach can be seen by computing the new order of complexity. First assume that
all the wj are calculated and let W (N) be the required number of operations for the
FFT with N points. Then we have that
W (2M) = 2W (M) + 4M (3.43)
since we split the problem in half arriving at the term 2W (M) and then have the
multiplications w
j
F
′′
j followed by the addition +w
j
F
′′
j and subtraction −wjF ′′j and
recombination Fj +Fj+M yielding the term 4M . Note also that W (1) = 0 since there
is nothing to compute on just a single point.
Now if the number of points being considered in the FFT are a power of 2 then
N = 2n. Let ωj = W (2
j) so that
ωj = 2ωj−1 + 2(2j), (3.44)
with ω0 = 0.
Multiplying through (3.44) by a factor of 2n−j and summing we arrive at
n∑
j=1
2n−jωj = 2
n∑
j=1
2n−j(ωj−1 + 2j) (3.45)
= 2n2n +
n∑
j=1
2n−j+1ωj−1 (3.46)
= {substituting k = j − 1 into the summation}
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= 2n2n +
n−1∑
k=0
2n−kωk (3.47)
= 2n2n +
n−1∑
k=1
2n−kωk, (3.48)
where the fact that ω0 = 0 has been used in the last step to discard the first term of
the sum. Observe that final summation on the right hand side of the equal sign and
the one on the left run over the same indices, except the nth term, thus giving the
final equation
ωn = 2n2
n. (3.49)
Finally,
W (N) = ωn = 2n2
n = 2N log2N. (3.50)
Therefore, the order of complexity of the FFT is O(N log2N) which is a vast im-
provement over the original brute force approach with order O(N2).
A few final observations about the FFT make the algorithm output easier to
follow in numerical applications. Firstly observe that
F0 =
1
N
N−1∑
k=0
fk. (3.51)
Therefore, F0 is simply an average of the input values. As such it doesn’t provide
much additional detail and is usually not included in graphs of FFT outputs.
Another remark about the FFT is that for real valued inputs
F j = FN−j. (3.52)
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This can be proven by observing that
FN−j =
1
N
N−1∑
k=0
fke
−ihk(N−j) (3.53)
=
1
N
N−1∑
k=0
fke
−i 2pi
N
k(N−j) (3.54)
=
1
N
N−1∑
k=0
fke
−i2pikei
2pi
N
kj (3.55)
=
1
N
N−1∑
k=0
fke
i 2pi
N
kj (3.56)
= F j (3.57)
where the assumption that the fk are real valued has been used in the final step.
The reason the symmetrical relationship F j = FN−j is important is that when
applying the FFT numerically it is only required to retrieve half of the output. This
simplifies the analysis of FFT applications.
A very fast implementation of the FFT, and the one used in this chapter, is
contained in the C++ package FFTW3 (Frigo and Johnson, 2005).
3.3.5 Fourier Analysis Application
Recall that the aim of using the Fourier series is to quantify the periodicities in the
monthly rainfall and AS event data. In particular, Fourier series will be fitted to the
monthly counts of each of these datasets using the FFT. This will be repeated for
each of the phase 3 and 4 datasets within the BT and VAC categories. Since the aim
of using the FFT is to compare the periods in the AS events and the rainfall data
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over the same time period it is necessary to ensure that the datasets analysed begin
and end on the same month.
Let N be the number of bins and let each bin be represented by i ∈ {0, ..., N−1}.
We use the left edge of each bin and corresponding bin height as input to the FFT.
We have from the symmetry properties of the FFT output in (3.52) that the
discrete Fourier series is given by
f(t) =
F0
N
+
2
N
∑
k=1,2,...,ceil(N2 )
ak cos
(
2pitk
N
)
− bk sin
(
2pitk
N
)
, (3.58)
where the ceil indicates that the number should be rounded upwards and the complex
numbers Fk = ak + ibk for real valued ak and bk. The
1
N
scaling factor of coefficients
results from the computation method used by the FFTW3 package (Frigo and John-
son, 2005).
In cases where a linear detrend has been applied to the data prior to using the
FFT the Fourier series takes the form
f(t) = αt+ β +
F0
N
+
2
N
∑
k=1,2,...,ceil(N2 )
ak cos
(
2pitk
N
)
− bk sin
(
2pitk
N
)
. (3.59)
On the other hand, when using the mean detrending method the Fourier series
is computed as
f(t) = m+
F0
N
+
2
N
∑
k=1,2,...,ceil(N2 )
ak cos
(
2pitk
N
)
− bk sin
(
2pitk
N
)
, (3.60)
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where m is the mean number of events.
Note that the rainfall data is already provided on a monthly scale. However,
the AS event data is provided on a daily timeframe. Therefore, to convert each AS
datapoint, denoted by t, to a monthly scale the transformation t
30
must be applied,
where, an approximation of one month equaling 30 days is used.
In this case the equations in (3.58)-(3.60) become
f(t) =
F0
N
+
2
N
∑
k=1,2,...,ceil(N2 )
ak cos
(
2pitk
30N
)
− bk sin
(
2pitk
30N
)
(3.61)
f(t) = αt+ β +
F0
N
+
2
N
∑
k=1,2,...,ceil(N2 )
ak cos
(
2pitk
30N
)
− bk sin
(
2pitk
30N
)
(3.62)
f(t) = m+
F0
N
+
2
N
∑
k=1,2,...,ceil(N2 )
ak cos
(
2pitk
30N
)
− bk sin
(
2pitk
30N
)
. (3.63)
When there is an even number of input data points, so that, ceil
(
N
2
)
= N
2
, there
is no need to multiply the N
2
term inside the summations in (3.58)-(3.63) by 2. The
frequency at this term is known as the Nyquist frequency (Grenander, 1959) which
only occurs once in the spectrum marking the point before the complex symmetry
described in (3.52) occurs.
In addition, it should be noted that with the definition of the Fourier series in
(3.58)-(3.63) the frequency of each term is given by
k
N
(3.64)
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and, therefore, the periodicity associated to each term is found via the inverse
N
k
. (3.65)
The formula in (3.65) will be used to compare the lengths of the periods in the event
and rainfall data.
Observe that the equations in (3.58)-(3.63) use all possible Fourier series terms
derived from the FFT. As more terms are used the series becomes more sensitive to
noise as opposed to the important long term periodicities. An approach to minimise
this is to concentrate only on those terms which have the most significant impact
on the Fourier series function. To determine significance the absolute value of the
coefficients of each term can be computed with larger values indicating more impor-
tance. In the complex plane a number of the form a + ib can be considered as a
vector with absolute value |a + ib| = √a2 + b2. Therefore, the values |ak + ibk|, for
coefficients ak, bk as defined in (3.58)-(3.63), can be computed to extract the most
import terms. This information is usually displayed in the form a power spectrum
displaying each term’s coefficient magnitude against frequency. The Fourier series of
(3.58)-(3.63) can then reconstructed keeping only those terms with the largest rela-
tive absolute value. For the analyses conducted in this chapter only the two highest
powered frequencies will be included in the final Fourier series approximations.
Since the focus of using the Fourier series is to find the time varying dynamics
via periodicities in the rainfall and AS event databases the constant leading terms
F0
N
, β and m will be dropped from the Fourier series.
Another issue of concern when utilising the FFT is that the window of time
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over which the data is observed should contain full periods. As detailed by Staudt
(1998) when this assumption is not met a problem known as spectral leakage may be
introduced into the FFT output. When spectral leakage occurs the power spectrum
of the FFT will be distorted with insignificant frequencies having high powers. One
approach to overcome this issue is to introduce a window function prior to performing
FFT calculations. Simply applying the FFT is the equivalent of using a rectangular
window function which takes the value 1 inside the timeframe under consideration
and 0 elsewhere. A second common type of window function is known as the Hanning
window (Harris, 1978; Staudt, 1998). The Hanning window acts to smooth the end
points of the dataset so that the data “wraps” around ensuring full periodicities in the
FFT. However, since this chapter uses finite length datasets the issue of extrapolation
beyond the final timestamps is not of concern. Moreover, only the two frequencies
with highest power will be used in the Fourier series thus providing a filter for noisy
terms. Therefore, the rectangular window will be used henceforth.
3.3.6 Results of Fourier Series Analysis
In this section the foundations of Fourier series analysis are used to extract the
two most important periods for each of the AS and weather datasets. From this
analysis the periods can be compared to determine the relationship between rainfall
in Somalia and AS terrorism.
Tables 3.7 - 3.10 provide the most significant periods found using the FFT. In
Figures 3.4 - 3.5 the histograms, detrended histograms, FFT power spectrums and
Fourier series functions are presented for the rainfall data in phases 3 and 4 cor-
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responding to the BT dataset. Similar results are obtained for the rainfall data
corresponding to the VAC datasets and, thus, are omitted. The results of the same
analyses for BT and VAC AS events are displayed in Figures 3.6 - 3.9.
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Table 3.7: Battle Territory Phase 3 Periods
Power Spectrum Rank Event Period (Months) Rainfall Period (Months)
1 2.9 5.6
2 2.7 6.5
Table 3.8: Battle Territory Phase 4 Periods
Power Spectrum Rank Event Period (Months) Rainfall Period (Months)
1 54 5.9
2 27 2.9
Table 3.9: Violence Against Civilians Phase 3 Periods
Power Spectrum Rank Event Period (Months) Rainfall Period (Months)
1 2.2 6.3
2 2.3 5.4
Table 3.10: Violence Against Civilians Phase 4 Periods
Power Spectrum Rank Event Period (Months) Rainfall Period (Months)
1 54 5.9
2 27 2.9
126
BT Rainfall Phase 3
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Figure 3.4: (a) Battle territory phase 3 weather data histogram. (b) Battle territory phase 3
weather data mean detrended histogram. (c) Battle territory phase 3 monthly weather data FFT
frequencies power spectrum. The higher the power the greater the significance of the frequency.
The highlighted points (black circles) correspond to the two frequencies with highest power which
are used to construct a Fourier series approximation for the data. (d) Battle territory phase 3
weather data mean detrended histogram with Fourier series constructed from two frequencies with
highest power.
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BT Rainfall Phase 4
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Figure 3.5: (a) Battle territory phase 4 weather data histogram. (b) Battle territory phase 4
weather data mean detrended histogram. (c) Battle territory phase 4 monthly weather data FFT
frequencies power spectrum. The higher the power the greater the significance of the frequency.
The highlighted points (black circles) correspond to the two frequencies with highest power which
are used to construct a Fourier series approximation for the data. (d) Battle territory phase 4
weather data mean detrended histogram with Fourier series constructed from two frequencies with
highest power.
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Battle Territory Phase 3
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Figure 3.6: (a) Battle territory phase 3 event data histogram. (b) Battle territory phase 3 event
data linearly detrended histogram. (c) Battle territory phase 3 monthly event data FFT frequencies
power spectrum. The higher the power the greater the significance of the frequency. The highlighted
points (black circles) correspond to the two frequencies with highest power which are used to
construct a Fourier series approximation for the data. (d) Battle territory phase 3 event data
linearly detrended histogram with Fourier series constructed from two frequencies with highest
power.
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Battle Territory Phase 4
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Figure 3.7: (a) Battle territory phase 4 event data histogram. (b) Battle territory phase 4 event data
mean detrended histogram. (c) Battle territory phase 4 monthly event data FFT frequencies power
spectrum. The higher the power the greater the significance of the frequency. The highlighted points
(black circles) correspond to the two frequencies with highest power which are used to construct a
Fourier series approximation for the data. (d) Battle territory phase 4 event data mean detrended
histogram with Fourier series constructed from two frequencies with highest power.
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Violence Against Civilians Phase 3
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Figure 3.8: (a) Violence against civilians phase 3 event data histogram. (b) Violence against civilians
phase 3 event data mean detrended histogram. (c) Violence against civilians phase 3 monthly event
data FFT frequencies power spectrum. The higher the power the greater the significance of the
frequency. The highlighted points (black circles) correspond to the two frequencies with highest
power which are used to construct a Fourier series approximation for the data. (d) Violence against
civilians phase 3 event data mean detrended histogram with Fourier series constructed from two
frequencies with highest power.
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Violence Against Civilians Phase 4
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Figure 3.9: (a) Violence against civilians phase 4 event data histogram. (b) Violence against civilians
phase 4 event data mean detrended histogram. (c) Violence against civilians phase 4 monthly event
data FFT frequencies power spectrum. The higher the power the greater the significance of the
frequency. The highlighted points (black circles) correspond to the two frequencies with highest
power which are used to construct a Fourier series approximation for the data. (d) Violence against
civilians phase 4 event data mean detrended histogram with Fourier series constructed from two
frequencies with highest power.
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Observe that the BT and VAC phase 3 periods are between 2-3 months whilst
the weather data for these phases have periods in the range 5-6. Significantly the
3 month periods suggest that the four cycles of rainfall in Somalia from April-June
and October-December appear as seasonal dynamics in AS attacks.
On the other hand, in phase 4 the AS data in both the BT and VAC categories
have periods of 27 and 54 months. The rainfall datasets for phase 4 have periods of
2.9 and 5.9 months. Therefore, in phase 4 the AS attack pattern does not appear to
show a yearly cycle as seen in phase 3.
One possible explanation for the difference between the periods of the rainfall
and attack data in phase 4 is the changing strategies of AS. Phase 4 covers the
timeline of renewed resistance against AS from international forces. In particular, in
2011 Kenyan troops crossed into South Somalia to resist the growing security threat
of AS at Kenya’s border. Simultaneously, the African Union Mission to Somalia
(AMISOM) consisting of international forces were also fighting against AS. A result
of all these pressures caused AS to retreat. In response AS shifted strategically
to rely more on the use of IED attacks as well as engaging in high profile events,
such as, an attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi in 2013. In contrast to military
type assaults against government forces which require mobilisation of AS members
and planning for weather related events, IED attacks can be organised in a more
spontaneous fashion. Therefore, the cycles observed in the Fourier analysis of the
phase 4 datasets may be demonstrating this difference in the strategies employed by
AS.
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3.4 Hawkes Process Modelling
3.4.1 Hawkes Process with Time Independent Background
Rate
In Chapter 2 of this thesis the Hawkes self-exciting point process model was discussed
in detail. The important components necessary for applying the Hawkes model will
be presented here in summary.
The premise of the Hawkes model is that given a series of timestamps {ti}Ni=1 an
intensity function of the form (Hawkes, 1971)
λ(t) = µ+ k0
∑
t>ti
ωe−ω(t−ti) (3.66)
can be fitted using the method of maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) (Ozaki,
1979). In this case µ is a time independent baseline rate at which events occur, k0
describes the rise in the rate of events following an initial event and ω is determined
by the length of time a series of self-exciting events propagates.
It should be noted that in the simple case λ(t) = µ the model becomes a Poisson
process (Ross, 2010). In this case the occurrence of events is assumed to have a
background rate µ = N
T
being the average number of events per unit time. This
Poisson model can be used as a baseline for comparison with the Hawkes process
model.
The parameter values for the model in (3.66) are computed by maximising the
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formula
log L =
N∑
i=1
log
µ+ k0 ∑
ti>tj
ωe−ω(ti−tj)
+ k0 (e−ω(T−ti) − 1)
− µT. (3.67)
The overall fit of the Hawkes process model can be determined using the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test (Brown et al., 2002; Massey, 1951). For this test the following statistic
is calculated
Dn = max
k
(∣∣∣∣Uk − k − 1N
∣∣∣∣ , ∣∣∣∣ kN − Uk
∣∣∣∣) . (3.68)
If Dn < Dα for some critical value Dα then there is evidence that the Hawkes process
is capturing the dynamics present in the dataset. The values for Ui are evaluated
using
Ui = 1− exp
(
−
(
µ(ti − ti−1) + k0
i−1∑
j=1
[
e−ω(ti−1−tj) − e−ω(ti−tj)])) . (3.69)
A comparative fit between Hawkes process models, applied to the same dataset,
can be determined using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) (Akaike, 1974)
AIC = 2k − 2 log L, (3.70)
where, k is the number of model parameters. A lower value of AIC implies a better
fitting model.
The results of applying the simple Poisson process model to the datasets studied
in this chapter are provided in Tables 3.11 - 3.12. None of the Poisson models prove
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to be a good fit for the data.
Table 3.11: Battle Territory Poisson Process Results
Dataset µ AIC KS Test KS Critical 95% KS Critical 99%
Phase 3 0.3449 1682 1.0000 0.0674 0.0808
Phase 4 0.8269 3175 1.0000 0.0372 0.0446
Table 3.12: Violence Against Civilians Poisson Process Results
Dataset µ AIC KS Test KS Critical 95% KS Critical 99%
Phase 3 0.0444 422 1.0000 0.1904 0.2282
Phase 4 0.3075 2146 1.0000 0.0613 0.0735
Applying the Hawkes process model in the form of (3.66) to the “Battle Territory”
and “Violence Against Civilians” datasets yields the results in Tables 3.13 - 3.14.
From these results it can be seen that KS test statistics exceed the critical values
except the VAC phase 3 dataset at the 99% critical value. However, the k0 value in
VAC phase 3 does not satisfy the requirements for a non-explosive Hawkes process
as detailed in Chapter 2. Therefore, these results suggest that a Hawkes process as
in (3.66) does not provide a sufficiently good fit to the Al Shabaab data.
Table 3.13: Battle Territory Time Invariant Background Hawkes Process Results
Dataset µ k0 ω AIC KS Test KS Critical KS Critical
95% 99%
Phase 3 0.0962 0.7430 0.0562 1612 0.1970 0.0674 0.0808
Phase 4 0.5715 0.3845 0.0034 3161 0.4442 0.0372 0.0446
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Table 3.14: Violence Against Civilians Time Invariant Background Hawkes Process Results
Dataset µ k0 ω AIC KS Test KS Critical KS Critical
95% 99%
Phase 3 0.0321 1.0000 0.0007 424 0.2175 0.1904 0.2282
Phase 4 0.1288 0.6492 0.0064 2121 0.2136 0.0613 0.0735
3.5 Hawkes Process with Seasonal Background Rate
It has been shown that the AS events have a cyclical dynamic as shown in Tables
3.7 - 3.10. A consequence of this finding is that the time invariant background rate
of the Hawkes process model in (3.66) may not be adequately well suited to capture
the variation in the underlying rate of AS events. Therefore, an extension of this
model is required which incorporates the FFT periodicities discovered previously.
A similar problem has been considered in the field of seismology. In the work of
Ogata (1999) a review is made of modelling seasonal variations in earthquake activity.
One of the pieces of research covered is by Ogata (1983) which demonstrates that an
appropriate extension of the Hawkes process to incorporate time trends in the data
being studied is
λ(t) = µ+ P (t) + C(t) + k0
∑
t>ti
ωe−ω(t−tt). (3.71)
Here P (t) is a polynomial equation. A polynomial can be used to capture trends
in the data such as linear or non-linear trends over time. On the other hand, the
term C(t) is a cyclic term consisting of trigonometric functions which can capture
patterns, such as, seasonal variations in datasets.
Fitting a Hawkes process model without P (t) and C(t) to a set of timestamps
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requires the use of the method of maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) (Ozaki,
1979). Discussed in detail in Chapter 2 of this thesis the MLE for a Hawkes process
model with timestamps {ti}Ni=1 , final time tN = T and intensity function λ(t) is
given by (Rubin, 1972)
log L({ti};µ, k0, ω) =
N∑
i=1
log(λ(ti))−
∫ T
0
λ(t) dt. (3.72)
Here the aim is to find the parameter set {µ, k0, ω} which maximises this equation.
A major issue that must be overcome when using the MLE is that the function log L
is highly multimodal (Ogata and Akaike, 1982). Therefore, the starting conditions
of any optimisation algorithm applied to (3.72) must be chosen carefully to obtain
a meaningful parameter set. One way to find the Hawkes process parameters is to
initialise the optimisation routine at multiple starting points and taking the resulting
parameter set yielding the highest value of (3.72) (Egesdal et al., 2010).
When extending the Hawkes process to incorporate a time varying background
rate as in (3.71) it is also necessary to determine the form of the functions P (t) and
C(t). A possible approach to find these functions would be to determine them inside
the MLE routine. For example, expressing the unknown functions as
P (t) =
N∑
n=0
ant
n (3.73)
C(t) = b0 +
N∑
n=1
bn cos
(
2pint
N
)
+ cn sin
(
2pint
N
)
(3.74)
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we would then need to consider an MLE problem of the form
log L({ti}; {an}, {bn}, {cn}, µ, k0, ω). (3.75)
In this chapter a better approach to studying the functions P (t) and C(t) has been
presented. In particular, we determine their form prior to performing the MLE
method. This provides both an additional layer of analysis from which to understand
the data and takes advantage of the fast computational time of the FFT.
However, since the computations of P (t) and C(t) are based on monthly event
counts it is unreasonable to assume that the coefficients found using FFT will be
directly usable inside the Hawkes process model (3.71). Therefore, it is necessary to
introduce a scaling factor using the following approach
1. Fit a background of the form B(t) = P (t)+C(t) to the dataset using the FFT.
2. Fit a model of the form λ(t) = A × B(t) + µ + k0
∑
t>ti
ωe−ω(t−tt) to the
dataset using MLE as in (3.72), where, the loglikelihood now has parameters
log L({ti};A, µ, k0, ω). Here A is a real number to be determined which scales
the function B.
For the MLE calculations in this chapter the “Nelder-Mead” (see Section 2.3)
routine from the C++ library “nlopt” (Johnson, 2017) is used to find the model
parameters. Note that “Nelder-Mead” is a minimisation algorithm and hence the
equivalent problem of finding parameters which minimised − logL was considered.
To overcome the issue of trying to find the minimum of the multimodal loglikeli-
hood function the minimisation algorithm was started at 100 different initial vectors.
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There are four parameters to find {A, µ, k0, ω}. Since A is used to scale the Fourier
series to daily timestamps it is reasonable to bound the search space to [0, 1]. Sim-
ilarly the search space for parameter µ was [0, 1]. A necessary condition on k0 to
ensure non-explosion of the Hawkes process is that k0 < 1 (Hawkes and Oakes, 1974)
so the search space for this parameter was [0, 1]. Finally since the inverse parame-
ter 1
ω
can be interpreted as the average number of days over which a series of self
exciting events persists (Lewis et al., 2012) then for daily timestamps it is expected
that ω < 1. Hence the bounds on the decay parameter were also [0, 1]. Therefore,
on each run of the minimisation algorithm a vector with four random numbers each
in the range [0, 1] was used as a starting value. After finding the Hawkes process
parameters the KS test and AIC value of the models can be computed to judge the
fit of the model.
3.6 Results
In this section the theoretical details discussed previously will be used in application
to study Al Shabaab data using a Hawkes process model with Fourier series back-
ground rate. Each of the datasets “Battle for Territory” (BT) and “Violence Against
Civilians” (VAC) are studied across phases 3 and 4 of the AS group. Tables 3.15 -
3.18 present the results of analysing a Poisson process, Hawkes process with constant
background rate, Hawkes process with a Fourier series background rate consisting
of the highest powered FFT frequency and a Hawkes process with a Fourier series
background rate consisting of the two highest powered FFT frequencies.
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Table 3.15: Battle Territory Phase 3 Hawkes Process Results
Model A µ k0 ω AIC KS KS 95% KS 99%
Poisson Process – 0.3449 – – 1682 1.0000 0.0674 0.0808
No Seasonality – 0.0962 0.7430 0.0562 1612 0.1970 0.0674 0.0808
1 Fourier Term 0.0152 0.0832 0.4768 0.0748 1604 0.2067 0.0674 0.0808
2 Fourier Terms 0.0163 0.0802 0.4656 0.0729 1600 0.2026 0.0674 0.0808
Table 3.16: Battle Territory Phase 4 Hawkes Process Results
Model A µ k0 ω AIC KS KS 95% KS 99%
Poisson Process – 0.8269 – – 3175 1.0000 0.0372 0.0446
No Seasonality – 0.5715 0.3845 0.0034 3161 0.4442 0.0372 0.0446
1 Fourier Term 0.0032 0.5854 0.3634 0.0034 3163 0.4436 0.0372 0.0446
2 Fourier Terms 0.0109 0.6428 0.2849 0.0030 3163 0.4522 0.0372 0.0446
Table 3.17: Violence Against Civilians Phase 3 Hawkes Process Results
Model A µ k0 ω AIC KS KS 95% KS 99%
Poisson Process – 0.0444 – – 422 1.0000 0.1904 0.2282
No Seasonality – 0.0321 1.0000 0.0007 424 0.2175 0.1904 0.2282
1 Fourier Term 0.0089 0.0331 1.0000 0.0006 425 0.1018 0.1904 0.2282
2 Fourier Terms 0.0075 0.0332 1.0000 0.0006 425 0.0894 0.1904 0.2282
Table 3.18: Violence Against Civilians Phase 4 Hawkes Process Results
Model A µ k0 ω AIC KS KS 95% KS 99%
Poisson Process – 0.3075 – – 2146 1.0000 0.0613 0.0735
No Seasonality – 0.1288 0.6492 0.0064 2121 0.2136 0.0613 0.0735
1 Fourier Term 0.0138 0.1729 0.4794 0.0075 2122 0.2094 0.0613 0.0735
2 Fourier Terms 0.0289 0.2779 1.0000 0.0001 2109 0.2080 0.0613 0.0735
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3.7 Discussion
In this chapter a novel modelling framework has been presented which can be used to
capture cyclical and history dependent dynamics in terrorist attacks. In particular,
by utilising the FFT significant periodicities were identified and used to build a
Fourier series. This Fourier series was then used as a background rate for the past
dependent Hawkes point process model.
The chapter opened with an examination of the historical roots of the AS group.
In particular, AS was found to have operated in four phases according to strate-
gic developments (Anderson and McKnight, 2015a; Hansen, 2013; Marchal, 2009;
Maszka, 2017; Wise, 2011). These phases spanned the period from the groups incep-
tion through to December 2007, January 2008 to April 2008, May 2008 to July 2011
and August 2011 to the present time.
During the AS group’s history there were three leaders as follows
 2006-2008: Aden Hashi Ayro (killed by a US airstrike).
 2008-2014: Ahmed Abdi Godane (killed by a US drone strike).
 2014 - Present: Abu Ubeyda.
Initially AS had success in fighting against government forces. To reverse the
gains achieved by AS a force consisting of international troops known as the African
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was sent into Somalia. In addition, to provide
a bulwark against AS on the border Kenyan troops also moved into South Somalia.
This combination of international forces had the effect of AS losing ground.
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As a consequence of the pressure placed on AS the group evolved strategically.
Specifically, the group relied more on attacks involving IEDs. Accompanying this
shift in tactics AS also began launching high profile international events including
an attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi in 2013 (Williams, 2014) and another
on the Garissa University in 2015 (Lyons et al., 2015). The incorporation of less
discriminant attacks by AS lead to numerous civilian deaths.
From these observations concerning AS the datasets studied in this chapter were
analysed in four sets - BT (phases 3 and 4) and VAC (phases 3 and 4). Phases 1
and 2 were excluded from analysis due to a limited number of datapoints.
Section 3.3 presents the results of using the FFT to find periodicities in the AS
event data in monthly counts and Somalia rainfall data also in monthly counts. It
was shown that the BT and VAC phase 3 datasets followed a four cycle period each
year. On the other hand, the BT and VAC phase 4 datasets followed a much longer
27 and 54 months cycles.
These observations concerning the periodicities in the AS data can be interpreted
in terms of the real-world changes the group underwent.
In phase 3 the group was more involved in fighting government forces. Since these
type of events involved more traditional military tactics organising AS members and
accounting for weather patterns influenced the trends seen in the groups attack
dynamics.
In contrast during phase 4 AS had been forced to retreat by the arrival of inter-
national forces in Somalia. Hence the group relied more on IED attacks which could
be organised in a more spontaneous manner.
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Having studied the cyclical nature of AS events this chapter focused on generating
a model capable of capturing any past dependent behaviour in the attacks. This was
achieved via the use of seasonal background rate in a Hawkes self-exciting point
process model. The background rate took the form of a Fourier series constructed
from the two frequencies with highest power identified with the FFT.
For the BT phase 3 dataset the best performing model is the seasonal Hawkes
process model with a two term Fourier series background rate. Also for this dataset
the simple stationary background rate Hawkes process outperforms a Poisson model.
Therefore, despite no overall goodness of fit there does appear to be some evidence
for historical dependence between the datapoints.
For the dataset of BT phase 4 the Hawkes process with constant background rate
has the lowest AIC value. Hence there appears to be historical dependence in this
dataset but the inclusion of seasonal trends does not provide any improvement.
The best performing model, according to the AIC, for the VAC phase 3 dataset
was a simple Poisson process. However, it can be observed from the KS test statistics
that the seasonal Hawkes process models have a significant fit. Moreover, the AIC
values of the Poisson and Hawkes models are similar. This provides some evidence
for both cyclical and historical dependence. However, it should be noted that the
values of k0 for the VAC phase 3 models are not in the allowed range for a Hawkes
process.
In the results for the dataset VAC phase 4 the seasonal Hawkes process with two
Fourier terms has the lowest AIC value, and, is thus the best performing model.
Hence evidence exists for both a cyclical dynamic and historical dependence in the
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dataset. As was noted for the phase 3 VAC models the value of k0 = 1 for the VAC
phase 4 Hawkes process model with a two termed Fourier series background is not a
valid value for the Hawkes model.
In addition to studying the quantitative results from the analyses in this chapter
it is also insightful to relate the results to real-world events.
For the scaling parameter only small changes are observed for the seasonal Hawkes
process models across the datasets. This implies that the magnitude of the seasonal
effects are consistent. From this observation it can be deduced that seasonal trends
are a stable dynamic in each AS dataset.
The background rate of the seasonal Hawkes process models show a greater shift
across the data phases. For the BT and VAC phase 3 datasets the parameter µ has
smaller values than for the corresponding phase 4 datasets. A possible reason for
this observation was that phase 4 was associated with a greater usage of IED attacks
which may be easier to launch leading to a higher background rate of attacks.
After an event the Hawkes process model aims to capture a boost in successive
events via the parameter k0. There is a significant change in this parameter value
between the phase 3 and 4 datasets. In particular, after attacks in phase 3 the boosts
were much greater than those observed in phase 4. Phase 3 was associated with the
arrival of forces made up of Ugandan and Burundian troops aimed at countering
AS. Therefore, the boost parameter in the seasonal Hawkes model may be reflecting
this increased domestic focus of AS. On the other hand, in phase 4 AS was forced to
retreat from territory and adopted a wider use of IED and high profile international
attacks. These types of attacks may have been more standalone in nature meaning
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follow up events were less likely.
Since a boosted level of attacks is unsustainable the parameter ω controls the
decay rate of related events. Across phases the decay parameters do not change
significantly for either the BT or VAC datasets. This implies the length of the
memory of AS attacks was consistent under each category. This implies that in the
longer term tactics used by Godane, the second leader of AS, were continued under
the group’s third leader, Ubeyda. This observation is similar to that of (Maszka,
2017) that Ubeyda has not yet altered the tactical approach of AS.
In addition to analysing the results across the BT and VAC datasets it is also
interesting to discuss the differences between corresponding phases. For the BT
and VAC phase 3 datasets the background rates µ are slightly higher for BT events
whilst the boost is greater for the VAC events. The decay factors are greater for
the BT events. This observations suggest that the BT events in phase 3 occurred at
a slightly higher average rate and decade much faster than VAC events. However,
after an initial attack the VAC phase 3 events had a greater increase in rate. These
results may be explained by AS attacks being focused on obtaining territory from
governmental forces in phase 3. Once territory was obtained further attacks would
be unnecessary. On the other hand violence against civilians could have been used
for population control which would need to be maintained during AS occupation.
This observation resembles a similar discussion by Maszka (2017) who notes that
Godane aimed to impose strict laws on the people in AS held territory.
Between BT and VAC phase 4 the values of µ move from higher to lower. On the
other hand the boost values are higher in the VAC category. In contrast, the decay
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parameters for VAC phase 4 are similar to those for BT except for the seasonal
Hawkes process with a two termed Fourier series for the VAC dataset where the
decay parameter is smaller than for BT. The results for the value of the background
rate µ and boost k0 are similar for the AS events studied in phase 3. However, the
similarity of the decay rates in phase 4 demonstrate a shift in tactics by the AS group.
Specifically, the group was losing territory in phase 4 and had begun relying on IED
attacks. The usage of more indiscriminate methods could be leading to convergence
in BT and VAC attack profiles.
Although this chapter has provided little evidence for statistical significance of
the seasonal Hawkes process model for AS attacks some interesting observations have
still be obtained. Firstly, by utilising the FFT prior to the Hawkes model fitting
it was possible to confirm insights about seasonal trends in the event datasets. In
particular, some evidence was found for Hypothesis 3 that AS attacks have a 3 month
cycle relating to rainy seasons in Somalia. Having obtained the most significant
periods present in the AS event data a seasonal Hawkes process model was derived.
Specifically, the two FFT periods of highest power were used to construct a Fourier
series background rate for the Hawkes model. The analyses of these seasonal models
did not provide much evidence for goodness of fit. Therefore, there is little evidence
to support Hypothesis 1 in the case of AS that there is historical dependence in the
data similar to earthquakes and aftershocks. However, after fitting the full seasonal
Hawkes process the model parameters provided a link between the models and the
real world event occurrences. Hence, some evidence exists for Hypothesis 4 that the
Hawkes model can be used as a real-time analysis tool. Moreover, the use of the
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extensions of the Hawkes process in this chapter demonstrate how the model can
be used to study terrorism internationally. In particular, the research conducted in
this chapter illustrates the usage of the Hawkes model to study terrorism in a non-
western setting. Developing universal models has implications for counter-terrorism
practitioners and researchers by providing the foundations of versatile modelling
approaches adaptable to a variety of environmental conditions.
There are several possible approaches to extending the work presented in this
chapter. A simple change that could be taken within the framework already es-
tablished would be to consider different kernels for the Hawkes process. Here an
exponential self-exciting kernel was studied but as discussed by Ogata (1999) there
are numerous other approaches that can be studied. Another direction that could be
taken to improve the model developed in this chapter is to consider a marked point
process (Daley and Vere-Jones, 2003). A marked point process could be adapted to
explicitly model weather conditions inside the point process model. Finally, it could
be possible to incorporate the change point detection methods from Chapter 2 of
this thesis to confirm whether the points used to delineate Al Shabaab’s phases were
mathematically correct.
CHAPTER 4
GEOGRAPHIC PROFILING USING THE DIRICHLET PROCESS MIXTURE
MODEL
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A fundamental principle in the field of crime science is that environmental factors
have a significant influence on the occurrence of crime (Brantingham and Branting-
ham, 1981; Brantingham and Brantingham, 1993a; Eck, 2010). These factors can be
disaggregated into three classes - spatial, temporal and spatio-temporal. In previous
chapters covered in this thesis the main focus has been on modelling temporal dy-
namics of terrorist attacks. On the other hand, spatial components of attacks have
been treated implicitly via data segmentation according to geographic locations of
interest. Hence there is potential that some important insights may have been missed
concerning the underlying factors driving terrorist incidents. Therefore, in this chap-
ter the temporal studies of IED attacks by the Provisional Irish Republican Army
will be further enhanced through consideration of a spatial model.
Motivation to study spatial patterns in the field of Crime Science stems from
observations made concerning urban crime. Currently the predominant theory in
this setting, as discussed in Cornish and Clarke (1986), is that an offenders spatial
targeting of where to commit a crime is based on a rational thought process. This
theory is also padded with the caveat that this rational approach is based on a utility
maximisation based on multiple factors, such as, risks vs rewards, knowledge, time
constraints and possible resource requirements needed for the offence. Building on the
rational offender view is the crime pattern theory of Brantingham and Brantingham
(1993a). Here spatial patterns are modelled based on the assumption that offences
occur at locations coinciding with an offenders awareness space developed as a result
of the offenders routine activities.
Combining the approaches of these theories (Cohen and Felson, 1979) crimes
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are more likely to occur when there exists an overlap between the awareness space
of an offender and targets which are lacking guardianship. These hypotheses have
been demonstrated to be correct in the urban crime studies literature. For example,
crimes, such as, burglary and robbery have higher probability to be located on road
networks that are widely known (Beavon, Brantingham and Brantingham, 1994;
Davies and Johnson, 2015; Johnson and Bowers, 2010) as well as potential nodes,
such as, shops and bars, within an offenders awareness space (Bowers, 2014; Groff
and Lockwood, 2014).
The spatial targeting methods of offenders have also been shown to be similar in
nature to ways animals are observed to purse foraging strategies (Johnson, Summers
and Pease, 2009). In particular, evidence has been found that offenders choose to
commit crimes at locations which have proven successful in the past (Bernasco, 2008;
Bernasco, Johnson and Ruiter, 2015; Johnson, 2008; Johnson, Summers and Pease,
2009; Pitcher and Johnson, 2011). The theory underpinning this foraging behaviour
is that offenders are limited in their journey-to-crime distance. Therefore, repeatedly
targeting a geographic location can ensure that good knowledge of an area is obtained
which can be used to ensure future successful offences. On the other hand, this type
of offending pattern can both deplete the available resources in an area and attract
the attention of authorities. As a result of these two factors there is a shift in the
offenders risk-reward analysis whereby after some period of criminal activity in an
area the offender will move to a new geographical target.
Parallels may be drawn between the spatial patterns of criminal offenders and
those of terrorist attacks. Specifically terrorist groups although existing under the
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name of their organisations can actually carry out attacks at a more refined smaller
group level. An example of this occurred within the Provisional IRA which, after
suffering heavy infiltration by British Security Forces, splintered into a cellular or-
ganisation in 1977 (Asal et al., 2013). The terrorist actors versus state actors at this
group scale can now be treated somewhat analogous to the urban criminal versus a
police force. Both situations present an asymmetry between the resources accessible
to the actors on each side. It has been argued in the literature (Johnson and Braith-
waite, 2009; Townsley, Johnson and Ratcliffe, 2008) that this observation makes it
suitable to apply Crime Science approaches to study spatial dynamics of terrorist
attacks.
One area of overlap between cell based terrorist group attacks and urban crimes
is the focusing of spatial targets as described previously. It was a specified aim of
the PIRA, presented in the groups “Green Book” (O’Brien, 1999), to wage a “war
of attrition against enemy personnel which is aimed at causing as many casualties
and deaths as possible so as to create a demand from their people at home for their
withdrawal”. This method of trying to exhaust the enemy centered on a widescale
campaign of improvised explosive device (IED) attacks with Coogan (2002) explain-
ing that PIRA had the ability to “turn ... bombing[s] on and off like a tap”. In
this respect the cells within PIRA were operating in a similar way to an urban crim-
inal targeting an area before moving on when the risk of detection by authorities
outweighs any rewards. Investigations of the relationship between insurgent and
counterinsurgent strategies (Braithwaite and Johnson, 2012; Johnson et al., 2011)
have revealed that space-time patterns hold similar to those of urban offender theo-
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ries described earlier.
In this chapter research into spatial clustering of terrorist attacks will be expanded
through research into the relationship between PIRA IED attacks and the closure of
IED factories by British Security Forces. The methodology used to study the spatial
patterns of attacks in this chapter are based on research into geographic profiling
(GP). In essence GP models incorporate the theoretical aspects of environmental
influences from crime science and mathematical techniques that analyse groupings of
objects to determine likely geographical locations for the source of criminal activities
(Rossmo, 2000). Although such approaches have been proven effective to understand
the spatial nature of offending (Canter et al., 2000; Levine, 2006; Miller, 2003; Verity
et al., 2014) there is a gap for their extension into terrorism literature.
For the research presented here a GP model known as the Dirichlet Process
Mixture Model (DPMM) will be introduced and used to study spatial components
of terrorist attacks. The DPMM is a method based on Bayesian analysis which uses
the relationship between prior and posterior distributions to convert the locations of
events into information pertaining to the most likely sources of the events (Verity et
al., 2014). The DPMM will be used here in a novel approach which studies how the
grouping of IED attacks is influenced by the closure of IED factories. This research
can be directly employed by those developing counter-terrorism policies to inform
best practise approaches.
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4.1 Datasets
There were two separate datasets used in the analyses undertaken in this chapter
corresponding to PIRA IED attacks and IED factory discoveries by British Security
Forces. Both of these datasets were collated from open sources as part of a research
project by Asal et al. (2013).
The IED dataset was derived from open source accounts of attacks in Northern
Ireland using LexisNexis and the Irish Times reporting archive. In total the database
consists of 5461 entries. For the research conducted in this chapter the main fields
extracted from the database were times and locations of the events. Timing data for
the attacks was measured on a daily scale in the form of year/month/day. Location
data was recorded on a county level scale covering the six counties of Northern
Ireland (Antrim, Armagh, Derry, Down, Fermanagh, Tyrone) and the capital city
(Belfast). Further data also exists for the border counties of Cavan, Donegal, Leitrim,
Louth, and Monaghan. However, the focus in this chapter was restricted to Belfast,
which, as the capital city witnessed a high volume of terrorist activity (Bell, 2000;
Coogan, 2002; Fay, Morrissey and Smyth, 1999; McKittrick, 2007). Alongside county
information the IED dataset also contains some limited street level data, which,
is needed to perform a more refined spatial analysis using the DPMM. From this
reduced dataset unique events are separated where unique is defined by the condition
that no two entries have the same time and location. The use of “and” in this
context is as a logical operator allowing events to have overlaps of time or location
but excluding any cases where these features are both identical. In particular, there is
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data covering 192 street level events in Belfast. Although this disaggregation reduces
the number of available data points used from the original dataset it is also necessary
to obtain more detailed results from applying the DPMM. It is also of importance
to state that the dataset constructed is ordered temporally ranging from earliest to
latest event. This arrangement of the data by increasing time is important for the
novel implementation of the DPMM that will be introduced later in Section 4.4.
For data pertaining to the IED factory closures Asal et al. (2013) explain that
“such data were difficult to collect in a systematic way”. However, Asal et al. did
compile an unstructured dataset of news reports covering some of the IED factory
discoveries that occurred in Northern Ireland. Focusing on Belfast it was possible
to extract from the original unstructured dataset a series of 19 events involving IED
factory identification. This subset of data had dates of identification on a daily scale
recorded in the form year/month/day and street level addresses.
A further step that was taken before using the IED and factory datasets was
to code their geographic information into latitude (lat)/longitude (long) pairs. To
achieve this coding the Python module requests (Chandra and Varanasi, 2015) was
used to make calls to OpenStreetMap (OSM) search engine Nominatim
(www.nominatim.openstreetmap.org/) and extracted the returned lat/long coordi-
nates. When the OSM search failed to return coordinates the same script would
instead use the Google Maps Api (https://maps.googleapis.com).
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In Tables 4.1 - 4.2 summaries of the datasets used in this chapter are provided
Table 4.1: PIRA IED Dataset
Field Data
Date Time of the recorded event in the form
year(1970-1998)-month(1-12)-day(1-31)
Lat/Long Latitude and longitude coordinates of street
level events in the Belfast area
Table 4.2: Factory Closure Dataset
Field Data
Date Time of the recorded event in the form
year(1970-1994)-month(1-12)-day(1-31)
Lat/Long Latitude and longitude coordinates of street
level closures in the Belfast area
4.2 Geographic Profiling
In the following sections the historical and mathematical development of the Dirich-
let Process Mixture Model in the field of geographic profiling will be covered. This
section also serves as a way to motivate the use of the DPMM as a method for study-
ing the relationship between terrorist IED factories and counter-terrorism approaches
aimed at closing them.
4.2.1 Criminal Geographic Profiling
The research field of geographic profiling and its application to studying criminal
geographic targeting (CGT) stems from the idea that criminal actors are bound by
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environmental factors. In particular, Lo´pez (2005) describes four parameters which
determine an offenders search space: operational range (furthest distance traveled
by an offender), distance decay (the relationship between offender travel distance
and number of crimes committed), a buffer region (offenders tend not to commit
crimes too close to home so as to avoid incriminating themselves) and direction of
travel (potential for an offender to prioritise a specific direction e.g. due to better
area knowledge). These criminal considerations are then coupled with non-criminal
nodes, such as, pathways and edges associated with daily activities (Brantingham
and Brantingham, 1993b), for example, traveling to socialise or shopping.
A mathematical description of the theory underpinning criminal geographic pro-
filing is given in the work of Rossmo (2000). In studying CGT Rossmo derives the
formula shown in (4.1) to determine the likelihood, pij, that a point, (xi, yj), inside
a specific 2 dimensional region is the source location of observed criminal event sites
{xn, yn}. To make the function more applicable to the study of criminal activity
in the research of Rossmo the Manhattan metric is used which models the distance
between the source of crimes and the criminal events on a grid network which the
offender must traverse.
pij = k
N∑
n=1
[
φ
(|xi − xn|+ |yj − yn|)f
+
(1− φ)(Bg−f )
2B − (|xi − xn|+ |yj − yn|)g
]
(4.1)
with the conditions that
|xi − xn|+ |yj − yn| > B ⊃ φ = 1, (4.2)
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and
|xi − xn|+ |yj − yn| ≤ B ⊃ φ = 0. (4.3)
Here the value pij is known as the score function indicating the likelihood that a
geographic location is the source of the observed events. For each possible source
(xi, yj) the score function is calculated by the formula in (4.1). The function φ is used
to defined a buffer zone or region where the crimes are most likely located based on
the ideas of distance to crime researched discussed earlier. The buffer zone is defined
to have radius B. Inside the buffer zone the function φ = 0 and outside φ = 1.
The constant value k is determined empirically. When summing over the crime
site locations the total number of crimes is N . Finally the empirically determined
parameters f and g control the decay rate around a potential source location. After
applying the formula in (4.1) a 3 dimensional surface plot can be made illustrating
the likelihood of source locations of the observed events.
4.2.2 Bayesian Framework of CGT
One of the major drawbacks of the CGT method proposed by Rossmo (2000) is that
the model assumes a fixed formulation. In particular, the model utilises a specific
decay function and distance metric. As a result of this fixed nature the equation in
(4.1) has somewhat limited usage.
A method widely used in the fields of probability and statistics which allows for
models to evolve based on other pieces of information is known as Bayes’ rule. This
rule is derived as follows (Ross, 2010).
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First define the probability of event A given another event B as
P (A|B) = P (A
⋂
B)
P (B)
. (4.4)
Similarly
P (B|A) = P (A
⋂
B)
P (A)
. (4.5)
From the definitions in (4.4) and (4.5) it follows immediately that
P (A|B)P (B) = P (B|A)P (A), (4.6)
which leads to Bayes’ rule
P (A|B) = P (B|A)P (A)
P (B)
. (4.7)
The use of Bayes’ rule in CGT begun with the research of O’Leary (2009). Specif-
ically, O’Leary formulated that the posterior distribution for a source location z and
an average distance to crime α given the observed location x of a single criminal
event is
P (z, α|x) = P (x|z, α)pi(z, α)
P (x)
. (4.8)
Note that in (4.8) the source z = (z(1), z(2)) and crime site x = (x(1), x(2)) are
two-dimensional vectors. In this chapter these vectors are lat/long coordinates.
Here the term pi(z, α) is called the prior distribution and represents the distribu-
tion of the potential source location z and distance to crime α before information
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about the crime location is known. O’Leary also assumes a situation in which the
source location and distance parameter are independent thus factorising
pi(z, α) = H(z)pi(α). (4.9)
Now the H is the prior for the source location and pi is the prior for the average
distance traveled by the offender.
Since the marginal distribution P (x) is independent of the z and α this term can
be ignored and hence the final formulation becomes
P (z, α|x) ∝ P (x|z, α)H(z)pi(α). (4.10)
O’Leary (2009) also further extends the Bayesian CGT model to incorporate the
observation of several crime site events given by the series {xi}Ni=1. Following similar
steps to the case of observing only a single crime site we obtain the formula
P (z, α|x1, ...,xN) ∝ P (x1, ...,xN |z, α)H(z)pi(α). (4.11)
As before the term P (z, α|x1, ...,xN) is the posterior distribution of source, z, and
average distance, α, whilst P (x1, ...,xN |z, α) gives the joint probability of observing
the locations {xi}Ni=1 given the source and average distance.
Assuming that the criminal event sites are independent yields
P (x1, ...,xN |z, α) = P (x1|z, α)P (x2|z, α)...P (xN |z, α). (4.12)
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Therefore we can write
P (z, α|x1, ...,xN) ∝
(
N∏
i=1
P (xi|z, α)
)
H(z)pi(α), (4.13)
where
∏
is used to denote the product of the terms.
The final step in O’Leary’s formulation is to observe that since we are only in-
terested in the source location, z, for the crimes it is possible to take the conditional
distribution by integrating as follows
P (z|x1, ...,xN) ∝
∫ ( N∏
i=1
P (xi|z, α)
)
H(z)pi(α)dα. (4.14)
Hence to search for a likely source location it is necessary to find a geographic point
with a high value of P (z|x1, ...,xN) computed via (4.14).
At this point it is worth noting a major drawback that also occurs with this
Bayesian approach. When introducing the method of Rossmo (2000) no assumptions
were made concerning the number of potential sources. However with the Bayes
approach described by O’Leary (2009) only one source location is considered. Hence,
although allowing more flexibility to include new information into the model, the
Bayes method is not suitable in this form for studies with potentially multiple sources.
A goal, therefore, is to derive a model capable of combining more than one source
location as in Rossmo (2000) with the adaptability of adding new information with
the use of a Bayesian approach as in O’Leary (2009). This problem is solved using
the Dirichlet Process Mixture Model.
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4.3 Dirichlet Process Mixture Model
4.3.1 Model Theory
The problem of assigning event locations to more than one source location can be
solved by appealing to Dirichlet Process Mixture Models (DPMM). In this section the
theoretical foundations of the DPMM will be presented alongside practical aspects
of how the model can be used in application.
Extensive research covering the mathematical foundation and properties of the
DPMM already exist (Escobar and West, 1995; Ferguson, 1983; Green and Richard-
son, 2001). One property in particular which makes the DPMM such a useful model
is the flexibility it affords concerning the possible number of source locations that
can be found. Specifically the DPMM has the property of allowing a potentially infi-
nite number of sources to exist. Therefore, when applying the DPMM to a problem
where N events are observed all possible groupings of N events in up to N groups
are considered with the most likely model being chosen.
The basic design of the DPMM and details of model inference are provided in
the research of Neal (2000). Here an overview of the work of Neal will be provided.
From this point the model will be established with the aim of applying the DPMM
in a two dimensional discrete setting. Therefore, all crime event locations and source
locations will be assumed to be points of the form (ω(1), ω(2)) ∈ Ω ⊂ R2.
Assume that the total number of observed crime sites is given by N and that
these sites are denoted by the set {xi}Ni=1. Moreover, assume that the infinite possible
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source locations for the crimes are denoted by {zi}∞i=1 or z1,...,∞. It should be noted
that in application the actual number of sources will be bounded by the number
of events. However, to demonstrate the potential of the DPMM it was decided to
present arguments with a potentially infinite number of sources. Prior to adding
information concerning the observed event locations xi it is also assumed that the zi
are drawn from some prior distribution denoted G0(zi). In the language of DPMM
G0 is known as the base distribution of the Dirichlet Process. Then each crime event
location xi can be associated with a source via an index denoted ci. In particular,
it is said that the crime at xi originated from the source at zci . The point xi can
be thought of as a draw from some distribution F (zci). Here the distribution F
will be taken to be a 2 dimensional Gaussian centered on the location of zci . This
assumption on the distribution is justified based on the theory of criminal geographic
profiling where it is assumed that an offenders travel distance decays moving away
from their home location (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1981; Liu and Eck, 2008;
Rhodes and Conly, 1981).
Subsequently the ci are considered to be drawn from a method known as the
Chinese Restaurant Process (CRP). The CRP is associated with a concentration
parameter α. If the model has determined that there exists a group A from which
a total of NA crime events are grouped then the probability that the next observed
crime event also belongs to group A is given by
NA
N + α
(4.15)
where NA is the number of elements already in A and N is the total number of
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observed crime events observed thus far. Conversely the probability that the next
observation stems from a group with a different source is given by
α
N + α
. (4.16)
Observe that under the CRP probabilities in (4.15) and (4.16) there is preference for
groups with a higher number of events to grow larger than the emergence of a new
group.
Considering all of the above assumptions the DP model can expressed as
xi|zci ∼ F(zci) (4.17)
z1,...,∞ ∼ G0 (4.18)
ci ∼ CRP(α). (4.19)
With the DPMM as stated above the concentration parameter of the CRP must
be estimated from the dataset being studied. However, this estimation procedure
can be avoided using an extension of the DPMM made by Verity et al. (2014). In
particular, a hyper-prior distribution can be placed on α denoted by H. In this
case hyperprior simply means a prior distribution placed on α but it is termed a
hyperprior in order to distinguish that the prior is over the parameter α of the CRP
model. Therefore, the full DPMM can be described as follows
xi|zci ∼ F(zci) (4.20)
z1,...,∞ ∼ G0 (4.21)
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ci ∼ CRP(α) (4.22)
α ∼ H. (4.23)
The F , G0 and H each denote a type of distribution, such as, normal or exponential.
On the other hand F (xi|zci), G0(zi) and H(α) represent probability mass/density
functions.
4.3.2 DPMM Formulae
Having established a description of the DPMM in terms of distributions it is now
possible to derive relevant formulae that can be used to compute useful information
from the DPMM framework. The main application of the DPMM in this chapter
is to cluster data. Therefore, consider a specific partition defined by the indices ci
and assign the indices to the vector c := (c1, ..., cN). With this partitioning there is
a corresponding value Nj = |{ci : ci = j}| which denotes the number of elements in
group j. Moreover, for a total number of groups u ≤ N we have that ∑uj=1 Nj = N .
In the work of Antoniak (1974) it was shown that the conditional probability
P (c|α) = α
uΓ(α)
Γ(N + α)
u∏
j=1
Γ(Nj). (4.24)
Here the function Γ is defined by (Artin and Butler, 2015)
Γ(α) =
∫ ∞
0
sα−1e−sds. (4.25)
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As is common in Bayesian settings (Gelman et al., 2014) we can integrate over
the α to obtain
P (c) =
∫
P (c|α)P (α)dα =
∫
P (c|α)H(α)dα (4.26)
where P (α) = H(α) follows from the definition of the DPMM.
In the research of Verity et al. (2014) the authors define the function
t(u) =
∫ ∞
0
αuΓ(α)
Γ(N + α)
H(α)dα. (4.27)
Therefore, we obtain
P (c) = t(u)
u∏
j=1
Γ(Nj). (4.28)
Another quantity of interest that is easily obtained from the definition of the
DPMM, and using Bayesian techniques, is the marginal probability for the vector of
data points x := (x1, ...,xN)
P (x|c) =
∞∏
j=1
∑
ω∈Ω
G0(ω)
∏
i:ci=j
F (xi|ω). (4.29)
Observe that the first product in this formula considers the possibility of an infinite
number of source locations. However, in application there will always be a finite
number of sources. In this case only a subset of the indices j are associated with
sources whilst other indices in the summation will correspond to a sum over the prior
which is equal to 1.
The probabilities found in (4.28) and (4.29) can be combined using Bayes’ rule
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to obtain
P (c|x) = P (x|c)P (c)∑
c∈P P (x|c)P (c)
, (4.30)
where the set P denotes all possible ways to partition N data points in at most N
groups.
In the previous derivations formulae have been obtained relating to a particular
partition defined by the vector c. However, when performing inference techniques for
the DPMM discussed later in this chapter it is also necessary to have a formula for
the distribution of a single source location zj. Again using the distributions defined
in the DPMM it holds that
P (zj|c,x) =
G0(zj)
∏
i:ci=j
F (xi|zj)∑
ω∈Ω G0(ω)
∏
i:ci=j
F (xi|ω) . (4.31)
So far in this exposition of the DPMM the necessary equations have been provided
which allow us to compute the required probabilities for the model. These numerical
values can contain interesting information but are harder to interpret raw than a
visual representation. Moreover, if models like the DPMM are to be useful in real
world settings by practitioners unfamiliar with the mathematical theory a simple to
interpret representation of the model outcomes is essential. To this end the formulae
derived above can now be combined in order to provide a method for calculating a
jeopardy surface visually demonstrating the most likely sources for crime or terrorist
attacks.
As the research of Verity et al. (2014) explains the problem of interest is to find
the location of any source location z. In probabilistic terms this problem can be
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reduced approximately to finding the mean of the probabilities P (zj|c,x) (exactly in
the case of a continuous setting with the use of probability density functions instead
of probability mass functions). This mean is computed as
J (z|c,x) = 1
u
u∑
j=1
P (zj|c,x), (4.32)
where J represents the jeopardy surface of source locations conditioned on a partic-
ular partition c and event locations x.
However, we have from (4.30) a distribution for partitions given events. Therefore,
a full jeopardy surface for source locations given event locations can be obtained via
the formula
J (z|x) =
∑
c∈P
J (z|c,x)P (c|x). (4.33)
4.3.3 Markov Chain Monte Carlo Method of Inference
The fundamental idea underpinning the DPMM is to consider each point of a dataset
in turn and compute the likelihood that the point should be included in a previously
found cluster or added to a new cluster. This process is then repeated iteratively
through the dataset until the most likely combination of the datapoints into clusters
is discovered. As demonstrated in Section 4.3.2 for a dataset consisting of N entries
the problem requires a summation over N points into at most N clusters. This type
of problem has been considered in the field of combinatorial mathematics where Bell
numbers are used to describe the total possible partitions of a set (Bell, 1934; Bell,
1938). As pointed to by Verity et al. (2014) even for very small datasets with 10
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data entries the Bell number is large, B10 = 115975. Therefore, adopting a brute
force approach by directly trying to apply the DPMM on even small datasets is
computationally expensive. Hence it is necessary to use a probabilistic sampling
method to infer the best clustering of a given set of data.
When performing statistical inference a well studied and highly effective method
to minimise problems of expensive computational time is to appeal to a class of
algorithms known as Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods (Berg, 2004;
Gamerman, 1997; Gilks, Richardson and Spiegelhalter, 1996). MCMC algorithms
are used to reconstruct a probability distribution. The algorithm starts from some
initial value and constructs a new value, for example by adding a random number,
and then compares the current and new value using some chosen criteria in order to
determine whether to keep the current value or move to the new value. Since this
step only requires the current and new values, i.e. no past dependence, a Markov
chain is being constructed. This method must be repeated until a required level of
convergence is achieved. The latter step is the Monte Carlo method. By carefully
choosing the comparison technique at each stage of the algorithm it can proven that
this method will converge on the original probability distribution.
4.3.4 Gibbs Sampling for DPMM
A specific type of MCMC algorithm which has been used for DPMM inference is
known as a Gibbs sampler. In the research of Neal (2000) a full account of the
application of Gibbs sampling to DPMM is provided. Here an overview of the work
of Neal is presented.
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Recall that the index ci links the location of event xi to a source zci . Assume
that on the current step of the Gibbs sampling method a draw of value k is made
for ci. Then let c−i := {cj|j 6= i} be the subset of indices excluding ci. From this
subset make a further definition of the subset c−i,k := {cj|j 6= i, j = k} of index ck
with k 6= i. Corresponding to c−i,k we have the value N−i,k = |c−i,k| which represents
the number of elements of the subset c−i,k. In this case formula 3.6 from Neal (2000)
implies that given the most recent source locations we have
if k ∈ c−i
P (ci = k|c−i,xi, z1,...,∞, α) = b N−i,k
N − 1 + αF (xi|zk) (4.34)
else if k /∈ c−i
P (ci = k|c−i,xi, z1,...,∞, α) = b α
N − 1 + α
∑
ω∈Ω
F (xi|ω)G0(ω) (4.35)
for some normalising constant b. These formulas hold for i = 1, ..., N .
In terms of the CRP (4.34) states that the probability of placing xi in an already
occupied cluster is proportional to the number N−i,k of other data points associated
to that cluster. On the other hand (4.35) states that there exists a probability
proportional to α of xi being assigned to a new cluster. After finding the most likely
of these two situations for each i it is then possible to draw a new set of zci based
on the formula derived in (4.31).
As discussed by Verity et al. (2014) the formulations in (4.34) and (4.35) can be
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simplified by removing the dependence on α via integration. In particular, using the
function t defined in (4.27) Verity et al. (2014) derive the formula
if k ∈ c−i
P (ci = k|c−i,xi, z1,...,∞) = b′t(u−i)N−i,kF (xi|zk) (4.36)
else if k /∈ c−i
P (ci = k|c−i,xi, z1,...,∞) = b′t(u−i + 1)
∑
ω∈Ω
F (xi|ω)G0(ω) (4.37)
with u−i denoting the number of unique elements of the set c−i. The value b′ is
used to indicate a new constant of proportionality.
The last step in deriving the formulae for the Gibbs sampling method is to move
from the discrete setting into the case of continuous space. In this case the functions
F (·) and G0(·) are probability density functions (pdfs). To simplify the calculations
needed for the DPMM these pdfs are assumed to be conjugate. Conjugate means
that the density functions F (·) and G0(·) belong to the same family (Gelman et
al., 2014). A common example of conjugation is when the pdfs take the form of
an exponential. In this case the relationship between posterior and prior density
functions corresponds, according to Bayes’ theorem, to exponential multiplication
which results in arithmetical changes to the exponent. A well studied example of an
exponential family are Gaussian distributions. As discussed earlier in this chapter
the 2 dimensional multivariate Gaussian is employed.
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We can now describe the analogous probabilities to (4.36) and (4.37), under the
assumption of continuous space and conjugate pdfs
if k ∈ c−i
P (ci = k|c−i,xi) = b′′t(u−i)N−i,k
∫
Ω
F (xi|ω)dy−i,k(ω) (4.38)
else if k /∈ c−i
P (ci = k|c−i,xi) = b′′t(u−i + 1)
∫
Ω
F (xi|ω)dG0(ω). (4.39)
The term y−i,k(ω) represents a posterior distribution over the ω which stems from the
prior G0 and the observed data points xj where j 6= i and cj = k. As in the previous
derivations a new constant of proportionality b′′ has been introduced. It should be
noted however than none of the proportionality constants actually require numerical
evaluation since we only need to sample from the distributions and compare their
relative likelihoods when using the DPMM for cluster analysis.
4.3.5 DPMM Parameter Fitting
A major assumption that has been made throughout the current exposition of the
DPMM is that at each step of the MCMC algorithm only the clustering of data points
needs to be computed. This neglects the fact that the probability distributions being
used to determine the clusters have parameter values which require initialisation.
Specifically, under the model used here where the risk surface consists of multivariate
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distributions over the source locations there are two parameters - the mean and the
standard deviation. In the description of the group allocation method described in
Section 4.3.4 it can be seen that the mean is actually integrated out of the model
to improve efficiency. However, the standard deviation has to be user-defined. One
method described by Stevenson (2013) is to set the standard deviation manually by
consulting a histogram of pairwise distances between the event data points. But
this clearly introduces subjectivity into the problem. Therefore, Stevenson (2013)
proposes incorporating the method now described into the MCMC algorithm which
results in an adaptive model-derived estimation of the standard deviation parameter.
On the level of distributions the adaptive estimation method proposed by Steven-
son (2013) is manifested in the following way
X|µ, σ ∼ N (µ, σ), (4.40)
µ ∼ N (µ˜, σ), (4.41)
σ ∼ IG(δ, β), (4.42)
where X = (x1, ...,xN) is the vector of observed event data, N denotes a normal
distribution and IG is an inverse gamma distribution.
In the case of a one dimensional example a random variable xi which has an
N (µ, σ2) distribution has a probability density function given by (Ross, 2010)
f(xi) =
1√
(2piσ2)
exp
{
−(xi − µ)
2
2σ2
}
. (4.43)
When analysing multidimensional data, as in this chapter, this one dimensional
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density can be generalised. For a random vector of N dimensions, denoted X, with a
multivariate normal distribution having parameters N (µ,Σ) the probability density
function is given by the formula (Ross, 2010)
f(X) =
1
(2pi)
N
2 |Σ| 12
exp
{
−1
2
(X− µ)TΣ−1(X− µ)
}
, (4.44)
where, (X − µ)T denotes the usual vector transpose, which, takes a column vector
to a row vector.
In application to the DPMM the source locations are assumed to correspond to
the same standard deviation σ with this value assumed to hold in both the x- and
y-axes dimensions for each data point. Here the value of σ represents knowledge
about the dispersal distance expected around the sources. A justification for this
assumption in the context of PIRA IED studies can be found in the research of
Horgan et al. (2013). In particular, the research group of Horgan et al found that
63.4% of PIRA members travelled less than 4 miles to commit their attacks.
A final assumption needed to simplify the model is that the dispersal patterns
along the x- and y-axes are independent. This simplifying assumption removes any
matrix multiplications arising from covariance and minimises the number of parame-
ters to be fitted. Furthermore, under this independence assumption it is only neces-
sary to derive formulae in one dimension with the formulae in the second dimension
being the same with a simple change in variable name.
Here we will refer to the spatial x-components via Xx and the y-components as
Xy. The formulae derived using Xx will be the same for Xy except for a change of
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variable.
In each group update step of the MCMC algorithm the density function mod-
elling the event data is dependent on an N (µx, σ2) distribution. Incorporating this
information into (4.44) yields the following density
f(Xx|µx, σ2) = 1
(2piσ2)
N
2
exp
{
− 1
2σ2
N∑
i=1
(xi − µx)2
}
. (4.45)
For the density in (4.45) to be useful it is also necessary to draw values for the
mean and variance at each update step. To achieve this objective it is assumed
that each source location is drawn from a prior distribution modelled as a bivari-
ate normal. For this source distribution we follow the same labelling notation as
in Stevenson (2013) denoting the means along each spatial dimension via the pair
(dx, dy) and the corresponding variances (T
2
x , T
2
y ). With these definitions for the prior
on source locations it is now possible to obtain the following likelihood which models
the joint conditional distribution of event data Xx and mean µx along the x-axis
spatial direction
f(Xx, µx|dx, σ2, T 2x ) =
1
(2piσ2)
N
2
1√
(2piT 2x )
exp
{
−1
2
N∑
i=1
(xi − µx)2
σ2
+
(µx − dx)2
T 2x
}
. (4.46)
This formula is simply the multiplication of the function in (4.45) by the prior over
the source locations.
Observe that the formula in (4.46) contains an exponential function which can
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be simplified. In particular, this formula can be written in the form
f(µx|Xx, dx, σ2, T 2x ) =
1√
(2pi2x)
exp
{
−(µx − θx)
2
22x
}
. (4.47)
To derive this formula observe that the exponent on the right hand side of (4.47)
takes the form
µ2x − 2µxθx + θ2x
2x
(4.48)
whilst the exponent in (4.46) can be expressed as
µ2x
(
N
σ2
+
1
T 2x
)
− 2µx
(∑
xi
σ2
+
dx
T 2x
)
+
(∑
x2i
σ2
+
d2x
T 2x
)
. (4.49)
Comparing the expansions in (4.48) and (4.49) yields the following identities
2x =
1
N
σ2
+ 1
T 2x
θx =
∑
xi
σ2
+ dx
T 2x
N
σ2
+ 1
T 2x
. (4.50)
The significance of the identities derived in (4.50) is that the density from which µx
is drawn can be obtained using the distribution
µx ∼ N
(∑xi
σ2
+ dx
T 2x
N
σ2
+ 1
T 2x
,
1
N
σ2
+ 1
T 2x
)
. (4.51)
Since we made the simplifying assumption earlier that the dispersal along each spatial
axis is independent the same formula in (4.51) holds for the y-dimension after a
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change of notation
µy ∼ N
∑ yiσ2 + dyT 2y
N
σ2
+ 1
T 2y
,
1
N
σ2
+ 1
T 2y
 . (4.52)
Recall that X = (x1, ...,xN) denotes the vector of event data points, where, each
xi = (xi, yi) is a two dimensional point. Each run of the MCMC algorithm assigns to
each data point xi a group via the index ci as outlined in the previous Section 4.3.4.
Moreover, each group defined by a set of the form {xi|ci = j} has a corresponding
cardinality Nj. Let the pair (µ
j
x, µ
j
y) represent the x and y axes means for the event
data assigned to the jth group. From (4.45) we have the following density formulas
f(xi : ci = j|µjx, σ2) =
1
(2piσ2)
Nj
2
exp
{
−
∑
i:ci=j
(xi − µjx)2
2σ2
}
, (4.53)
f(yi : ci = j|µjy, σ2) =
1
(2piσ2)
Nj
2
exp
{
−
∑
i:ci=j
(yi − µjy)2
2σ2
}
. (4.54)
Assuming that the number of groups found on the current step of the MCMC is k then
by combining the density functions for each of the k groups via multiplication the
formula for the complete density function describing the event data can be obtained
via
f(Xx|µ1x, ..., µkx, σ2) =
1
(2piσ2)
N1
2
· · · 1
(2piσ2)
Nk
2
exp
{
−
∑
i:ci=1
(xi − µ1x)2
2σ2
· · · −
∑
i:ci=k
(xi − µkx)2
2σ2
}
(4.55)
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and
f(Xy|µ1y, ..., µky, σ2) =
1
(2piσ2)
N1
2
· · · 1
(2piσ2)
Nk
2
exp
{
−
∑
i:ci=1
(yi − µ1y)2
2σ2
· · · −
∑
i:ci=k
(yi − µky)2
2σ2
}
.
(4.56)
The final parameter that still remains undetermined in the equations derived thus
far is the variance σ2. To draw this parameter an appeal is made to the theory of
conjugate priors. A conjugate prior/posterior relationship simply means that the
prior and posterior distribution are from the same family of distributions (Raiffa and
Schlaifer, 2000). This is usually the case with densities which utilise exponential
functions due to the additive property of the exponents.
It is a standard result that the conjugate prior distribution of a normal distri-
bution with known mean and unknown variance is the inverse gamma distribution
(Gelfand et al., 1990). In the context of the present study of the DPMM an inverse
gamma (IG) distribution of the following form is fitted to the variance parameter σ2
σ2 ∼ IG(δ, β),
f(σ2|δ, β) = β
δ
Γ(δ)
(
1
σ2
)δ+1
exp
{
− β
σ2
}
,
(4.57)
where Γ is the gamma function as defined in Section 4.3.2 as Γ(α) =
∫∞
0
sα−1e−sds.
Multiplying the densities along each axis given by (4.55) and (4.56) and the
inverse gamma prior over the variance given by (4.57) yields the equation
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f(X, σ2|µ1x, ..., µkx, µ1y, ..., µky) =
βδ
Γ(δ)
(
1
σ2
)δ+1+N
1
(2pi)N
exp
{
− 1
σ2
[
β +
k∑
j=1
∑
i:ci=j
[(xi − µjx)2 + (yi − µjy)2]
2
]}
.
(4.58)
Observe that the distribution in (4.58) is again an inverse gamma distribution.
This was the motivating reason to select the IG conjugate prior to the normal distri-
bution. As a result of this observation draws for the variance can now be constructed
using the distribution defined by
σ2 ∼ IG
(
δ +N + 1,
[
β +
k∑
j=1
∑
i:ci=j
[(xi − µjx)2 + (yi − µjy)2]
2
])
. (4.59)
An important remark concerning the result derived in (4.59) is that the inverse
gamma distribution requires the specification of the parameters δ and β. A simple
approach that can be taken to solve this problem is to set the parameters so that
the inverse gamma distribution is uninformative as discussed in Stevenson (2013).
However, in crime science much research has been conducted to numerically quantify
distance-to-crime relationships so it would be preferable to set the inverse gamma
parameters more precisely based on prior knowledge. In the context of the study of
PIRA IED attacks research quantifying the distance travelled by PIRA members to
conduct their attacks has been undertaken by Horgan et al. (2013). Specifically the
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research of Horgan et al found that 63.4% of PIRA attackers travelled less than 4
miles to conduct attacks.
To adapt the model in (4.59) to use prior information about expected dispersal
distance for the data studied, Faulkner et al. (2017) and Stevenson (2013) discuss
a change of space from a prior over σ2 to a one over σ. Firstly we use the formula
discussed in the work of Glen (2011) which shows that the expected value for an
inverse gamma distributed random variable Xr is given by the formula
 = E(Xr) = βr
Γ(δ − r)
Γ(δ)
(4.60)
for δ > r. Therefore, for a fixed expected value of X the following relationship exists
β =
(

Γ(δ)
Γ(δ − r)
) 1
r
. (4.61)
In addition to the expected value formula in (4.61) a transformation formula is
also required. As found in Tanizaki (2004) if for random variables X and Y there is
a one-to-one function ψ such that Y = ψ−1(X) then the following formula holds
fY (y) = |ψ′(y)| fX(ψ(y)), (4.62)
where, fX and fY are the density functions for the random variables X and Y ,
respectively, and ψ
′
is the first derivative of ψ.
With the expectation formula from (4.61) and setting ψ(y) = y2 in the change-
of-variable formula from (4.62) it follows that the prior on the standard deviation is
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given via the formula
f(σ|δ, ) = 2β
δ
Γ(δ)
(
1
σ
)2δ+1
exp
{
−
(
Γ(δ)
σΓ(δ − 1
2
)
)2}
. (4.63)
Here, the value of  is interpretable as the expected dispersal distance for the data
being studied. Observe that a user-specified value for δ is also required. As explained
by Stevenson (2013) this parameter is less important than the value of  and can be
set to provide a diffuse fat-tailed distribution which carries little prior information.
The value of δ needs to satisfy the condition that it is > 0.5 so that the model in
(4.63) is well-defined. We follow the same convention as used in Stevenson (2013)
and have the parameter δ = 1.
On each iteration of the MCMC Gibbs sampler the standard deviation parameter
σ can be now be updated so that the parameter’s value is fitted automatically. Notice
that in this section to obtain the prior on the standard deviation the group means for
the multivariate normals used in the DPMM had to be realised. This is in comparison
to the previous Section 4.3.4 where these means values were integrated out of the
model. In a similar way the group allocations can be found on each iteration of the
MCMC method by integrating out the means. However, prior to performing the
update step of the standard deviation in (4.63) the mean values must be realised
following the steps in this section.
In the research of Faulkner et al. (2017) and Stevenson (2013) the MCMC method
for DPMM fitting was coded into a piece of R (Team, 2017) software. The R code
is maintained on GitHub at https://github.com/stevenlecomber/Rgeoprofile-1.1.0.
The analyses in the remainder of this chapter will be based on this R software which
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will be adapted to include a study of temporal dynamics.
4.4 DPMM Analysis of PIRA IED Factories
In the previous sections of this chapter the mathematical foundation and implemen-
tation methods for using the DPMM have been introduced. Thus far the focus has
been on utilising the DPMM to find groupings of datapoints based on their spatial
configuration. Although this purely spatial model has proven useful in a number of
research topics (Faulkner et al., 2015; Faulkner et al., 2017; Verity et al., 2014) there
is scope for improving the model via the inclusion of temporal dynamics. In partic-
ular, temporal data can enrich insights from spatial patterns by providing a natural
ordering for the data being studied thus allowing for a more detailed description of
the underlying phenomena to be discovered.
As outlined already the outcome of applying the DPMM is a jeopardy surface
illustrating the most likely source locations of a set of events based on grouping
of their spatial coordinates. Here the objective is to look at this jeopardy surface
for IED attacks committed by PIRA in Belfast during The Troubles in Northern
Ireland. However, instead of studying IED attacks in isolation we will also consider
how the spatial patterns evolved over time in relation to the closing of IED factories
by British Security Forces.
Two datasets were required to perform the analyses in this chapter. One dataset
covered the dates and locations of PIRA IED attacks whilst the second dataset
provided the same information but for factory closures. The method devised to
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incorporate events from both datasets was two-fold. Firstly, new datasets of IED
attacks were constructed by extracting all events which occurred prior to the date
of each recorded IED factory discovery. In this case the factory closure dates are
employed as temporal boundaries for the entire time span of IED attacks. This
generates one dataset corresponding to each factory. Secondly, the DPMM model is
fitted to each of these datasets using the Gibbs method. This procedure yields a set
of jeopardy surfaces delineating the timescale of PIRA attacks according to times
when factory closures arose. By comparing and contrasting the final set of jeopardy
surfaces the aim is to analyse the space-time impact of disrupting IED manufacturing
on subsequent IED attacks.
4.5 Analysis
4.5.1 Model Calibration
Before implementing the spatio-temporal version of the DPMM one important model
parameter requires calibration. In particular, in Section 4.3.5 a prior distribution was
found to enable the MCMC procedure for the DPMM to automatically update the
standard deviation used to model dispersion in the data. As part of the derivation of
the formula describing this prior distribution (4.63) it was stated that the user must
specify an initial expected value for the dispersal distance associated to the data
being studied. In the context of PIRA it was found in the research of Horgan et al.
(2013) that 63.4% of PIRA members travelled less than 4 miles to conduct attacks.
Therefore, we shall take this value as an initialisation for the dispersal distance.
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As well as defining an initial parameter value for the DPMM in the R code ver-
sion of the model authored by Faulkner et al. (2017) and Stevenson (2013), and
utilised in this chapter, the dispersal distance is required to be in units of latitude
decimal degrees. To perform the conversion from miles a two step procedure was per-
formed. Firstly from the R package “Measurements” by Birk (2016) the conv unit
function was employed to find the conversion of 1 mile to 1609.344 metres. Then
from the R package “Geosphere” by Hijmans, Williams and Vennes (2016) the func-
tion distm was used to find the conversion between 1 latitude decimal degree and
metres. To define 1 lat of distance in the input to distm the coordinates of the
first factory location and another fictional location 1 latitude degree decimal away
{(54.5961886,−5.9858976), (55.5961886,−5.9858976)} was used. This resulted in a
conversion of 1 latitude decimal degree to 110716.5 metres. It should also be noted
that whilst utilising the distm function the method for computing distance was set
to “distVincentyEllipsoid” which uses an ellipsoidal model for highly accurate and
computationally efficient calculations (Vincenty, 1975). Moreover, the “distVincen-
tyEllipsoid” method calculates “great-circle-distance” between inputs thus handling
issues arising from the Earth’s curvature. Finally these two conversions were com-
bined to find the distance conversion of 4 miles as 4
(
1609.344
110716.5
)
= 0.05814285 latitude
decimal degrees, which, was the initialising value for equation (4.63).
4.5.2 Results
The results of applying the DPMM according to the steps outlined in the previous
sections are now presented. In Table 4.3 information is presented which illustrates
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the composition of the final datasets after using the IED factory closure dates as
temporal boundaries. It should be observed from this table that there are a total
of 16 datasets. This is in comparison to the value of 19 factory closures discussed
in Section 4.1. Of the 19 factory closures 10, 12, 15 and 16 were found to contain
no more additional IED events compared to the previous closure. Therefore, the
influence of these factory closures are considered in datasets 11, 13 and 17. To avoid
confusion the final datasets will be labelled 1-15. A final dataset denoted by 16 covers
all IED attacks which appeared in the dataset before and after the final recorded
factory closure. The final IED event in Belfast was recorded on 24/05/1998 whilst
the final recorded factory find was 14/03/1994. A decision to have this additional
dataset was taken to ensure that the impact of the last recorded factory closure could
be analysed.
In Figures 4.1(a) - 4.1(o) and Figure 4.2 plots of the DPMM jeopardy surfaces
are presented. The IED event locations are shown as red circles, the most recent
factory closure is highlighted via a black triangle and the previous factory closures
are displayed as blue squares. It should be noted that in these figures the map
boundaries are determined from the IED locations. Therefore, when factory locations
fall outside these boundaries they are not shown. The definition of the plot area is
made in this way to ensure that the final model represents the best fit to the event
data rather than imposing preconceived ideas about the source locations. Note that
Figure 4.2 has no black triangle since this map is used to show the remaining IED
events which occurred after the final factory closure in Figure 4.1(o). An overview
of the datasets studied in each figure appears in Table 4.3.
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In the plots of Figures 4.1(a) - 4.1(o) and Figure 4.2 likely source locations are
determined via their hitscore. The hitscore is calculated by ranking the surface
generated by the multivariate normals used in the DPMM and dividing by the size
of the total search area. Each grouping of events found using the DPMM has an
associated hitscore which can be interpreted as the percentage of space that must be
searched to locate the source location. Therefore, the hitscore provides a measure
of fit of the DPMM. A lower hitscore is associated with a better model fit and vice
versa for a higher hitscore. As a benchmark value a 0.5 hitscore would be indicative
of a random search over the given area. Graphically, a heatmap of the hitscores
is presented in the plots of Figures 4.1(a) - 4.1(o) and Figure 4.2 with the lowest
hitscores in white and the highest in dark red with shades of a white-yellow-dark red
scale moving between the two extremes. Also in Table 4.3 the hitscore associated to
the new factory closure being considered in each dataset is presented.
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Table 4.3: Datasets Analysed using the DPMM
Factory Closure Closure Date Number of
Data
Points
Hitscore
1 1 / July / 1970 5 0.70
2 24 / November / 1972 17 0.90
3 11 / May / 1974 19 0.15
4 8 / March / 1979 61 0.28
5 11 / August / 1981 67 0.41
6 28 / August / 1982 72 0.95
7 21 / March / 1988 88 0.46
8 22 / August / 1988 89 0.17
9 7 / November / 1988 98 0.23
10 28 / April / 1990 135 0.40
11 18 / May / 1991 145 0.09
12 13 / January / 1992 158 0.85
13 15 / June / 1992 162 0.06
14 18 / August / 1993 172 0.49
15 14 / March / 1994 175 0.03
16 NA / NA / NA 192 NA
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Figure 4.1: (a)-(o) Jeopardy surface distribution of PIRA IED attacks (red circles) before the
closure of IED factories. Old factories closures are marked via blue squares whilst the new closure
in each figure is marked with a black triangle. On the jeopardy surfaces white areas indicate likely
source locations whilst red areas have a lower probability of containing a source.
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Figure 4.2: Jeopardy surface covering all PIRA IED attacks which occurred after the final recorded
factory closure. Red circles highlight IED attacks and blue squares mark the locations of all
previously identified factory closures. On the jeopardy surface white areas indicate likely source
locations whilst red areas have a lower probability of containing a source.
4.6 Discussion
Before analysing the results in Section 4.5.2 it is necessary to recall the sociological
phases of PIRA outlined in the literature review in Chapter 1. In the research of
Asal et al. (2013) five distinct time periods of the conflict in Northern Ireland were
identified which correspond to operational and tactical shifts of the PIRA. These
fives phases and summaries of the shifts observed in the organisation’s structure are
 1969-1976 - Phase 1: During this phase the organisation was arranged in
a military style consisting of brigades, battalions and companies. Within this
army structure each unit of the organisation was given responsibility for a
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specific geographical area of combat.
 1977-1980 - Phase 2: A cell-based structure was adopted. This approach
was characterised by PIRA fracturing into small groups of members known
as Active Service Units (ASUs) (Horgan and Taylor, 1997). The aim of this
re-structuring was to improve the organisation’s secrecy by making it harder
to infiltrate. This change in structure was successful with 465 fewer charges
for paramilitary activity within a year (Smith, 1997). During this phase new
leaders were also appointed for the organisation including Gerry Adams and
Martin McGuinness (Moloney, 2003).
 1981-1989 - Phase 3: This period began with the Hunger Strikes by Provi-
sional IRA members protesting against the conditions of their incarceration. A
catalyst moment during this period was the death of a PIRA member known
as Bobby Sands who had been elected to Westminster whilst in prison and died
on hunger strike (English, 2004). This incident resulted in a rise of sympathy
for PIRA and its political wing Sinn Fe´in. As a result the Republican cam-
paign moved into the political arena through the Sinn Fe´in party who now had
similar levels of prestige as their militant wing, PIRA.
 1990-1994 - Phase 4: Secret meetings occurred involving top ranking PIRA
leaders who were negotiating a ceasefire with the British Government.
 1995-1998 - Phase 5: Finally the peace talks were announced and a ceasefire
ratified in the Good Friday Agreement. For many this signalled the end of “The
Troubles”.
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Returning to the present chapter these qualitative descriptions of the phases of
PIRA can be compared to the DPMM plots from Section 4.5.2. Specifically the
timestamps of factory closures in Table 4.3 are related to the five phases in the
following manner
 1969-1976 - Phase 1: Figures 4.1(a) - 4.1(c).
 1977-1980 - Phase 2: Figure 4.1(d).
 1981-1989 - Phase 3: Figures 4.1(e) - 4.1(i).
 1990-1994 - Phase 4: Figures 4.1(j) - 4.1(o).
 1995-1998 - Phase 5: Figure 4.2.
It can be seen that the jeopardy surfaces in Figures 4.1(a) - 4.1(c) are highly
concentrated around a single area. This observation relates to the sociological de-
scription of PIRA in phase 1 as having a military style approach to the conflict. In
particular, this military-type strategy could be leading to the source of attacks being
centralised hence producing the concentration over one area found by the DPMM.
In terms of the counter-terrorism responses in phase 1 it can be seen that the factory
closures appeared away from the central mass of the jeopardy surfaces. One possible
explanation for this distribution is that the centralised nature of PIRA in phase 1
acted as a form of protection for IED factories in more central parts of Belfast.
Moving to phase 2 of PIRA the organisation was seen in sociological research
to have begun shifting to a cellular operation to thwart infiltration from British
authorities. The DPMM model in Figure 4.1(d) demonstrates a similar pattern
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where it can observed that the concentration of mass on the jeopardy surface begins
to disperse more widely over Belfast. An important shift in the discovery of bomb
factories for phase 2 was that the recorded location is now closer to the central
high probability source area found in the phase 1 plots. This indicates that the
infiltration from the security forces was yielding better intelligence penetrating the
protected area identified by the phase 1 DPMM results.
Phase 3 of PIRA corresponds to the longest period identified in the sociological
research. During this phase there was an uptick in violence by PIRA with Moloney
(2003) drawing an analogy between the tactics of PIRA in the 1980’s and the waves of
attacks conducted by the People’s Army of Vietnam, known as the “Tet Offensive”,
in 1968. In Figures 4.1(e) - 4.1(i) the dispersal pattern observed in Figure 4.1(d) can
be seen continuing in phase 3. Of particular interest in Figures 4.1(e) - 4.1(i) is the
appearance of source areas in the North and North-West of Belfast. This highlights
the expansionist nature of PIRA attacks in phase 3. The change in dispersal of
possible source locations also resonates with the aim to wage a “war of attrition
against enemy personnel which is aimed at causing as many casualties and deaths as
possible so as to create a demand from their people at home for their withdrawal”
stated as an objective in the PIRA “Green Book” (O’Brien, 1999). The increased
diffusion of potential source locations as identified by the DPMM is also reflecting
the relationship between the PIRA and security forces. In particular, as more factory
closures occur the potential sources of new IED factories are shifted away from the
previous factory closure indicating a certain level of displacement in factory locations.
In phases 4 and 5 PIRA began secret channels of communication with the British
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Government to conduct peace negotiations ending in the announcement and ratifi-
cation of the Good Friday Agreement. As noted by Asal et al. (2013) PIRA used
IED attacks as a leverage in negotiations with the British authorities. Moreover,
Coogan (2002) discusses the ability of PIRA to “turn...bombing[s] on and off like a
tap”. These elements of the groups evolution are captured by the DPMM as further
fracturing into numerous IED source locations. In this case the model could be seen
to be providing evidence of PIRA using IEDs more strategically to strengthen the
group’s hand during the peace deal discussions. Moreover, as PIRA was using IEDs
more strategically as bargaining leverage the dispersal patterns observed might be
the organisation utilising factories on a more temporary basis. This latter observa-
tion is particularly obvious in Figure 4.2 with the appearance of more disjoint source
locations.
It is also interesting to consider the hitscore values presented in Table 4.3. These
hitscores indicate how much of the search area identified by the DPMM must be
searched to identify the closed factory locations considered in each dataset. Another
interpretation of the hitscore is as a goodness of fit measure, whereby, a lower hitscore
implies a better model fit. It can be seen from Table 4.3 that in general the hitscores
for the closed factories are low. This observation suggests that the DPMM is good
at locating the known factory locations. In addition, the low hitscores give evidence
for Hypothesis 5 that the DPMM can find the locations of closed IED factories.
When the hitscores are high this may be explained by data quality. In particular, it
was described in Section 4.1 that the IED dataset had to be filtered to obtain data
on a street level, which, reduced the number of data points available for use from
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the original dataset. Since some of the IED events in the unfiltered dataset did not
have street level data these entries would not have been analysed in this chapter.
Therefore, some of the located IED factories may have been related to events not
considered by the DPMM. Moreover, to improve computational efficiency, and due
to limited data, the research in this chapter focused only on Belfast. However, it
may be possible that some of the recorded IED factories were linked to IED attacks
outside of the Belfast area. Without more data and expertise to link factories to
IEDs this issue remains.
Combining these phase-by-phase observations it can be seen that this temporal
version of the DPMM provides important lessons for the construction of effective
counter-terrorism strategies. The jeopardy surfaces produced in this chapter demon-
strate that over the course of “The Troubles” factory raids were occurring more
frequently within source locations identified by the model. However, the DPMM
was also revealing potential IED factory locations which do not appear to have been
discovered by authorities working to counter PIRA attacks. In particular, observe
that at the top of Figures 4.1(h) - 4.1(o) there is clearly a source being identified by
the DPMM but with no follow-up factory raids. Therefore, had the framework as
illustrated in this chapter been employed as part of the authorities tools to identify
factories there is a chance that at least one further closure could have been achieved.
Another factory identification may also have had further implications in terms of
intelligence gathering.
Further to the contributions the DPMM can make to counter-terrorism practi-
tioners the model can also be useful to academics. In particular, obtaining terrorism
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data can be a difficult task due to security issues. This problem could become more
significant when trying to conduct research on currently active terrorist groups. In
this chapter the ability of the DPMM to realise IED sources without prior informa-
tion concerning the number of sources can assist researchers in collating datasets.
Specifically, the sources identified by the DPMM could act as a guide for researchers
to understand geographical patterns of terrorist activity based on open source data
of attacks.
Overall the DPMM has proven to be a very useful tool to further uncover shifting
tactical and hierarchical structures used by PIRA during its IED campaign. This
gives evidence to support Hypothesis 7 stating that the temporal framework for the
DPMM could lead to new insights into spatio-temporal patterns of IED usage. The
similarities between the findings of sociological research and this empirical space-time
usage of the DPMM give credit to the model as a good method for counter-terrorism
researchers and practitioners to understand terrorist groups. In addition to this
support for the DPMM model it has been shown that the model can act as a testing
tool to understand the impacts of counter-terrorism events aimed at closing IED
factory locations. In particular, we have seen some level of displacement of areas
most likely to contain the sources of IED attacks suggesting that following a factory
closure there is a need to increase security operations to stifle the emergence of any
new factories opening. Moreover, we saw that the negotiating period of PIRA was
characterised by more temporary usage of disjoint IED factories. This suggests that
if militant groups choose to begin moving away from conflict towards a ceasefire
and political integration there is a need for security forces to increase intelligence
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gathering to remain ahead of factory openings. These observations provide support
for Hypothesis 6, which, considers the efficacy of the DPMM to provide a method of
assessing count-terrorism policies aiming to close IED factories.
In future research the work in this chapter could be progressed by including tem-
poral dynamics directly inside the framework of the DPMM model. In particular,
having a specific time component as part of the model formulation could allow for
greater usage of the model as a predictive tool by stepping forward the time compo-
nent to uncover future potential dynamics. Another useful extension of the research
presented in this chapter could be to find spatio-temporal boundaries for PIRA IED
attacks. In particular, in Chapter 2 it was demonstrated how the Hawkes process
can be used to determine temporal phase boundaries mathematically. Therefore, a
coupling of the methods used in this chapter and those of Chapter 2 might present
an opportunity to determine quantitatively both the spatial and temporal phase
changes for terrorist group activity.
Finally, it should be noted that in Figures 4.1(a) - 4.1(o) and Figure 4.2 an
implicit temporal memory is incorporated into the model since the effect of past
factory closures is not considered. The impact of this treatment of time is that some
of the IED events in later figures are possibly leading to false groupings of attacks.
In a real-world situation this problem could be managed by utilising more detailed
data about which IED events correspond to which factories. Having this additional
detail would enable practitioners to remove IED events which are no longer relevant
to the model. Hence, although this chapter provides a good prototype of how the
DPMM can be used its full potential and accuracy is likely being underestimated.
CHAPTER 5
MANUAL VS AUTOMATIC DATA COLLECTION METHODS
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5.1 Introduction
In a paper published by Moore (1965) an observation was made that the number
of transistors in integrated circuity was approximately modelled by the equation
2y where y is the number of years since 1959. Qualitatively this observation, that
the number of transistors doubles each year, has become known as Moore’s Law.
Due to a self-fulfilling nature, which observed the technology industry aiming to
improve their products at this pace (Brock, 2006), Moore’s Law is considered to
have been a dominant theory underpinning much of the growth seen in technological
advancements over the last five decades.
Alongside a rapid growth in technological capabilities has been the globally ex-
panding reach and accessibility of the world wide web. First presented by Tim
Berners Lee to CERN in 1989 (McPherson, 2010) the world wide web has expanded
the ability of the human race to rapidly share information across the globe. This has
lead to advancements in scientific discovery and research as academics can seamlessly
share and discuss their ideas. In the discussion of Coffman and Odlyzko (2002) the
idea of a Moore’s Law for the rate of growth of the internet is presented suggesting
a link between the developments observed physically in the technology sector and
wider usage of virtual data accessible via the web.
Combined new technologies and their use for data sharing are quickly beginning
to evolve the landscape of 21st Century scientific research. The observance of this
shift in research methods has been discussed by Hey, Tansley and Tolle (2009). In
particular, the authors of the latter highlight four phases of progression in science
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based research - empirical, theoretical, computational and data exploration. The em-
pirical phase is described as the observation of natural phenomena and involved the
manual collection of data approximately a thousand years ago concerning the changes
observed in people’s environments. As scientific reasoning and methods progressed
the next shift was towards a theoretical approach to studying the world around a
few hundred years ago. The theoretical phase saw the introduction of mathematical
models and their use to abstract and generalise ideas and understandings obtained
from empirical studies. More recently science has transitioned through the computa-
tional phase in the last few decades where the models which were introduced in the
theoretical stage could now be simulated using newly available computational power
afforded by the advancements in computer design. The current phase is that of data
exploration. Now with new computational hardware and rapid sharing features pro-
vided by the web a combination of empirical, theoretical and computational research
can be undertaken in large volumes on “big datasets”.
An introduction to “Big Data” and its implications for modern society can be
found in the book of Mayer-Scho¨nberger and Cukier (2013). Big data is commonly
described as exhibiting three properties known as volume, variety and velocity. Vol-
ume of data is simply a measure of the size of modern datasets which are now able
to be stored in increasing magnitude due to the improved effectiveness and efficiency
of modern hard drives. Within these large datasets it is possible to store a variety of
information ranging from easily tabulated structured data, such as, numerical values,
to unstructured data which requires more involved preprocessing, for example, collec-
tions of text documents. Finally, data is frequently moving either across the web on
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external networks or through computers on internal networks leading to the a metric
of data velocity. When referring to Big Data in scientific studies Demchenko et al.
(2013) also include two more “v’s” of big data - veracity and value. Veracity relates
to the need to have some method of data validation to ensure that the data being
obtained provides a reliable basis for accurate analyses. Additionally, determining
the added value provided by a dataset ensures that the scope of research remains
focused to avoid scientific pitfalls, such as, linking correlation and causation.
With the beginning of a new phase in research centered on data exploration there
is a requirement to develop new tools and techniques which can enable researchers
to collate and analyse Big Data sources. There are three main branches of research
which cover this area (Getoor and Machanavajjhala, 2012) - information retrieval,
data mining and machine learning. Information retrieval (IR) is a term first coined
by Mooers (1950) and aims to connect users with data. This can involve searching
both structured datasets, such as, organised tabular databases and unstructured
datasets, for example, searching text documents for key words or phrases (Manning,
Raghavan and Schu¨tze, 2008). A number of approaches to IR already exist including
studies of Boolean, vector and probabilistic models (Baeza-Yates and Ribeiro-Neto,
2011; Manning, Raghavan and Schu¨tze, 2008; Roelleke, 2013).
Having retrieved data via some combination of IR methods the next step is to
obtain value from the data. A primary method to achieve this goal is to use the
knowledge discovery in database (KDD) process. As described by Fayyad, Piatetsky-
Shapiro and Smyth (1996) the KDD process is a method which segments the man-
aging of large datasets into multiple steps moving from data retrieval to analysis
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and then result validation. One of the main steps in the KDD process is data min-
ing which is “a process of discovering useful patterns and trends in large datasets”
(Larose and Larose, 2014). As with IR the field of data mining has begun rapidly
growing as researchers develop tools to manage “Big” datasets. Some of the cur-
rent methods of performing data mining are classification, regression, clustering,
summarisation, dependency modelling and change and deviation detection (Fayyad,
Piatetsky-Shapiro and Smyth, 1996).
Machine learning (ML) is an umbrella term which covers tools and techniques
developed to enable computers to derive value from data via learned structures and
patterns (Alpaydin, 2014). There are two main classes of machine learning - super-
vised and unsupervised (Alpaydin, 2014; Masashi, 2016; Mu¨ller and Guido, 2017).
In the case of supervised learning some initial training input and observed output
is used to train a ML algorithm. On the other hand, in unsupervised learning only
inputs are provided to the ML algorithm. Methods of IR and data mining can be
used as tools to develop machine learning approaches and vice versa (Aggarwal and
Zhai, 2012; Craven et al., 2000; Liu and Motoda, 2001).
As the power of computing resources has grown, and the accessibility of data has
increased, the applications of Big Data, and the tools required for its analysis, have
become more widespread. Of particular interest in this chapter is the usage of these
techniques as a basis for mathematical studies of terrorism and counter-terrorism.
In particular, multiple books and research papers have been published examining
a range of possibilities to use newly developed technological tools to monitor and
analyse terrorist activity in real or near-real time (Baesens et al., 2009; Chen et al.,
204
2008; Leslie, 2016; Memon et al., 2009; Thuraisingham, 2003; Toure and Gangopad-
hyay, 2016). As in all areas of research these novel approaches to study terrorism
must ensure that the data being utilised provides an accurate reflection of real-world
events. If there is a failure to retrieve good data or a reliance on incomplete datasets
then any resulting conclusions may be incorrect and lead to poor counter-terrorism
strategy design.
In this chapter the aim is to address the issues of developing tools to automatically
collate terrorism databases and methods to evaluate their usefulness. In particular,
an important issue that the tools and techniques of information retrieval and machine
learning can be used to tackle is information overload in manual data collection.
For example, when collecting data concerning terrorist attacks there are a plethora
of local and international news sources from which information can be gathered.
Collating datasets from many sources manually is time intensive requiring a large
outlay of human capital to be effective. However, with the speed and efficiency of
modern computers and communication methods via the web there is potential to
greatly simplify the task of data retrieval. Two main contributions will be made in
this thesis. Firstly, an IR tool will be implemented in Python which can interact with
online news articles to retrieve terrorism event data. Secondly, a unique evaluation
dataframe will be designed combining methods of temporal and textual similarity
measurements to compare the IR dataset to a manually collected database.
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5.2 Datasets
5.2.1 Manually Collected Dataset
The manually collected dataset is derived from the Armed Conflict Location and
Event Dataset (ACLED) project (Raleigh et al., 2010). As part of the ACLED
project numerous research analysts are involved in collecting and storing data about
conflicts in Africa as well as South and South East Asia. The database released from
ACLED appears in two versions. The first dataset has complete year-on-year daily
coverage of data since the project began in 1997. In the second dataset a real-time
rolling coverage is provided which details recent weekly updates of events. The real-
time data is annually reviewed and integrated into the complete dataset which is
then released as a new full coverage archive.
In this chapter to complement the earlier research of Chapter 4 the focus will be
the Al Shabaab militant group in Somalia. Moreover, to simulate a real-world setting
for the tools developed the real-time ACLED data will be considered. Specifically, the
2017 ACLED rolling coverage dataset, which is manually collected, will be compared
to an automatically retrieved dataset, which is detailed in Section 5.2.2. The final
event date recorded in the ACLED database is 14/10/2017 . The data collected for
the ACLED project covers the topics displayed in Table 5.1.
It should be noted that the source of the data for the ACLED database is split into
two categories - non-local and local. Here the local sources are specific to ACLED
which is connected to local organisations working regionally and reporting events to
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Table 5.1: ACLED Data Headings
Heading Data
Date Date of the event (DD/MM/YYYY)
Location Administrative areas and latitude/longitude coordinates
Event Type
{battle, civilian killing, riots, protests,
recruitment activity}
Event Actors
{rebels, governments, militias, armed group, protesters,
civilians}
Change in Territory Details of any changes seen in area control
Source Source of data {Non-Local, Local}
Notes Notes covering details of the event
Fatalities Estimated number of fatalities
the ACLED team. The non-local sources are more readily available articles which
can be retrieved online. These two categories will be compared separately to the IR
dataset as explained using the framework detailed in Section 5.4. The number of
events across the two datasets are non-local sources - 268 and local sources - 881.
5.2.2 Automatically Collected Dataset
In the first unique contribution made in this chapter an automated information
retrieval (IR) tool was written in a Python script. Specifically using the Python
requests module (Chandra and Varanasi, 2015) an automated tool was constructed
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Table 5.2: Automated Article Retrieval Data Headings
Heading Data
Date Date of the event (DD/MM/YYYY)
Description Article title and first sentence from article
which searches Google news for user defined terms. Once the results have been
retrieved for a search the Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) structure returned
is saved to a csv file. To extract relevant data the saved HTML structures are parsed
by searching for tags where important information is contained and retrieving the
corresponding text. This textual data is then used to form an event database. In
particular, for the database studied in this chapter the search term used was simply
“al Shabaab” in an attempt to observe as many events as possible involving the
group. In addition to a direct search for articles the code performs the search for
each month of the year. The motivation for this temporally disaggregated searching
method was that it resulted in a higher number of returned articles compared to
longer time-frame searches. Data headings, and their descriptions, found in the final
dataset are illustrated in Table 5.2.
In contrast to the ACLED dataset the IR data has only non-local sources having
been collected entirely from online news articles. In total 960 articles were obtained
using the Python IR tool.
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5.3 Comparison Techniques
In this chapter the aim is to compare and contrast the data obtained from the
manually collected ACLED data and an automatically retrieved dataset from online
news sources. The two types of data appearing in Tables 5.1 - 5.2 are dates of events
and textual data. Two tools from the current literature are employed in this chapter
to analyse these types of data. The background of these pre-existing techniques are
now introduced.
5.3.1 Dynamic Time Warping
To compare the event dates a technique known as Dynamic Time Warping (DTW)
was employed to study the similarity between the datasets. In the research papers
of Berndt and Clifford (1994), Ding et al. (2008) and Keogh and Ratanamahatana
(2005) the fundamental motivations and assumptions for using the model are de-
scribed alongside experimental applications demonstrating the approaches effective-
ness. Principally, DTW is a search algorithm which provides a mapping between a
template time series T = {t1, t2, ..., tm} = {tj}mj=1 and a second comparison time se-
ries S = {s1, s2, ..., sn} = {si}ni=1. This mapping aims to find the minimum distance
between the time series.
The initial step for constructing the DTW algorithm is to align the indices of
the template time series against the second time series in a two dimensional grid. In
this case the grid consists of points (i, j) which can be interpreted as a comparison
between time points si and tj. With this grid so constructed a vector of each of the
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possible elements wk = (i, j)k can be constructed. Selecting one element from each
consecutive vector leads to a possible warping path
W = w1, w2, ..., wk, ..., wK . (5.1)
For each of the points on this grid a comparison can quantified using some distance
function d(si, tj). A simple approach to measuring distance between time points is
to use an absolute value measure as described by Berndt and Clifford (1994)
d(wk) = d((i, j)k) = |(si − tj)k|. (5.2)
After defining an approach to measuring the distance between time points the
main DTW problem can be introduced. In particular, the aim now is to find the
optimal warping path between the series S and T by minimising the cumulative
distance
DTW (S, T ) = min
W
K∑
k=1
(d(wk)) . (5.3)
It should be observed that the cumulative summation in equation (5.3) is defined
over the range of all possible warping paths. For large datasets this optimisation
problem will be computationally expensive due to its combinatorial nature. There-
fore, some assumptions are made about the DTW to improve efficiency (Berndt and
Clifford, 1994)
1. Monotonicity - the time series used in the problem are assumed to be mono-
tonically increasing in time, such that, the indices of S and T satisfy ik−1 ≤ ik
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and jk−1 ≤ jk,
2. Continuity - each subsequent element in the warping path must only pass
through neighbouring points so that ik − ik−1 ≤ 1 and jk − jk−1 ≤ 1,
3. Warping Window - when comparing points (i, j) from the grid there is a max-
imum distance of comparison |i − j| ≤ ω, where, ω is a positive integer value
defining the window width,
4. Slope Constraint - to avoid large movements in any single direction it is possible
to define a restriction on the steepness of possible warping paths,
5. Boundary Conditions - fixing the start of each warping path to (1, 1) and the
end to (n,m) ensures the path always moves between the lowest left-hand-side
of the grid and finishes at the highest right-hand-side.
With the above assumptions the final DTW can be formulated as a dynamic
programming problem using the function
γ(i, j) = d(i, j) + min [γ(i− 1, j), γ(i− 1, j − 1), γ(i, j − 1)] . (5.4)
From the equation in (5.4) the DTW is computed via a recurrence formula which
computes the cumulative summation of the current grid element distance d(i, j) and
the minimum of the cumulative summations at neighbouring elements. The form of
the DTW in (5.4) is known as the symmetric version of the problem due to its use
of both previous points found diagonally on the grid. An asymmetric version of the
equation in (5.4) also exists by choosing only one of the diagonals. However, the
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research of Sakoe and Chiba (1978) found that the symmetric form of the problem
to be the better choice.
The advantage of the approach to DTW using (5.4) is that the algorithm does
not require re-computing previous path distances. In particular, at each step of the
dynamic programming technique a table of values is computed which can be used to
find the next entry of the cumulative sum in (5.4). To complete the DTW and find
the minimised path matching series S and T this table can be traversed backwards
finding the points corresponding to the lowest cumulative distance values.
In this chapter an implementation of the DTW in Python by Rouanet (2018) was
used to perform temporal analyses.
5.3.2 Term Frequency - Inverse Document Frequency
The second area of overlap that is important to this thesis, and terrorism studies
more broadly, is the spatial data of terrorist activity. Table 5.1 illustrates that the
ACLED dataset contains location data whilst the IR dataset described in Table
5.2 has only textual information in the form of the article titles and the articles
first sentence. A simple method that could be used to overcome this difference
between the databases would be to simply scan each of the IR article titles and
first sentences for the locations in the ACLED database. However, this approach
presents multiple difficulties. In particular, difference in the spelling of place names,
such as, (“Mogadisho”, “Mogadishu”) and (“Buulo Gaduud”, “Bulo-Gadud”) can
prove difficult to cross-reference.
In addition to comparing spatial data between the datasets it is also of interest to
212
compare the text data contained in the “notes” section of ACLED to the “descrip-
tion” information in the IR events. This further analysis between the two datasets
was used to provide insight into the usefulness of the IR data to offer more detail
about the events being recorded.
To overcome the difficulties of comparing textual data and provide a comparison
between location and notes data of the ACLED and IR datasets a method known as
term frequency - inverse document frequency (tf-idf) was employed. As the name of
the technique indicates tf-idf is a two step approach for comparing text documents.
Term frequency (tf) is the study of occurrence of a notion or combination of no-
tions within a single document (Luhn, 1957). As noted by Luhn the more frequently
a word or combination of words within a document the more important the word or
combination is likely to be for the subject being studied. Hence a simple measure of
the relative importance of different parts of text within a document can be obtained
using a simple word frequency. However, the problem with such a simplistic result
is that when comparing multiple documents according to simple word frequencies
words, such as, “terrorism” in papers in the field of terrorism studies can lead to
broad matching results making searches less useful.
To resolve the issue of matching documents with highly occurring keywords but
low overall importance Spa¨rck Jones (1972) suggested utilising a term weighting
approach. In particular, when searching across a range of documents high frequency
terms which likely have little meaning are given low weighting whilst terms of more
rarity are given a greater weighting. This inverse relationship leads to the term
inverse document frequency (idf). Under this scheme the issue of retrieving irrelevant
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documents containing the word “terrorism” in a field studying terrorism is largely
resolved. A commonly used formula to find the inverse document frequency for a
term ti occurring ni times in a collection of N documents is (Robertson, 2004)
idf(ti) = log
(
N
ni
)
. (5.5)
The term frequency (tf) multiplied by the inverse document frequency (idf) yields a
measure of importance of a term to a document in a collection of documents.
As well as being useful as a matching tool for searching databases of documents for
keywords the tf-idf can also be extended to a document comparison tool using a tf-idf
cosine weighting (Peters, Braschler and Clough, 2012). The tf-idf can be considered
a mapping from the space of the text documents to the d-dimensional real space Rd.
For example, one could form a vector of all words across all documents and for each
vector element the tf-idf value could be computed. After the tf-idf calculation each
document is now a vector of real numbers in space whose dimension is equal to the
total number of words. Hence for two documents with tf-idf vectors denoted d1 and
d2 it is possible to compute the cosine of their angle θ via
cos(θ) =
d1 · d2
‖d1‖ ‖d2‖ . (5.6)
For two similar documents the formula in (5.6) will have tf-idf vectors close in space
and thus a small angle difference leading to a value of cos(θ) near to 1. On the other
hand, documents which are dissimilar will lead to values of cos(θ) nearer 0. Note also
that since tf-idf vectors contain only non-negative values we have that θ ∈ [0°, 90°].
214
In this chapter the tf-idf implementation from Python’s scikit-learn module (Pe-
dregosa et al., 2011) was used to perform the textual analyses.
5.4 Dataset Comparisons
To compare the ACLED and IR datasets a novel approach of combining dynamic
time warping and the tf-idf methods was designed. In particular, a hybrid method
was developed to evaluate the similarity between the two sets of data based on the
event timings and textual descriptions.
5.4.1 Event Date Comparisons
For the temporal component of the data the standard DTW defined in Section 5.3.1
was adapted. Specifically for each of the dates observed in the IR database the set
of closest dates in the ACLED database were identified. The cardinality of this set
can range from a single element to multiple elements if there were multiple entries
for a single date. However, at this top level of analysis the aim is to simply identify a
closest date matching the IR event recording. In this case a perfectly matched date
found in the IR and ACLED event recordings would produce a distance of 0 whilst
any dissimilarity would be measured in the number of days difference.
5.4.2 Location Comparisons
As previously described in Section 5.2 the ACLED dataset has separate columns
containing location data for the observed events. In the ACLED dataset the location
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data is split into multiple columns covering different levels of spatial disaggregation.
To compare this spatial information to that contained in the IR dataset the tf-idf
method was employed. Specifically, each of entry of location data from the ACLED
database was compared with the the text strings obtained from the IR dataset via
tf-idf. To improve the efficiency of these textual based comparisons in the next level
of analysis conducted the sets of closest event matches between the IR and ACLED
databases from Section 5.4.1 were looped over and the IR elements in each set had
their title and first sentence data compared to the corresponding ACLED event
location data. To achieve this comparison the following procedure was performed for
the elements of each closest events sets
1. Split text strings from IR data entry into a list of words in Python.
2. For each of these list elements extract all words beginning with an uppercase
letter. This step follows from the observation that location names are written
with capital letters.
3. For each upper case word lower all the characters, remove punctuation and
perform a character comparison to the lower cased version of the location data
from the ACLED event. The character comparison was performed using the
tf-idf described in Section 5.3.2. In this context the tf-idf was set to perform a
character comparison which considers similarity based on the number of letters
matched between the inputs. This approach is used to overcome the issue of
the different spelling of location names, such as, (“Mogadisho”, “Mogadishu”)
and (“Buulo Gaduud”, “Bulo-Gadud”).
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4. Return the highest matching value,
5. Repeat the above procedure for all location information of the event contained
in the ACLED database.
The matching value from this procedure will be a number in the range [0, 1], where,
0 represents no match and 1 represents a perfect match.
5.4.3 Event Note Comparisons
The final comparison technique performed between the databases was to compare
the “notes” section of the ACLED events to the “description” data in the IR dataset.
Similar to the location comparison the textual comparison was conducted using the
tf-idf implementation of the scikit-learn module. However, instead of decomposing
the text into characters the full sentences were passed as inputs to the function.
The matching value, in the range [0, 1], as before, was then returned. In addition,
the note comparisons were made using the set of closest times found between the
ACLED and IR datasets in Section 5.4.1 using the dtw method.
5.4.4 Comparisons Framework
These analyses yield three results, where, the IR data used is listed first and the data
from the ACLED database is listed second
1. (Date) and (Date) time comparison
2. (Date, Description) and (Date, Locations) location comparison
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Table 5.3: Example of Matching Events
Dataset Event Date Event Details
ACLED 15/08/2017
“Five police officers have been killed by Al-Shabaab
militia while on patrol along Bothai-Ijara road,
within Garissa County. One officer sustained injuries
during the attack while another one managed to
escape unhurt.”
IR 15/08/2017
“Nairobi - Five police officers have been killed by
Al-Shabaab militia while on patrol along Bothai-Ijara
road, within Garissa County. One officer sustained...”
3. (Date, Description) and (Date, Notes) event description comparison
As described in Section 5.2 the sources for the ACLED can be divided into local
and non-local categories. To further disaggregate the comparisons made between the
ACLED and IR databases the above analyses were repeated using the non-locally
sourced ACLED data and only locally sourced ACLED data.
An example of the type of matches observed between the IR and ACLED databases
is shown in Table 5.3. In particular, this table illustrates the best time-text match
between the ACLED non-local dataset and IR dataset. It can be observed that the
timestamps in Table 5.3 are identical whilst the textual descriptions of the events are
almost identical. However, since the text in the IR data entry is only a snippet of the
full article the final sentence is truncated reducing the overall matching according to
the tf-idf to 68.2%.
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5.5 Results
Sections 5.5.1 - 5.5.2 present the results of the analyses described in Sections 5.4.1
- 5.4.3. Two sets of results are presented according to comparisons between the IR
dataset and the non-locally sourced ACLED data and the IR dataset and only locally
sourced ACLED data.
Each set of results consists of six graphs. The first plot is a simple barcode of the
event times occurring in each dataset. These event times are then compared using
the DTW with plots provided showing the warping path between the ACLED and
IR timeseries. After analysing temporal relationships the textual comparisons for
each set of closest event times are made via the tf-idf method. The highest tf-idf
values for these comparisons are plotted for both location and event text descrip-
tions. Finally, cumulative percentages of the tf-idf values are shown illustrating the
percentage of event comparisons with tf-idf exceeding threshold values in the range
{0.1, 0.2, ... , 1.0}. These cumulative plots indicate the distribution of tf-idf values.
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5.5.1 ACLED Non-Local Source Comparison
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Figure 5.1: (a) Barcode plot comparing the timeseries of IR and ACLED events in days since each
datasets first event. (b) Time warping path between the IR and ACLED timeseries. This path is
derived from the dynamic time warping (DTW) method.
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Figure 5.2: Location and event description comparison of the ACLED and IR datasets. For each
event in the IR dataset the closest datapoint in the ACLED database in time and location is shown
in red. Similar results are shown in blue for the closest event in time and event textual description.
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Figure 5.3: (a) Percentage of event locations matched with a tf-idf value greater than or equal to
threshold values {0.1, 0.2, ... , 1.0}. (b) Percentage of event descriptions matched with a tf-idf
value greater than or equal to threshold values {0.1, 0.2, ... , 1.0}.
5.5.2 ACLED Only Local Source Comparison
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Figure 5.4: (a) Barcode plot comparing the timeseries of IR and ACLED events in days since each
datasets first event. (b) Time warping path between the IR and ACLED timeseries. This path is
derived from the dynamic time warping (DTW) method.
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Figure 5.5: Location and event description comparison of the ACLED and IR datasets. For each
event in the IR dataset the closest datapoint in the ACLED database in time and location is shown
in red. Similar results are shown in blue for the closest event in time and event textual description.
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Figure 5.6: (a) Percentage of event locations matched with a tf-idf value greater than or equal to
threshold values {0.1, 0.2, ... , 1.0}. (b) Percentage of event descriptions matched with a tf-idf
value greater than or equal to threshold values {0.1, 0.2, ... , 1.0}.
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5.6 Discussion
The graphs in Section 5.5 compare and contrast the ACLED dataset to the automat-
ically mined IR dataset. There are two sets of results corresponding to a different
disaggregation of the ACLED data according to the data’s recorded source. In Fig-
ures 5.1 - 5.3 comparisons are made using only the data in the ACLED set derived
from non-local sources, which, covers all articles and events manually read on the
internet. The second set of graphs in Figures 5.4 - 5.6 are used to study the similarity
between the ACLED data sourced from local projects, which, is reported to ACLED
from local organisations, and the IR dataset.
To investigate the difference of temporal event records between the two datasets
a Python implementation of the DTW method (Rouanet, 2018) of Section 5.3.1 was
used. The results are presented in Figures 5.1(b) and 5.4(b). It can be observed from
these plots that on a purely temporal basis the IR dataset events are more closely
aligned to the locally source ACLED data. Moreover, it was found that 94% of event
times had an exact match between the IR and local sourced ACLED data compared
to only 56% for the IR and non-locally sourced ACLED data.
In addition to studying the temporal event records further depth of analysis can
also be obtained by comparing locations data from the ACLED and IR datasets. In
particular, for the set of events identified as having the closest distance in the previous
temporal comparison a search for location data was performed. This comparison
was undertaken using the tf-idf measure outlined in section 5.3.2. In this case the
ACLED dataset was used as a benchmark with the source locations from the dataset
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compared character-wise to the words in the event descriptions obtained using IR as
discussed in 5.4.2. The higher the percentage from this comparison the more likely
it is that the ACLED location recording was mentioned in the event description.
By comparing the plots in Figures 5.2 and 5.5 it can be seen that the location
comparisons for both non-local and local sources produce similar results. In partic-
ular, the non-local analysis has a mean tf-idf of 0.55 and standard deviation of 0.09.
On the other hand, the only local comparison has a mean tf-idf of 0.57 and standard
deviation of 0.08.
The plots in Figures 5.3(a) and 5.6(a) show the cumulative percentage of tf-
idf comparisons with value greater than values in the range {0.1, 0.2, ... , 1.0}.
Both non-local and local source data yielded similar patterns of high cumulative
percentages which decrease rapidly around the 0.5 threshold.
The final comparison that was made between the ACLED data and the IR dataset
was to analyse the difference between the textual content provided for the ACLED
events and the event descriptions in the IR data. In a similar approach as the one
taken to compare spatial details for each of the closest matches found in time between
the events a match percentage between their event descriptions was calculated. As
before the tf-idf metric was used to compare this textual data.
From the graphs in Figures 5.2 and 5.5 it can be seen that compared to locations
comparison the textual descriptions of the ACLED and IR datasets have lower tf-idf
values. This indicates a lower accuracy when considering the textual event data in
each dataset. The mean tf-idf value for the non-local comparisons was 0.13 with a
standard deviation of 0.07. On the other hand the local source data results had a
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mean tf-idf of 0.14 and standard deviation 0.07.
In the graphs of Figures 5.3(b) and 5.6(b) it can be observed that the cumula-
tive percentages of tf-idf values are similar for the non-local and only local results.
Moreover, these plots show that the textual comparisons are worse than the results
obtained for location comparisons.
It is interesting to note that the IR dataset has 960 data entries which is greater
than the 268 non-local source entries in the ACLED database. In particular, this
provides evidence that the IR technique presented in this chapter could be of benefit
to supplement the ACLED data collection method. It can be observed from Figures
5.1(a) - 5.1(b) that there is divergence between the IR and non-local source ACLED
time series. However, this may be explained by the use of less widely used news
sources by the ACLED data gathering team, such as, online news organisations
based in Somalia. As a consequence it may be that the ACLED non-local source
data is obtaining some data that is unlikely to occur in a standard browser search.
This issue could be resolved by redesigning the IR tool developed in this chapter to
work with the specific websites used for the ACLED project.
Within the local source ACLED dataset there are 881 events. When compared
to the local source ACLED data it can be seen from Figures 5.4(a) - 5.4(b) that
there is a close relationship with the event times recorded in the IR dataset. Hence
the IR tool is able to find news sources which provide information as effectively as
local source organisations. This observation is promising since IR methods like those
used in this chapter provide a cheaper and simpler option for obtaining data about
terrorism related conflicts.
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For both the non-local and local source ACLED data the textual comparisons
with the IR dataset yield similar results. Location comparisons were matched with
higher accuracy than event descriptions. This fall in accuracy may be the result of
considering only first article sentences in the IR database which may not be providing
a good summary of the main article text.
The results of the research conducted in this chapter indicate partial evidence
for Hypothesis 8. In particular, this hypothesis described the possibility of produc-
ing an automatic data retrieval tool that could collect temporal, spatial and event
description details comparable to a manually collected dataset. As has been dis-
cussed temporal data was matched with high accuracy between the IR and ACLED
datasets. With lower matching some spatial and event description data was also
found to be contained in the IR collected database.
As has been demonstrated in all the previous chapters of this thesis temporal
dynamics can prove very useful for providing insights into terrorist groups and their
activities. Therefore, having such quickly accessible data automatically collected
yields great potential in the field of terrorism studies. A particularly useful ap-
plication of this approach to data collection is the ability to monitor in near real
time terrorist events and integrate the feed into mathematical models to generate
a fully automated terrorism analysis tool. For example, the timestamps from the
IR dataset could be used as input into the Hawkes point process model in Chapter
2 to generate a live alert system for monitoring shifts in a terrorist organisation’s
structure. The advantages of employing such a technique would likely be reaped by
both academics and practitioners. In particular, in real world scenarios the ability
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to constantly monitor terrorist activity is essential to provide quick and effective
counter-measures. Moreover, since the research in this chapter is based on open
source materials the IR tool developed provides a computationally cheap method
without security constraints to analyse terrorist activity. The IR tool developed in
this chapter also has a flexible search function meaning it can easily be used to gather
data on emerging terrorist threats.
Although the location and textual data from the IR method were not as close to
the ACLED data there is still some evidence that such an approach can be useful.
An immediate extension of the research in this chapter would be to study natural
language processing methodologies and to adapt them to generate a tool which can
more accurately extract textual information from many different website layouts.
This would likely provide a much richer automated dataset and would improve the
depth of location and description data of events greatly. Again this additional au-
tomated data could be integrated directly into mathematical models yielding more
in-depth real time event analyses.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
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The aim of this thesis was to demonstrate the effectiveness of mathematical mod-
elling as a method of studying terrorism and providing new insights. In particular,
via the the translation of the theory of crime science into mathematical language
it was hoped that novel approaches to understanding terrorist activity with open
sourced data could prove to be a fruitful area of research.
Initially in Chapter 1 the foundations of crime science and terrorism literature
were provided to give contextual meaning to the thesis. Within this literature atten-
tion was drawn to two main groups - the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)
and Al Shabaab (AS). These organisations provided the case studies which were used
to test the models constructed throughout the later chapters.
Alongside a review of the literature in Chapter 1 was a brief introduction to the
topics which would be covered in the thesis. The first of these areas was introduced
as a study of the Hawkes process. Specifically, the Hawkes process was described
as a self-exciting point process capable of capturing dynamics associated with an
initial shock followed by a sequence of after-shocks. A foundation for applying this
type of model had already been demonstrated in previous work by this thesis author,
where, the Hawkes process had shown potential for capturing the temporal dynamics
associated with the IED attacks conducted by the PIRA. One of the drawbacks of
this previous research was its reliance on sociological theory as a basis for conducting
analysis between the various phases changes observed with the PIRA organisation.
To overcome this limitation in this thesis the research was extended so that the
mathematical approach could be conducted independently from the predetermined
boundaries. By considering the problem of change point detection in terms of an
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optimisation problem it was shown in Chapter 2 that new insights could be obtained
regarding the PIRA organisational structure and its attack patterns. To further this
mathematical investigation a new sociological study could be conducted to try to
reconcile the findings of the found change points with the broader theory surrounding
the PIRA.
The Hawkes process studied in Chapter 2 had a simple constant background rate
which it was found did not provide a good fitting model in the context of Al Shabaab
attacks in Somalia. Therefore, to gain a further level of numerical detail in Chapter
3 a Hawkes process with time dependent background rate was analysed. Based on
observed wet-dry weather seasonality in Somalia an attempt was made to model the
influence of environmental factors on the attack patterns of the Al Shabaab group.
The specific form used for the background rate was a Fourier expansion model for
the underlying rate of attacks. Although some improvements were observed over the
Hawkes process with a constant background rate the seasonal Hawkes process studied
in Chapter 3 still failed to fully capture the underlying dynamics of the AS attacks.
This result warrants further investigation of different forms of point processes in
the modelling of the AS group. One possible extension would be to experiment with
different kernels as opposed to the exponential decay utilised in the Hawkes processes
of this thesis.
In the previous chapters the Hawkes processes studied were fitted only to temporal
data with spatial information being encoded implicitly via the grouping of events
according to geographical boundaries. To study the spatial nature of terrorism more
exactly in Chapter 4 a Dirichlet Process Mixture Model (DPMM) was introduced.
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The DPMM was used in an attempt to find a mathematical approach to determining
the locations of PIRA bomb making factories based on the observed locations of IED
events. Moreover, by using the timestamps of factory closures as temporal boundaries
the DPMM was used to study the effects of these closures on terrorist activity in
Northern Ireland. From the results of Chapter 4 it can be seen that the DPMM had
some success in matching areas were bomb making plants were found. Moreover,
in some cases the model discovered likely areas for bomb factories prior to their
actual closure. These positive results provide evidence that the DPMM is effective
at locating sources of IED manufacturing. In an applied setting such a model could
be useful for highlighting areas most likely to be the source of terrorist IED factories
thus reducing the required resources to trace and close down terrorist operations.
One of the main drawbacks of the research conducted using the DPMM was a
lack of detail concerning the relationship between factories and IED attacks. In
particular, since it was not possible to remove events according to each factories
closure the results obtained may have been altered by historical dependence in the
data. Therefore, more precise data about the factories and IED events may greatly
improve the accuracy of the results obtained with the DPMM. Another approach
to improve the research of Chapter 4 would be to include a temporal component
inside the model. Specifically, temporal dynamics have been treated implicitly with
the use of factory closure timestamps. An explicit temporal treatment within the
DPMM could allow more interesting findings to be obtained concerning the space-
time evolution of the PIRA.
For the final research chapter of this thesis an important topic across all branches
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of numerical studies has been explored. It was explained in Chapter 5 that data,
and the methods used to collect and analyse its contents, have undergone a rapid
evolution which is only set to increase in the future. In particular, with high volume
and velocity “Big Data” provides many opportunities to expand human knowledge
immensely in many different regards. However, pitfalls associated with analysing
large datasets must be carefully guarded against. This is especially relevant in areas
of critical importance, such as, terrorism studies whereby lives may be potentially
put at risk by pursuing poor policy. Nonetheless, it was shown in Chapter 5 that
tools can be constructed to provide information about terrorism automatically with
the additional benefit of real-time analysis.
Comparing event timings found from this automated tool and those from a man-
ually collected database, using the method of dynamic time warping, demonstrated
a good match. Moreover, utilising the term frequency - inverse document frequency,
there is evidence to suggest spatial information can also been obtained automatically
with some degree of accuracy. Less accuracy was found when comparing event de-
scriptions of the automatically and manually collected data. A possible explanation
for the fall in accuracy compared to temporal data is that the automatic data col-
lection method was only retrieving the first sentence of each online article. Due to
the varying nature of website designs it can be difficult to find a single algorithmic
approach to finding article text. Therefore, there is scope to extend the research in
Chapter 5 by employing more sophisticated natural language processing techniques
to enhance the detail of automated database recordings.
This thesis has highlighted several significant contributions mathematical mod-
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elling can make to the field of terrorism research. However, it is also necessary to
consider the limitations of the types of approaches which have been presented.
One of the major problems surrounding modelling techniques is accurately detect-
ing the underlying distribution of the data being analysed. In particular, throughout
each chapter in this thesis assumptions have been made concerning the precise ana-
lytical forms of the models studied. For example, within the Hawkes point process
model an exponentially decaying kernel is used to model PIRA and AS attacks. Al-
though the model choice is supported by current literature and statistical techniques
other models may exist which have even greater potential to capture terrorism dy-
namics. Hence, the research in this thesis could likely be advanced by considering
more general methods of model fitting. In particular, the field of machine learning
is presently a very active area of research which can provide methods for finding
generalised model frameworks which adapt to data inputs.
In addition to choosing the best models in each chapter the research outcomes also
depend on the data utilised. When conducting terrorism research using only open
source data there are limitations on attainable insights. This observation was made
in relation to the DPMM in Chapter 4, where, allocating IED factories to sources was
not possible. A similar situation may also be present in other chapters. In particular,
the Hawkes process models the ability of past events to trigger future occurrences.
Without further information attributing attacks to particular cells within PIRA or
AS it was not possible to determine precisely which events were related. With this
extra detail more refined research outcomes could have been achieved highlighting
the size of the influence of different parts of terrorist groups on the overall attack
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profile. Such findings have the potential to enable counter-terrorism practitioners
to allocate resources most efficiently and effectively. These types of issues would
likely be overcome in a real world scenario, where, practitioners have access to more
detailed closed source datasets.
Alongside the data analysis and modelling results in each chapter is a discussion
of the research outcomes. When presenting these discussions the arguments pre-
sented mainly focused on linking the quantitative findings to the present literature.
However, the models and techniques developed in this thesis may have lead to new
insights if considered from a social science perspective. An example of the unique
insights offered by this thesis was observed in Chapter 2. Specifically, the change
point detection methods developed using the Hawkes process model resulted in new
dates for the phases of the PIRA. Therefore, engaging more widely the social sci-
ence community with the research presented in this thesis would likely lead to much
greater depth from the analysis outcomes.
In concluding this thesis it is hoped that the mathematical modelling utilised
to study many different aspects of terrorism, terrorist groups and counter-terrorism
strategies has demonstrated that mathematics has great potential in this field of
study. Going forward the expansion of this type of approach in terrorism and crime
science literature will enhance many future research endeavours and provide new and
profound insights. In addition, extending these types of mathematical approaches
beyond the confines of academia and into the tools employed by practitioners will
likely prove to be highly beneficial and offer valuable depth of understanding.
APPENDIX A
SPATIO-TEMPORAL PATTERNS OF IED USAGE BY THE PROVISIONAL
IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (PUBLISHED PAPER)
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In this paper a unique dataset of improvised explosive device (IED) attacks
during “The Troubles” in Northern Ireland (NI) is analysed via a Hawkes process
model. It is found that this past dependent model is a good fit to IED attacks
yielding key insights about the nature of terrorism in NI. We also present a novel
approach to quantitatively investigate some of the sociological theory surrounding
the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) which challenges previously held
assumptions concerning changes seen in the organisation. Finally we extend our
use of the Hawkes process model by considering a multidimensional version which
permits both self and mutual-excitations. This allows us to test how the PIRA
responded to past IED attacks on different geographical scales from which we
find evidence for the autonomy of the organisation over the six counties of NI
and Belfast. By incorporating a second dataset concerning British Security Force
(BSF) interventions, the multidimensional model allows us to test counter-terrorism
(CT) operations in NI where we find subsequent increases in violence.
1 Introduction
Terrorism is a major international concern which shows little signs of abating.
There is therefore great importance in developing scientific approaches to under-
stand the behavioural underpinnings of terrorism in order to prevent and disrupt
these activities. The ability to gain such insights through real world experimen-
tation is questionable due to the risks associated with unsuccessful approaches.
One of the cheapest and most adaptable methods of research in this area is
mathematical modelling [33]. Such modelling provides not only a vast number
of well-developed tools and techniques but also the opportunity to experiment
freely without unnecessary safety risks or ethical concerns.
Several advances have been made in this field of late, leading to a vari-
ety of conclusions with policy making implications. Braithwaite and Johnson [7]
studied the interactions of insurgent attacks and Coalition counter-insurgency op-
erations in Iraq. The authors were able to conclude from space-time patterns
that indiscriminate counter-insurgency operations resulted in a backlash effect by
insurgents whilst discriminate operations had the opposite effect. Along similar
lines Lewis et al. [29] apply self-exciting point process models to study violent
civilian deaths in Iraq during the U.S.-led invasion. They found a two to six
2 S. Tench et al.
lines Lewis et al. [29] apply self-exciting point process models to study violent
civilian deaths in Iraq during the U.S.-led invasion. They found a two to six
month timescale for violent deaths which correspond to a series of related at-
tacks. Hence, quick interventions could help to drastically lower the problem of
violent deaths in Iraq. In a similar spirit a study by Mohler [35] found evidence
that terrorist attacks in Northern Ireland followed a pattern of self-excitation
lasting 9.3 weeks. The line of investigation taken by these sorts of studies have
important consequences for tackling the types of terrorism seen in NI where in-
surgency and civilian deaths were major issues [20]. These approaches marked a
large departure from political science-inspired methodologies that generally linked
the quantity of terrorist attacks to “root causes” like socio-economic indicators
that are quasi-static and fail to provide insight into the triggers needed for a
strategic intervention.
The methods employed in these terrorism studies [7, 20, 29, 35] along with
several others [14, 22, 55] share similarities with the modelling of spatio-temporal
phenomena in crime pattern theory [8]. In that context it is assumed that crim-
inal activity forms a series of quantifiable patterns at the macro scale [16, 44].
Mathematical descriptions of these patterns, or more generally ‘crime hotspots’,
can be explored and exploited in real-time. By targeting susceptible areas with
preventative measures there is potential for great reductions in subsequent crime.
This approach has since been shown to be effective in a number of real-world
applications including policy [2, 17, 31], and predictive policing [6, 27].
It is from this point of view that we aim to approach the issue of terror-
ism during the conflict in NI. In this paper we seek to add to the literature
concerning spatio-temporal patterns of terrorism by studying a unique dataset
of IED attacks in NI between 1970-1998. Specifically for the case of NI this
paper is focused on the group known as the Provisional Irish Republican Army
(PIRA). Although there are extensive historical accounts and a growing body of
social science research related to this group [3, 19, 25, 26, 51] there is a gap
for a wider scope of mathematical investigations of their activities.
The PIRA was predominantly formed from members of the Catholic commu-
nity in NI [56] and saw itself as “the legal representatives of the Irish people,
[who] are morally justified in carrying out a campaign of resistance against for-
eign occupation forces and domestic collaborators” [39]. The active period of the
PIRA between 1969-1998 can be traced out in five phases [3]. These phases and
their historical context are described below.
• 1969-1976 - Phase 1: During this phase the organisation was arranged in a
military style having brigades, battalions and companies.
• 1977-1980 - Phase 2: A cell-based structure was adopted. This approach was
characterised by PIRA fracturing into small groups of members known as Ac-
tive Service Units (ASUs) [25]. This approach aimed to improve the organisa-
tion’s secrecy by making it harder to infiltrate.
• 1981-1989 - Phase 3: The Republican campaign moved into the political arena
3through the Sinn Fe´in party who now had similar levels of prestige as their
militant wing, PIRA.
• 1990-1994 - Phase 4: Secret meetings involving top ranking PIRA leaders
negotiating a ceasefire with the British Government.
• 1995-1998 - Phase 5: Peace talks announced with a ceasefire ratified in the
Good Friday Agreement signalling for many the end of “The Troubles”.
During its active phases the PIRA successfully developed a large arsenal of
IEDs which it employed with devastating effects for both the security forces and
civilians [53]. In particular, the impact of violence was felt heavily by the civil-
ian population which constituted approximately 54% of all deaths [20]. Moreover,
the deaths caused by the NI conflict were highly concentrated in Belfast, where
approximately 47% of fatalities occurred [20].
In analogy to the studies of Braithwaite and Johnson [7], Lewis et al. [29] and
Mohler [35] we make an attempt to understand the driving forces behind IED
attacks in NI. Our extension to the present literature revolves around the access
we have to a unique dataset of IED events which allows us to study a specific
type of terrorist activity in great detail at a fine temporal scale. The dataset we
use provides ample evidence for any past dependence on insurgent attacks and
this study attempts to understand these dynamics in greater detail. The model
chosen to explore this question is a Hawkes self-exciting point process. It makes
use of a response function (or kernel) which holds information pertaining to the
long-term influence of previous events and has been shown to well represent a
number of past dependent processes including gang related violence [18, 24, 52],
email exchanges to infer organisation leadership [21], burglary [34, 50] and violent
deaths in conflicts as previously mentioned [29]. It also provides an opportunity
to examine each of the five phases of PIRA activity separately, as is done in
Model 1 and all subsequent models, offering direct quantitative insights into how
the group behaved and reacted through the stages of the Republican campaign.
As well as studying temporal patterns of insurgency Lewis et al. [29] also
compare Hawkes processes in different regions of Iraq to understand spatial in-
fluences seen during waves of violent attacks. Similarly in this paper we un-
dertake spatial disaggregation of PIRA attacks according to the six counties of
NI and we also separate Belfast due to its significance during “The Troubles”
as discussed above [20]. This additional spatial information is to yield insights
about the extent to which PIRA units in NI acted autonomously as suggested
by Horgan and Taylor [25]. This latter study forms the theoretical basis for
Models 2 and 3.
The PIRA did not act in isolation however, and in this contribution, we
also aim to explore the interplay between PIRA and the British Security Forces
(BSF) by employing a multidimensional Hawkes process. Previous studies into
British counter-terrorism (CT) strategies in NI [12, 28, 40] found evidence that
the actions of BSFs could undermine the effort to curb Republican terrorism
and even result in a negative backlash increasing the number of attacks. For
instance, in 1988 an operation by BSFs resulted in the deaths of three PIRA
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members in Gibraltar. An analysis of subsequent PIRA attacks found positive
increases related to the incident 36 months after it occurred [28]. The inclusion
of additional mutually exciting terms in the Hawkes process has been seen to
represent other interacting systems in the past including multiple gang networks
[50], but, to the best of our knowledge, has yet to be applied to yield insights
into CT strategies.
To test the CT strategies employed in NI two types of events will be assessed
in this paper. Firstly, from the discussion above concerning the background of
the PIRA it was pointed out the organisation drew the majority of its volun-
teers from the Catholic community [56]. Consequently deaths of Catholic civilians
resulting from BSF operations may be expected to prompt a significant retalia-
tion from the PIRA. We investigate this effect in Model 4. Moreover, following
the case study findings of Lafree, Dugan and Korte [28], as discussed above, the
backlash effect of BSF actions which killed PIRA members will be considered
in Model 5. With such insights we aim to uncover a useful methodology by
which CT practitioners and academics can judge the efficacy of past strategies
to combat terrorism.
Alongside the contributions this paper aims to make concerning the use of
the Hawkes process we also present a novel approach to deal with the issue we
refer to as edge effects. This effect is the result of events outside the observa-
tion period influencing those inside [46]. Whereas in previous studies using the
Hawkes process the data analysed is in a single time series [18, 29] with the
segmentation of our data according to the five phases of PIRA it is possible
that events in previous phases may have influenced those in future ones. As a
consequence of this a moving time window approach was considered whereby the
data points from adjacent phases were combined to find the quantitatively best
fitting model.
The structure of presentation will be in 6 sections. In Section 2 a discussion
of the datasets used for this paper will be provided. Then in Section 3 the
mathematical models that have been studied will be introduced in more detail.
This section will also contain further information about the method used to ob-
tain model parameters. Next in Section 4 the numerical results of the paper will
be provided. This will begin with a description of the novel approach we have
taken to examining edge effects in the data analysed. Alongside the results a
discussion will be provided about how the model parameters can be interpreted.
Finally in Section 5 the findings of the paper will be discussed with their po-
tential impacts for both the academic community and practitioners demonstrated
as well as a brief overview of future research topics.
2 Data
This paper utilises a unique dataset of PIRA IED events from 1970 to 1998.
This dataset was collected through an exhaustive coding of newspaper reports
and other open source outlets. Please see Asal et al. [3] for a full outline of
the data collection and verification process. In total, the dataset spans 5461 IED
5Table 1. PIRA IED Dataset Event Fields
Field Values
Date Year (1970-1998)/Month (1-12)/Day (1-31)
Location {Antrim, Armagh, Belfast, Derry, Down, Fermanagh, Tyrone}
Target {Political, Military, Police, Paramilitary,
Government, Transport, Civilian, Foreign}
Table 2. BSF Dataset Event Fields
Field Values
Date Year (1970-1976)/Month (1-12)/Day (1-31)
Religion {Catholic, Protestant}
Status {Civilian, British Security, Republican Paramilitary,
Loyalist Paramilitary, Irish Security}
Organisation Responsible {British Security, Republican Paramilitary,
Loyalist Paramilitary, Irish Security, Unknown}
Geographical Location {Belfast North/East/South/West,
County Antrim/Armagh/Derry/Down/Fermanagh/Tyrone,
Derry, Britain, Europe, Republic of Ireland}
events. For each event there are numerous details concerning the IED attack and
groups involved. Details of the event fields relevant to our study are given in
Table 1. It should be noted here that when discussing BSFs we refer to both
military and police targets. For further details on all the information contained
in the dataset the reader is referred to Asal et al. [3].
Alongside the study of PIRA related attacks in isolation, an additional inves-
tigation was made into how BSF attacks impacted upon further PIRA attacks.
The dataset concerning BSF attacks was obtained from the Conflict Archive on
the Internet (CAIN) [53]. In Table 2 the event fields and possible values for
this dataset are presented. In this study only the events which occurred in NI
were considered. There were a total of 131 Catholic civilian deaths recorded in
the final dataset of BSF events. Of these entries 78 were found to correspond
to Phase 1 of PIRA activity. This lead to a only a small number of data
points being available in the other phases with 12, 34 and 7 points for Phases
2, 3 and 4 respectively and 0 for Phase 5. Due to this distribution of data,
results were only obtainable for Phase 1. The number of PIRA IED events in
Phase 1 targeting BSFs was 144. See Sections 4.8 and 4.9 for further details.
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3 Methodology
3.1 Poisson Process
The first model studied serves as a baseline to compare with the Hawkes process
[18]. The specific baseline model tested was a Poisson process model specified
via a single parameter N/T, where N = number of events and T = time of the
final event measured from time 0 [47]. The Poisson process assumes that each
event is independent and thus that the system has no memory of attacks in
the past.
3.2 Univariate Model
Moving to a more complex model this paper will consider the influence of self-
excitations of PIRA IED attacks. The method we used is based on studying
an intensity function which describes the rate of IED incidents as a function of
time and conditional on the past history of events. The intensity function takes
the following form [23] for a given set of event times {ti}Ni=1.
λ(t) = µ+ k0
∑
t>ti
g(t− ti;ω) (3.2)
The response function g is taken to be of the form g(t) = ωe−ωt. The expo-
nential form for the response function is routinely used in studies of crime and
insurgency data [18, 29, 52]. It makes good intuitive sense for events which are
clustered in time and allows for a physical interpretation of each component of
the intensity function. In the example of IED attacks the constant µ can be
considered as a background rate at which IED events occur. After an initial
IED attack there may be further attacks, for example, a PIRA unit may wish
to follow up on the success of a previous attack, and the constant k0 captures
the jump in the IED event rate. However, an indefinitely higher rate is unre-
alistic and eventually the rate will return to the background rate. The rate of
decay is controlled by the term ω. The additional ω preceding the exponential
term acts as a normalisation constant so that the jump factor multiplied by the
response function can be viewed as the number of offspring after an event and
the density of the time interval for the increase in activity [46].
Parameter estimation for the intensity function can be undertaken via the
method of maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) [42]. This process involves find-
ing the parameters which maximise the following log-likelihood function derived
by Rubin [48]:
log L({ti};µ, k0,ω) =
N∑
i=1
log(λ(ti))−
∫ T
0
λ(t) dt,
where tN = T will be taken as the final time of observation in a similar ap-
proach taken by Ozaki [42]. For the form of the intensity function given in
7(3.2) the log-likelihood becomes
log L =
N∑
i=1
log
µ+ k0 ∑
ti>tj
ωe−ω(ti−tj)
+ k0 (e−ω(T−ti) − 1)
− µT.
A number of assumptions are built into this formulation. First, all parame-
ters used in the intensity function should be positive [29] to ensure the model
remains realistic. Second, the set of points {ti}Ni=1 should be measured from
time zero. However, since the Hawkes process depends on the infinite past, this
assumption is not achievable in a real world setting and it may be difficult
to eradicate the influence of events outside the observation period on those in-
side [46]. More details on how this problem was handled for this paper will be
discussed in Section 4.1.
A further assumption is that the set of times should be unique [30]. Our
dataset contains several simultaneous events and thus to satisfy the requirement
for uniqueness, events in the same county, or multiple events in Belfast, on the
same day were regarded as a single event. However, to avoid losing too much
detail, events in different counties, or events inside and outside of Belfast, on
the same day were distinguished via the addition of a random timestamp (as
in Bowsher [5]). This is justified by looking at the command and functional
structure of the PIRA which reveals that at the county and Belfast levels IED
attacks were fairly autonomous [25].
Finally, a restraint on the response function g ensures that the model is non-
explosive (see Varadhan [54] for further details concerning explosive stochastic
processes). This assumes that the integral of g over t should be strictly less
than unity [42]. Our choice of g satisfies this condition.
3.3 Multidimensional Model
After examining the past dependent nature of IED attacks based on self-excitations
the second type of model investigated will also include mutual-excitations. For
example, such models will be used to consider the influence of PIRA attacks
and BSF attacks on further PIRA attacks.
The multidimensional Hawkes process model can be defined in a similar way
as was done for the one-dimensional case. Here, with two adversaries, we require
a two-dimensional model. Now there are two sets of event times which will
be labelled {ta}Na=1 and {tb}Mb=1 and two counting processes, Nr(t), r ∈ {1, 2},
which form a two-dimensional counting process N(t). Each individual process has
intensity function defined by [23]
λr(t) = µr + k0
∑
t>ta
g(t− ta;ω) + s0
∑
t>tb
h(t− tb;ν), (3.3)
where the two response functions are defined by g(t) = ωe−ωt and h(t) = νe−νt.
The form chosen for the response functions is chosen by analogy to the research
of Short et al. [50]. In particular, in extending the work of Egesdal et al. [18],
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to study interactions between multiple gangs, results were obtained indicating
that exponential response functions may prove useful to study mutual-excitations
between gangs.
Similar to the univariate case described in Section 3.2 we can interpret the
model in a real world setting. In the case of modelling influences on PIRA
attacks one could, for example, take event times {ta} to represent times of
PIRA IED attacks and times {tb} as BSF attacks. The background rate µr,
jump rate k0 and response function g have the same interpretation as that given
in the one-dimensional case. Similarly the parameter s0 represents the jump in
IED attacks following a mutual-excitation, such as, retaliation against a BSF
attack whilst ν controls the temporal scale over which this mutual-excitation
persists. The parameter ν also acts as a normalisation constant for the response
function h so that the product of the jump factor s0 and the response function
h can be interpreted as the number of offspring events and the density for
the increase in activity following a mutually exciting incident [46]. In this two-
dimensional system the second intensity function would model the influence of
past BSF and PIRA IED attacks on BSF attacks.
To compute parameter estimates the MLE can again be employed. This MLE
takes the following form [50]
log L({ta};µ,k0,ω,s0,ν) =
N∑
a=1
log(λ1(ta))−
∫ T
0
λ1(t) dt,
where, T = max{maxa{ta},maxb{tb}}. A similar formula holds for λ2(t) and {tb}.
As in the one-dimensional case, all parameters must be positive [23] to make
the model realistic and events in the infinite past should be considered [46].
Likewise, event times must be unique [30]. The condition necessary for the model
to be non-explosive is reformulated in the higher dimensional case. In particular,
consider the 2x2 matrix G whose entries are formed of the integrals∫ ∞
0
grs(t) dt, r, s ∈ {1, 2},
for each response function occurring in the definitions of λr. Then the condition
for the model to be non-explosive is that the spectral radius defined as
ρ = max
i
{|ei|} < 1,
where ei represent the eigenvalues of G [9]. Again this assumption has been
checked and found to be satisfied for the models studied in this paper with
the exception of Model 5 (see Table 3 below) which has a spectral radius of
1.0124. This case should therefore be treated with care and may be the result
of a small dataset for this model (see the model analysis in Section 4.9 for
further details).
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Model Number Event Times Interpreted Dataset
0 Number of {ti} = IED events in NI PIRA Events
1 {ti} = IED events in NI PIRA Events
2 {ti} = IED events in Belfast PIRA Events
3 {ta} = IED events in Belfast PIRA Events
{tb} = IED events in the six counties of NI PIRA Events
4 {ta} = IED events targeting BSFs in NI PIRA Events
{tb} = BSF events which killed Catholic civilians BSF Events
5 {ta} = IED events targeting BSFs in NI PIRA Events
{tb} = BSF events which killed PIRA members BSF Events
3.4 Table of Models
Having given the general form of the models in this paper the specific models
that were studied are summarised in Table 3. In particular, this table presents
an interpretation of the event times used in each model. For clarity the datasets
being studied in each model are also listed corresponding to the information
in Tables 1 and 2. Times ti correspond to the univariate model presented in
Section 3.2 whilst times ta and tb correspond to the multidimensional model
from Section 3.3. In Section 4, where the numerical results of this paper are
provided, the order of presentation will correspond to the ordering of models
shown in Table 3.
3.5 Computational Methodology
Finding the parameters which maximise the log-likelihoods can be undertaken in
numerous ways [42]. For this paper optimisation of the log-likelihood functions
were undertaken in the Python programming language using the SciPy Optimize
package Nelder-Mead [37, 49]. The Nelder-Mead algorithm was chosen based on
previous observations of its effectiveness when applied to point process models
[45] and also its performance during preliminary coding. It should be noted at
this point that this optimisation procedure finds the minimum value, hence the
equivalent problem of finding the minimising parameters of − log L was consid-
ered. To obtain further computational efficiency a recursive algorithm described
by Liniger [30] was used to compute values of the intensity function.
Another important point, which is made by Egesdal et al. [18], is that due
to the nonlinear nature of the minimisation it is not guaranteed that a global
minimum will be found. Therefore, there is a need to begin the optimisation
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procedure at multiple points and take the parameters yielding the lowest value
of − log L and subject to the conditions given earlier.
Having derived each model’s parameters we then go on to assess its goodness
of fit. To determine the overall model fit residual analysis was employed. The
basic ideas of this approach can be found in Brown et al. [10] and are also
summarised below.
Consider a point process formed of the set of event times {ti} with intensity
function λ. Perform the following integrals which transform the set {ti} to the
set {τi}
τi =
∫ ti
0
λ(t) dt.
If the model is a good fit then the residuals {τi} are independent and dis-
tributed according to a stationary Poisson process with unit rate [43]. Therefore,
the inter-arrival times given by
Yk = τk − τk−1
are exponentially distributed. Setting τ0 = 0 [10] and applying these procedures
for the intensity function given in (3.2) the following formula is obtained
Y1 = µt1,
Yk = µ(tk − tk−1)− k0
k−1∑
i=1
e−ω(tk−ti) − e−ω(tk−1−ti), 1 < k ≤ N.
If the inter-arrival times are exponentially distributed then
Uk = 1− e−Yk (3.5)
form a set of independent uniform random variables over [0, 1). Therefore, to
test the goodness of fit of the Hawkes process it remains to determine if the
corresponding Uk do indeed come from a uniform distribution.
A quantitative test that can be used to check this assumption on the distri-
bution of the Uk values is the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test [32]. The KS
test in this case works by comparing the value of the test statistic Dn =
maxk
(|Uk − k−1N |, | kN −Uk|) [57] to a critical value Dα (see O’Connor and Kleyner
[41] for a table of critical values). Statistical significance is obtained if the con-
dition Dn < Dα is found to hold in which case there is evidence to suggest
goodness of fit of the model.
Another method we used, which compares the fit of different models, is the
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) [1]:
AIC = 2k − 2 log L,
where, k is the number of parameters being fitted in the model and log L is
the maximum of the log-likelihood function. The model yielding the lowest value
for AIC is deemed the better fit: more parameters are penalised whilst a greater
value for the log-likelihood is rewarded. Burnham and Anderson [11] point out
the AIC difference is not a significance test in the sense of critical values and
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requires some judgement. For general guidance Burnham and Anderson [11] sug-
gest that 0 − 2 shows little difference between models, 4 − 7 considerably more
evidence for a difference and > 10 is classified as a significant difference. It is
important that the AIC should only be used to compare models which are fitted
with the same dataset [11], as was done for the comparisons in this paper.
4 Numerical Results
4.1 Determining Phase Boundaries
Initially we will be focused on PIRA IED attacks across all of the counties of
NI and Belfast. Each phase of the events as outlined in Asal et al. [3] will
be explored separately to offer a quantitative description of the changes in the
Republican campaign.
The phases may not be treated in isolation, however. As discussed in Sec-
tion 3.2, the historical dependence of the Hawkes process means that events
outside of the observation period may influence those inside leading to spurious
parameter values [46]. Thus, Phase 1 may influence events in Phase 2, Phase 2
may influence Phase 3 and so on. To avoid this edge effects issue, a systematic
approach is required to deal with the phase boundaries.
We propose a novel approach to examine the impact of edge effects (see
also Nichols and Schoenberg [38] for another similar approach in the field of
seismology). Specifically, a moving time window was used to include the influence
of events from Phase i in Phase i + 1 for i = 1, 2, 3, 4. This method is best
illustrated via example. Consider Phases 1 and 2. First, we calculated the MLE
parameters that result from the dataset consisting of Phase 2 only. Then adding
one point from Phase 1 the MLE parameters were recalculated. This was then
repeated with two points from Phase 1 and so on until the MLE parameters
for all the data in Phases 1 and 2 combined had been calculated. Finally we
determined which of these models provided the best fit compared to the others
using the KS test. It was decided that a more positive difference ∆ = Dα −
Dn gives more certainty that statistical significance has been reached. Thus the
choice of the best fitting model, and hence the most sensible phase boundaries
to use, was decided based on maximising ∆.
Since Phase 1 was effectively the start of the conflict, and the beginning of
the PIRA as an organisation, we do not assume there will be any substantial
effects from previous events outside the dataset. Therefore, the boundaries for
Phase 1 were unchanged from their original definition as in Asal et al. [3].
In Table 4 the number of points that were required to maximise the difference
between the critical value and KS test statistic are given for the remaining four
phases. It can be seen that very few points were required to fix the correct
mathematical boundaries for Phases 2 and 3 and it was found that with so
few points there was little change in the parameter values compared to the
unadjusted phases. However, in Phase 4 it was necessary to include 65% of
data points from Phase 3 which significantly changed the parameter values from
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Table 4. Edge Effects Results
Phase Number of Data Points Added New Boundary
1 - 27/01/1970
2 11 24/10/1976
3 11 22/08/1980
4 494 11/4/1984
5 41 22/5/1994
those found for the original Phase 4 boundary. This is illustrated clearly by the
plots in Figure 1 which show the variation in the values of ∆ and the three
model parameters as each data point is added from Phase 3 to Phase 4. A
similar observation was also made for the case of edge effects in Phase 5.
The boundaries found from this edge effects analyses will be used throughout
the remainder of this paper. This ensures consistency and enables comparisons
between models. From here on in reference to a model’s MLE parameters means
the parameters found using the boundaries stated in Table 4.
4.2 Comparing Models
4.3 Table of Results
For brevity, all model results are listed concurrently for each phase in Tables
5 to 7, but care should be taken when making a comparison of the different
models. A comparison may be made within each of the three investigations:
PIRA events across NI, PIRA events in Belfast and outside, PIRA and BSF
events in NI, but not directly between them, except for model fit. See Section
3.5 for more detail.
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Figure 1. Figure (a) shows the values of ∆ = Dα − Dn for each point added from
Phase 3 to Phase 4. Figures (b)-(d) show the corresponding changes in the MLE
parameter values.
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Table 5. PIRA events across NI.
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5
Model 0 µ 0.3020 0.2541 0.2250 0.3028 0.0957
AIC 3359.6 1784.4 3834.3 5190.5 1079.7
Model 1 µ 0.0543 0.1721 0.0800 0.0597 0.0270
k0 0.8241 0.3233 0.6529 0.8040 0.7231
ω 0.0542 0.7685 0.0426 0.0316 0.0901
KS Test 0.0686 0.0528* 0.0465* 0.0343* 0.0455*
KS Critical 95% 0.0492 0.0701 0.0490 0.0396 0.1072
KS Critical 99% 0.0590 - - - -
AIC 3083.7 1717.6 3750.5 5004 987
* Significant at 95% level.
Table 6. PIRA events in Belfast and outside.
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5
Model 2 µ 0.0375 0.0397 0.0222 0.0175 0.0178
k0 0.7364 0.6456 0.7123 0.8766 0.5925
ω 0.0246 0.0298 0.0135 0.0103 0.0874
KS Test 0.0715* 0.0996* 0.0477* 0.0679** 0.0693*
KS Critical 95% 0.0726 0.1096 0.0878 0.0640 0.1626
KS Critical 99% - - - 0.0767 -
AIC 2015.1 967 1724.8 2707.8 556
Model 3 µ 0.0396 0.0299 0.0189 0.0099 0.0131
k0 0.6441 0.5783 0.7126 0.7449 0.3842
ω 0.0272 0.0339 0.0135 0.0138 0.1001
s0 0.0647 0.0949 0.0208 0.1085 0.2336
ν 0.7840 0.3976 1.1336 0.1099 0.1681
KS Test 0.0561* 0.0961* 0.0667* 0.0562* 0.1745**
KS Critical 95% 0.0726 0.1096 0.0878 0.0640 0.1626
KS Critical 99% - - - - 0.1948
AIC 2013.6 973 1726.1 2716.4 552.3
* Significant at 95% level. ** Significant at 99% level.
4.4 Model 0
For this model we look at just a Poisson process applied to IED attacks across
NI. Even this simple framework manages to capture a difference in rate across
the five phases, showing Phase 4 as having the highest probability of a ran-
dom event in a given time window with µ = 0.3028. This is in contrast to the
Hawkes process in Model 1 where Phase 2 is found to have the highest back-
ground rate whilst µ is much lower in Phase 4, suggesting that events in Phase
4 were heavily dependent on the past. Historical dependence is also seen for the
other phases since the background parameter values found for Model 1 are all
significantly lower than those of the Poisson process in Model 0. According to
the AIC comparisons Model 1 is also shown to provide a better model fit in
each phase.
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Table 7. PIRA and BSF events in NI.
Phase 1
Model 4 µ 0.0189
k0 0.1138
ω 0.9716
s0 1.0694
ν 0.0137
KS Test 0.1122*
KS Critical 95% 0.1133
KS Critical 99% -
AIC 1057.8
Model 5 µ 0.0212
k0 0.2411
ω 0.2757
s0 0.9774
ν 0.0087
KS Test 0.1205**
KS Critical 95% 0.1133
KS Critical 99% 0.1358
AIC 1070.4
* Significant at 95% level. ** Significant at 99% level.
4.5 Model 1
The next model studied was a Hawkes process with a single self-exciting term
applied to IED events across NI.
4.5.1 Goodness of Fit
Qualitative evidence for the model’s ability to represent the data is gained from
visualisation of the intensity function. In Figure 2 a plot of the intensity func-
tion over time for the Hawkes process in Phase 1 is presented. Here the peaks
and troughs of the model are seen to follow closely the patterns of event times
observed in the actual data.
The overall goodness of fit of Model 1 in each phase is determined via the KS
test results. The critical values for the 95% confidence level have Dα =
1.36√
N
[41].
For Phase 1 it was found that the KS test statistic exceeded the critical value
even when considering the 99% confidence level with Dα =
1.63√
N
[41]. Hence there
is insufficient evidence in this case to conclude that the model is accurately
capturing the dynamics of the data.
Although the KS test results for Phase 1 gave a negative result for the
model fit there is some evidence for goodness of fit in a KS plot. Following the
method outlined in Brown et al. [10] Uk, as defined in (3.5), is plotted against
the hypothesized cumulative distribution, evaluated at k−0.5N . If Uk is indeed
uniformly distributed, the resulting graph should be a 45◦ line. The results of
performing this procedure are shown in Figure 3 for Model 1 in each phase
of the PIRA. Upper and lower bounds are also shown, obtained by plotting
the lines y = x ± Dα [13]. In cases where points do deviate from the best fit
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Figure 2. Top graphs show event times of IED attacks and the intensity function for
Model 1 in Phase 1. The bottom graphs are the same but only for the first 500
days.
line they still remain within or close to the error bounds, suggesting that the
Hawkes process generally represents the data well.
A final test is to inspect a plot of Uk+1 against Uk to ensure that the Uk
are independent [4]. If serial correlation occurs it is most likely to be between
adjacent time intervals, hence if these plots reveal some patterning it suggests
that the transformed times are not independent. The graphs in Figure 4 present
this analysis for each phase of the IED data. Although there is some patterning
occurring in the plots for Phases 1 and 4 overall these plots appear to show
little correlation between the neighbouring points of the sequence {Uk}. This
serves as reassurance that independence exists and the Hawkes process is a good
representation of IED attacks.
An AIC comparison to the simple Poisson process in Model 0 shows that
Model 1 provides a better fit in each phase.
4.5.2 Interpreting Parameters
The parameter ω−1 gives information concerning the average length of time a
series of attacks persists. In Phase 1 the average attack window is 10.0542 = 18.5
days. The rate of decay then has a large increase in Phase 2 yielding an av-
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Figure 3. Figures (a) - (e) show KS plots for Hawkes process Model 1 in Phases 1-5
respectively. Data points falling on the solid goodness of fit line imply a perfect model
fit with the dashed lines representing 95% error bounds.
erage time window of 1.3 days. The work of Asal et al. [3] points out that
in Phase 1 there was a more militaristic style of operation within the PIRA
which could suggest better attack coordination allowing for longer periods of re-
lated waves of attacks. However, this organisational structure made the PIRA
susceptible to infiltration by Security Forces thus prompting a shift to a cellular
based approach in Phase 2 [3]. One of the consequences of infiltration could
be reflected in the shorter attack window, which might be representing the fact
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Figure 4. Figures (a) - (e) show serial correlation plots for Hawkes process Model 1
in Phases 1-5 respectively. A random dispersion of data points indicates goodness of
fit of the model.
that many PIRA members were imprisoned [19], thus, there would have been
fewer members to carry out attacks. In Phase 3 the attack window becomes
23.5 days. This phase saw a resurgence of violence by the PIRA with Moloney
[36] describing the 1980’s as a period of escalating violence similar to the “Tet
Offensive” launched by the People’s Army of Vietnam in 1968. In particular, the
decay rate found could represent the PIRA using sustained attacks to weaken
British resolve to remain in NI. This also links to the PIRA objectives de-
scribed in the organisation’s Green Book [39]. One of these objectives was to
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use a “bombing campaign aimed at making the enemy’s financial interests in our
country unprofitable”. Another objective was to wage a “war of attrition against
enemy personnel which is aimed at causing as many casualties and deaths as
possible so as to create a demand from their people at home for their with-
drawal”.
Phases 4 and 5 then show an increasing trend for the decay rate. In Phase
4 the average time window for attacks is 31.6 days and in Phase 5 it is
11.1 days. These periods were characterised by secret meetings and negotiations
that eventually led to the Good Friday Agreement [3]. The PIRA used IED
attacks as a bargaining tool with the British Government [3] and as noted by
Coogan [15] PIRA had the ability to “turn ... bombing[s] on and off like a
tap”. So these shortening periods of IED usage may have been the PIRA using
its capabilities as a way to achieve leverage with the British Government during
peace negotiations rather than for a war of attrition.
The parameter µ can be interpreted as the background rate at which new
events randomly occurred. The trend appears to be for the parameter to increase
from Phase 1 to 2 and then fall in the remaining three phases. The rise in
Phase 2 may be related to the fact that the organisation of PIRA was shifting
and hence with less control members were conducting attacks more randomly.
However, as the “Tet Offensive” campaign began in Phase 3 attacks became
more systematic. Finally de-escalation of violence over Phases 4 and 5 explain
the decreases in the value of µ.
The final parameter k0 can be interpreted as the jump in the rate of events
following an initial event. Phase 1 has the highest value for this parameter. This
could again be a result of the military structure of the PIRA leading to more
flexibility to escalate events. As before the drop in Phase 2 may be related
to imprisonment of PIRA members hindering the extent to which attacks could
occur. The rise in Phase 3 may also be interpreted as PIRA adopting a “Tet
Offensive” approach and the Green Book objectives both explained above. The
final phases have relatively high values of k0. This can be linked to the PIRA
using IED attacks to demonstrate its capabilities during peace negotiations also
as described above.
4.6 Model 2
The work of Fay, Morrissey and Smyth [20] demonstrates that violence during
“The Troubles” was highly concentrated in Belfast. Thus in Model 2 we refine
the geographical scale of investigation to this region considering a single term
self-exciting Hawkes process applied to PIRA IED events.
4.6.1 Goodness of Fit
The results in Table 6 show that there is strong quantitative evidence for Model
2 providing a good fit to the data. The KS plot for the model in Phase 2 is
shown in Figure 5(a). It was not felt that the data stayed close enough to the
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Figure 5. Figures (a)-(b) show KS plots for Hawkes process Model 2 in Phases 2 and
4 respectively. Data points falling on the solid goodness of fit line imply a perfect
model fit with the dashed lines representing 95% error bounds.
Figure 6. Serial correlation plot for Hawkes process Model 2 in Phase 4. A random
dispersion of data points indicates goodness of fit of the model.
line of best fit to conclude a good fit of the Hawkes process. For the model
in Phase 4 the KS test had to be conducted at the 99% level of confidence to
obtain a significant outcome. Despite this the KS plot for Phase 4, as shown
in Figure 5(b), gives some qualitative evidence for goodness of fit of the model
even at the 95% level. There also appeared to be some patterning in the serial
correlation plot for Model 2 in Phase 4 as shown in Figure 6.
4.6.2 Interpreting Parameters
Since Belfast was such a central stage in the NI conflict it is not too surprising
that the trends for the parameter values in Model 2 are similar to those seen
for Model 1. However, Model 2 in Phase 2 does not share the same significant
changes in parameter values as observed for Model 1. This implies the PIRA
attacks in Belfast were less susceptible to internal and external changes. One
explanation for this observation is the existence of a Northern Command Unit
being based in Belfast since 1969 [25]. As such it may have been easier for
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PIRA to quickly adapt to internal and external events, such as, the mass im-
prisonment of PIRA members which led to the organisation becoming cell-based
in Phase 2 [19].
4.7 Model 3
The next model considered was a multivariate Hawkes process. With this model
we aimed to capture the influence on PIRA IED attacks in Belfast based on
self-excitations of past PIRA attacks in Belfast and mutual-excitations of past
PIRA attacks in the six counties of NI.
4.7.1 Goodness of Fit
It can be seen from the results table presented earlier that the increased com-
plexity from using a multivariate Hawkes process in Model 3 does not yield a
better fitting model compared to Model 2. This may be due to the autonomy
of ASUs in the counties of NI and Belfast [25].
Nonetheless, in all but one case there is quantitative evidence for goodness
of fit of the models. For the model in Phase 5 goodness of fit was found
only after the KS test was conducted at the 99% level. The models in Phases
2, 3 and 5 did not have strong qualitative evidence for the goodness of fit
of the model as shown by KS plots in Figure 7. Nonetheless, the transformed
time data for each model appeared to be independent as measured by a serial
correlation plot.
4.7.2 Interpreting Parameters
From the parameter values presented in Table 6 more evidence is gained for
the relative autonomy of the Belfast Brigade from the other PIRA units. In
particular, it can be seen that the value of the jump from self-excitations, k0,
is much higher than that for mutual-excitations, s0. Whilst the opposite is true
for the decay rate of self-excitations, ω, and those of mutual-excitations, ν. This
suggests that the events in the six counties of NI had little impact on IED
attacks in Belfast and the impact they did have was short lived. Also it can
be seen that the self-excitation part of the model is very similar to that of the
Belfast only case in Model 2 suggesting that Model 2 is sufficient for studying
the internal dynamics of PIRA attacks in Belfast.
4.8 Model 4
In the final two models examined in this paper the focus will be on the in-
fluence of actions by BSFs in NI. These models are only examined in Phase 1
and on spatially aggregated data across NI due to a lack of data concerning
BSF attacks. The first of these models is a multivariate Hawkes process con-
sidering the influence on PIRA attacks against BSFs based on self-excitations
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Figure 7. Figures (a) - (c) show KS plots for Hawkes process Model 3 in Phases 2,
3 and 5 respectively. Data points falling on the solid goodness of fit line imply a
perfect model fit with the dashed lines representing 95% error bounds.
of past IED attacks against BSFs and mutual-excitations of past BSF attacks
which killed Catholic civilians. The decision to study the impact of the deaths
of Catholic civilians resulted from the fact that the PIRA were heavily rooted
in the Catholic community [56]. In our datasets the number of IED attacks
targeting BSFs is 144 and the number of Catholic civilian deaths resulting from
BSF events is 78.
4.8.1 Goodness of Fit
Results of applying goodness of fit tests to Model 4 are shown in Table 7.
Quantitatively Model 4 appears to provide a good fit to the IED data. Qual-
itatively, however, it should be noted that the data points in the KS plot do
not lie on the line of best fit, as can be seen in Figure 8. Nonetheless, the
serial correlation plot, although not included here, does suggest independence of
the data points.
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Figure 8. KS plot for multidimensional Hawkes process Model 4. Data points falling
on the solid goodness of fit line imply a perfect model fit with the dashed lines
representing 95% error bounds.
4.8.2 Interpreting Parameters
Interpreting the MLE parameter values for Model 4 it can be seen that BSF
attacks, which lead to the death of Catholic civilians, actually caused a backlash
in terms of leading to an increase in IED attacks. In particular, the jump
parameter, s0, is high compared to the other values seen in this paper implying
that following an incident involving the death of a Catholic civilian the PIRA
were likely to respond with a large increase in IED attacks targeting BSFs.
Also the decay rate of this increase in attacks, ν, is small suggesting a lengthy
period of increased violence equivalent to an average of 73 days. This prolonged
retaliation by PIRA may be seen as an attempt by the organisation to obtain
public legitimacy by acting as defenders of the Catholic population. Such results
also give support for the sort of findings made by Braithwaite and Johnson [7]
where less discriminatory counter-insurgency operations were found to result in
an increase in violence.
4.9 Model 5
The final model studied in this paper is similar to Model 4 except now the in-
fluence of BSF attacks which killed PIRA members is considered. In our dataset
there are 58 recorded incidents of BSF events resulting in PIRA member deaths.
4.9.1 Goodness of Fit
Goodness of fit test results are shown in Table 7. These results show that,
based on the AIC, Model 5 performs worse than Model 4 at modelling PIRA
attacks targeting BSFs. This result indicates that Catholic civilian deaths were
better predictors of a backlash by the PIRA. Moreover, the KS test is only
significant for Model 5 when considered at the 99% level. The KS plot for
Model 5, shown in Figure 9, suggests that the data points are not falling on
the line of best fit so there is not enough qualitative evidence to declare a
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Figure 9. KS plot for multidimensional Hawkes process Model 5. Data points falling
on the solid goodness of fit line imply a perfect model fit with the dashed lines
representing 95% error bounds.
significantly good fit. However, the serial correlation plot did suggest that the
data points were independent.
4.9.2 Interpreting Parameters
The parameter values for Model 5 also suggest an increase in violence against
BSFs following a BSF event leading to the death of a PIRA member. The
increase in the rate of IED attacks, given by s0, following such an operation
is high compared to other values seen in this paper and the length of time
this increase is sustained, given by ν, is quite long at an average of 115 days.
These observations may be the result of PIRA trying to revenge the death of
its members as well as demonstrating defiance. This is similar to the findings
of Lafree, Dugan and Korte [28] which suggested an increase in PIRA attacks
following BSF operations which killed PIRA members. When planning CT strate-
gies these observations, and similar ones for Model 4, imply that after a civilian
or terrorist death quick interventions are necessary to avoid long time periods
of increased violence.
5 Discussion
We began this paper by outlining the importance of mathematical modelling in
terrorism and stressing in particular the contributions such modelling could make
to improving CT responses. From a firm foundation of criminological theory con-
cerning spatio-temporal patterns of crime and a mathematical model known as a
Hawkes process we then proceeded to model IED attacks during the NI conflict.
The first step taken in this paper was to divide the IED dataset we used into
five phases corresponding to organisational changes within the PIRA as described
by Asal et al. [3]. Although this allowed for a greater depth of analysis it did
introduce the issue of edge effects where events in one phase influence those
in the next phase. To account for this a novel approach was found using a
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moving time frame to incorporate events from the previous phase where an
improvement was then judged using the KS test. It was found that in Phases
2 and 3 very few data points were needed to achieve the best fitting model.
However in Phases 4 and 5 more significant edge effects were found. For each
phase new mathematical boundaries were fixed for the analyses in this paper.
Such findings raise interesting questions relating to the timing of tactical and
organisational shifts within the PIRA that may have previously been missed.
Having defined the phase boundaries of PIRA we then moved to analyse six
models aimed at capturing different temporal patterns of IED usage by the
organisation at different geographical scales.
Initially in Model 1 we examined the self-exciting nature of IED attacks across
the whole of NI. For this case it was found that the model outperforms a
simple Poisson process, defined by Model 0, as measured by the AIC. Moreover,
quantitative and qualitative evidence suggested that this model was capturing
the temporal patterns of IED attacks. With the model specified we were then
able to compare its predictions to historical accounts of the PIRA illustrating
how such models could be used in practise to determine how terrorist groups
respond to past events.
Being the center of much of the violence seen during “The Troubles” [20] we
then decided to refine the geographical scale to focus on Belfast. Here it was
found that there was quantitative and qualitative evidence to suggest the model
is good at capturing past influences on further IED attacks. In addition, a
study of the model parameters revealed a similar pattern to Model 1 although
with some difference in Phase 2. But again using historical accounts of the
PIRA we were able to account for this difference. This shows that by adjusting
the spatial scale it is possible to gain more refined information about a terrorist
organisation demonstrating the depth of insights that can be gained from Hawkes
process models.
Having studied univariate models the next model considered was a multidi-
mensional model which aimed to examine the interplay between IED attacks
in Belfast and those in the six counties of NI. It was found that the ad-
ditional complexity did not yield significant improvements over the self-exciting
model in Belfast only. However, it was found that this could be accounted for
by examining the autonomous nature of Active Service Units of the PIRA in
the counties of NI and Belfast. Hence this gives an example of how Hawkes
processes can also be used to uncover simultaneous influences on different com-
ponents of terrorist organisations over a range of spatial scales. Quantitative and
some qualitative evidence also exists confirming these models are capturing some
of the IED dynamics studied.
For the final two models our focus was on determining the effectiveness of
multidimensional Hawkes processes for testing CT strategies. The first of these
models was used to investigate how BSF attacks which lead to the death of
Catholic civilians influenced PIRA attacks. On the other hand the second model
examined the influence of BSF attacks leading to PIRA member deaths. The
former model proved to be a better fit for the IED data both in terms of a
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direct comparison using the AIC and using quantitative and qualitative goodness
of fit tests. Although with small datasets for this investigation some care should
be taken when drawing conclusions from these models. Despite this the param-
eter values for both models were consistent with previous research showing the
retaliatory nature of terrorist groups. This indicates that important lessons can
be learned from Hawkes processes concerning how terrorist groups will respond
to different events.
In conclusion, it is hoped that this paper has shown the adaptability of
Hawkes process models to study a range of areas within CT. For future re-
search it is planned to extend these models further using an explicit spatial
component as opposed to the implicit approach taken here. This should allow
further details concerning the patterning of PIRAs attacks to be uncovered and
also enable more depth to be gained concerning hotspots of terrorism during
the NI conflict. It would also be interesting to take a sociological point of view
on the results found here and in particular examine again the changes that
occurred in the PIRA to align theory with the mathematical phase boundaries
that we have found.
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